




The Dissertation Committee for Max Tomasz Brozynski
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Operations Research Models of Technology Transitions
and the Role of Policy Support
Committee:





Operations Research Models of Technology Transitions




Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
May 2020
Dedicated to my parents.
Acknowledgments
The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without
tremendous support from family, friends, and faculty. Words cannot express
how grateful and happy I am to have them in my life, but I will try nevertheless.
First, I’d like to thank my family, who provided relentless encouragement
and support when I needed it most. My struggle was their struggle, and my
achievement is their achievement.
In German, doctoral advisor is translated as Doktorvater, literally doctor
father, and that is how I describe Dr. Benjamin Leibowicz, whose friendship
I will forever cherish. From the moment we began working together, I knew
quite quickly that I had found a mentor, knowing full well this was rare and I
was lucky. Not only did Dr. Leibowicz teach me how to write and think about
research, but he also supported and encouraged me when the going got tough.
I am extremely proud to be his first Ph.D. graduate.
I’d like to thank all members of the dissertation committee, whose commit-
ment and dedication to this dissertation is appreciated. I am grateful for
Dr. John Hasenbein’s unparalled teaching and passion for mathematics. Dr.
Eric Bickel’s decision analysis course fundamentally changed the way I think
about decision making and his no-nonsense perspective taught me how to think
for myself and never stop asking questions. I admire Dr. Sheila Olmstead’s
inspiring work ethic and passion for research. And finally, I greatly appreciate
Dr. Michael Webber’s committment to this obligation despite being on leave
from the university.
v
I owe a considerable debt of gratitude to Shelby, who was always there
to listen – without response – while I tried to conceptualize some idea or talk
through an error in my work. But above all, from day one, thank you for being
there when it was hardest. Thank you for taking care of me, distracting me,
and encouraging me.
Thank you to Ed, with whom late-night hour-long conversations were
always a welcome respite. And thank you to Nick and Joe, the finest gentlemen
and scholars I have the pleasure of calling friends.
Finally, I gratefully acknowledge funding received through the Thrust 2000
– Jeff Heller Endowed Graduate Fellowship in Engineering, which made this
dissertation possible.
vi
Operations Research Models of Technology Transitions
and the Role of Policy Support
Publication No.
Max Tomasz Brozynski, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020
Supervisor: Benjamin D. Leibowicz
Technology exists to fulfill functions in society, and technological innova-
tions are continuously proposed to fulfill a particular function more effectively
than an incumbent technology. These innovations are disseminated through
society in a process called technology diffusion, and may ultimately replace
an incumbent system in what is known as a technology transition. Due to
the complex and uncertain underlying processes of technology adoption and
diffusion, technical systems are resistant to transition to possibly superior
alternatives. To address market, systemic, and structural failures preventing
a desired technology transition, a policymaker, or other motivated agent,
may strategically intervene to stimulate or accelerate the diffusion process.
The success or failure of such policy intervention carries crucial implications
for climate change mitigation, healthcare advances, and any other aspect of
society that technology touches. However, existing models of optimal tech-
nology policy design omit or otherwise offer crude representations of these
underlying processes and are largely case-specific at the expense of gleaning
generalizable insights. The goal of this dissertation is to advance the operations
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research modeling of technology transitions and the role of policy support.
Through a variety of powerful operations research methodologies and relevant
case studies, the individual projects in this dissertation offer novel models of
technology transitions and insights into real-world technology policy, especially
in the energy and climate domain. The three core chapters of this dissertation
begin with the development of an applied energy system optimization model
to assess a real-world climate policy, then move on to present two novel
theoretical models that yield more general, analytical insights into technology
policy decision making.
Chapter 2 addresses the growing importance of cities in climate change
mitigation with the development of an energy system optimization model for
urban-scale decarbonization. Our optimization model determines the least-
cost power and transportation technology pathways to achieve a policy goal
of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions and is used to analyze the Community
Climate Plan adopted by Austin, Texas. We find that the policy objective can
be achieved at a modest 2.7% increase in net present power and transportation
costs relative to business-as-usual. The optimal decarbonization pathway
proceeds through two distinct stages, first reducing power sector emissions,
then electrifying transportation. Solar PV expands in the long run with or
without the climate plan based on favorable cost projections, but the policy
causes wind to replace natural gas as a complement to solar PV. Our findings
also highlight the substantial value of intelligently scheduled battery storage
operations and electric vehicle charging.
While the energy system optimization model of Chapter 2 captures numerous
decisions for a complex urban energy system, it carries limiting assumptions
about how technology diffusion occurs and the role of a policymaker in supporting
viii
a technology transition. Addressing these larger questions motivates the project
in Chapter 3, which describes the development of two stylized models of
technology policy decision making under uncertainty. The first model is a
Markov reward process (MRP) that represents policy interventions with one-
time, upfront costs, while the second is a Markov decision process (MDP)
that represents interventions with recurring costs. For each model, we derive
analytical expressions for the policymaker’s willingness to pay (WTP) to raise
the probabilities of advancing a technology development or diffusion process at
various stages and compare and contrast the behaviors of the MRP and MDP
models. Most notably, our analytical findings elucidate how the different cost-
accounting schemes and the possibility of regressing from a more advanced
development or diffusion stage back to an earlier one affect the WTP. Then, we
conduct numerical sensitivity analysis to explore how the optimal technology
policy portfolio varies with certain parameters, and present a case study on
lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles to demonstrate the practical applica-
tion of our model to technology policy decision making.
In Chapter 4, we narrow our focus on technology transitions to infrastructure-
dependent technologies common in energy, transportation, and telecommuni-
cations systems. Policymakers seeking to promote the diffusion of infrastructure-
dependent technologies are often confronted with the chicken-and-egg problem:
consumers are reluctant to adopt the technology without adequate infrastruc-
ture available, and firms are reluctant to invest in infrastructure without a
sufficient number of adopters. This chicken-and-egg problem can hinder the
diffusion of new technologies and prolong the timeframe over which existing
technological systems remain locked-in. In this paper, we formulate a stylized
model of technology policy decision making from the perspective of a poli-
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cymaker who seeks to stimulate the market penetration of an infrastructure-
dependent technology. Our model is a bilevel optimization problem in which
a policymaker (leader) maximizes net social benefits by setting the levels of
two incentives: a subsidy for a profit-maximizing firm (follower) to invest in
infrastructure that raises the benefit of adoption to consumers, and a direct
subsidy for consumers to adopt the technology. We analytically derive the
firm’s optimal infrastructure investment response to the upper-level policy
decisions, and show that the bilevel model is equivalent to a quadratic program.
To bypass non-convexity, we develop a custom solution strategy based on
decomposition, and find that it performs better than directly applying an off-
the-shelf solver to the potentially non-convex problem. Finally, we present a
case study on the diffusion of battery electric vehicles and obtain insights into
how a policymaker should allocate resources to charging infrastructure and
vehicle incentives.
The three projects of this dissertation employ operations research methods
to model technology transitions and the role of policy support. While each
captures a variety of phenomena affecting technology transitions and optimal
technology policy decision making, there remain thought-provoking questions
that future research can address. We conclude this dissertation with proposed
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Technology exists to fulfill functions in society, and technological innova-
tions are continuously proposed to fulfill a particular function more effectively
than an incumbent technology. These innovations are communicated through
society in a process called technology diffusion, and may ultimately replace an
incumbent technological system in what is known as a technology transition.
Due to the complex and uncertain underlying processes of technology adoption
and diffusion, technical systems are resistant to transition to possibly superior
alternatives. To address market, systemic, and structural failures preventing
a desired technology transition, a policymaker, or other motivated agent,
may strategically intervene to stimulate or accelerate the diffusion process.
The success or failure of such policy intervention carries crucial implications
for climate change mitigation, healthcare advances, and any other aspect of
society that technology touches. However, existing models of optimal tech-
1
nology policy design omit or otherwise offer crude representations of these
underlying processes and are largely case-specific at the expense of gleaning
generalizable insights. The goal of this dissertation is to advance the operations
research modeling of technology transitions and the role of policy support.
Through a variety of powerful operations research methodologies and relevant
case studies, the individual projects in this dissertation offer novel models of
technology transitions and insights into real-world technology policy, especially
in the energy and climate domain. The three core chapters of this dissertation
begin with the development of an applied energy system optimization model
to assess a real-world climate policy, then move on to present two novel
theoretical models that yield more general, analytical insights into technology
policy decision making.
In this chapter, we begin with a survey of the study of technology tran-
sitions and then explore technology transitions in energy systems, or energy
transitions. Not only are energy transitions highly relevant today, but they also
provide a rich set of examples that aptly demonstrate the underlying processes
of technology adoption and diffusion, the concepts of path-dependence and
lock-in, and the efforts of policymakers to stimulate a technology transition.
Furthermore, the case studies designed to illustrate the models developed in
this dissertation belong to the energy domain. Indeed, Chapter 2 explores
an energy transition in electricity generation and transportation technologies
to meet emissions reduction goals; Chapter 3 explores the development of
lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles; and Chapter 4 explores the diffusion
of electric vehicles and their associated charging point infrastructure. While
the model developed in Chapter 2 is specifically designed to study an energy
transition, we stress that the models in Chapters 3 and 4 are general enough to
2
describe technology transitions in many domains. Finally, as complementary
to the more specific and technical literature reviews in the individual chapters,
we summarize the extant research on technology transitions and the design of
technology policy.
1.2 Definitions
At this point in the chapter, we find it useful to concisely define and
compare the concepts of technology adoption, technology diffusion, and tech-
nology transition, especially since the concepts are certainly related, but never-
theless distinct, and will be used repeatedly throughout the dissertation. Tech-
nology adoption describes the “decisions to make full use of an innovation as
the best course of action available” (Rogers, 1962). Research on technology
adoption usually focuses on questions about what determines the timing of
an adoption decision or whether or not an individual adopts at all. On the
other hand, technology diffusion describes the “process in which an innovation
is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of
a social system” (Rogers, 1962). Therefore, models of technology diffusion
explore aggregate phenomena, possibly over time, that result from adoption
decisions and the economic and social interactions among firms, households,
and policymakers. Widening the lens further, a technology transition is a
“major technological transformation in the way societal functions ... are
fulfilled,” which not only involves technological changes, but also changes in
user practices, regulation, infrastructure, and symbolic meaning (Geels, 2002).
Typically, technology transitions refer to such shifts in large technological
systems (Hughes, 2012). In short, technology transitions occur when one socio-
technical system is replaced by another. We use the term-of-art socio-technical
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since the system comprises not only the technologies’ characteristics, but also
both physical and non-physical artifacts fundamental to the system.
Figure 1.1. From Geels (2005), “Sociotechnical system for modern car-based
transportation.”
For example, the socio-technical system of road transportation is illus-
trated in Figure 1.1. The potential reconfiguration of technology, user prac-
tices, laws and regulations, and infrastructure necessary to accommodate sustain-
able transportation technologies such as electric or fuel-cell vehicles is a canon-
ical example of a technology transition: away from the current petroleum-
based socio-technical system of transportation towards something cleaner and
more sustainable. Clearly, this transition would not be straightforward, and
in examining Figure 1.1, we can hypothesize several barriers to transition for
alternative fuel vehicles, namely high cost (relative to internal combustion
engine vehicles), mismatch with consumer preferences (e.g., range anxiety and
cultural meaning), and the chicken-and-egg problem (does fuel infrastructure
or vehicle adoption come first?) (van Bree et al., 2010). In the chicken-
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and-egg problem, consumers are reluctant to adopt the technology without
adequate infrastructure available, and firms are reluctant to invest in infras-
tructure without a sufficient number of adopters. In fact, in Chapter 4, we
develop a bilevel optimization model that determines how a policymaker can
overcome the chicken-and-egg problem. While the conceptual boundaries of
technology adoption, diffusion, and transition are frequently blurred, the study
of technology transitions more precisely deals with the competition between
and replacement or evolution of technological systems.
1.3 A brief history of technology transitions research
In most surveys of the history of technological innovation research, Joseph
Schumpeter, an Austrian-school political economist, doubtless begins the discus-
sion (Stoneman, 2002). Indeed, Schumpeter first contemplated the role of
technological progress in affecting economic growth and initiated the economic
research tradition of studying the relationship between market structure and
firms’ innovative activity and performance (Cohen, 2015). He theorized that
innovations are combinations developed within an economy and built on the
existing stock of knowledge, leading to creative destruction in which markets
reorient and redesign themselves during the relentless process of disruptive
innovation (Schumpeter, 1939). Similarly, Solow (1957) indicated that tech-
nological innovation, having been largely ignored in economic research, was
as important to economic growth as were capital and labor. However, it
was not until mid-century, long before the term technology transition existed,
that quantitative studies of technology diffusion began. In fact, it was the
pioneering work of sociologists and anthropologists that kick-started the empir-
ical research on technology adoption and diffusion. For example, Ryan and
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Gross (1943)’s study of the diffusion of hybrid seed corn among farmers in
Iowa and Coleman et al. (1957)’s study of the diffusion of a new drug among
prescribing physicians remain canonical examples of diffusion research. While
limited to the statistical analysis of survey data, these seminal works helped
inspire technology diffusion concepts and terms such as logistic S-curves, inno-
vator adopters, increasing returns, positive reinforcement, and network effects
that remain in use today. Rogers (1962)’s Diffusion of Innovations summa-
rized the research typologies and distilled from numerous studies common
adoption and diffusion phenomena. For example, empirical findings frequently
indicated that cumulative adoption against time follows an S-shaped curve,
adopters are heterogeneous with respect to their degree of innovativeness and
so can be categorized, and social networks play a crucial role in adoption
decisions. Further, chance events, bad luck, and miscommunications have all
been observed in adoption and diffusion processes.
Beyond these early empirical studies, two broad research streams have
emerged to understand technology transitions. These research efforts are not
merely the statistical manipulation and collection of data, but an attempt
to model the reality. The first stream is a quantitative operations research
and economics tradition that seeks to construct stylized, theoretical models
of technology adoption and diffusion. In fact, a relatively modern approach
to economics in general, called complexity economics, folds these theoretical
results into a larger non-equilibrium perspective, which purports that the
economy drives and emerges from the development of technology in an inces-
sant feedback loop (Arthur, 2014). We consider this stream of research impor-
tant because, first, it marks a departure from exclusively empirical studies.
Second, observed phenomena receive rigorous mathematical treatment, and
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so their interactions generate theoretical insights. And third, it incorporates
decision making. The second stream, from the sociology of technology tradi-
tion, develops qualitative frameworks for understanding technology transitions
and evolution in large technical systems. This work was motivated in part by
the recent and relevant focus on how sustainable energy transitions can occur,
but nevertheless remains independent of any particular application or domain.
Not only do we believe these two research streams to be complementary, but
we also believe it crucial that future work meld these ideas and perspectives.
Indeed, future research ought to apply the ideas of the latter to advance the
former, thereby uniting the two research traditions. To that end, in Chapter
5, we examine how future research trajectories could accomplish this goal and
which research questions remain largely unanswered.
As an early example of diffusion models in the operations research liter-
ature, the Bass Model (Bass, 1969) represented the diffusion process of a
technology for which the rate of adoption among agents who have not yet
adopted is a linear function of the number of previous adopters.1 Its formula-
tion reflects the distinction between innovator adopters who are self-motivated
to choose a new technology, and imitator adopters who are encouraged to
adopt by their observations of others who have already done so. The model
was therefore an initial step in encoding the empirically-observed phenomena
of social networks and information gathering at a theoretical level. Bass
showed that his model fit the observed diffusion processes of many consumer
1Technically, Frank Bass’s work fell under a marketing or management science umbrella.
Indeed, much of the earlier research on technology adoption was motivated by business
questions. For example, Coleman et al. (1957)’s study was funded by a large pharmaceutical
company which sought to understand whether or not its drug advertisements in medical
journals were effective.
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durables, and a number of extensions to the Bass Model have since been
proposed (Jiang and Jain, 2012; Niu, 2006; Norton and Bass, 1987). While
Bass (1969) describes the aggregate behavior of his model as being driven by
probabilistic adoption decisions at the individual level, his model is ultimately
a deterministic one. The formal analysis of technological change as a stochastic
process was really initiated by W. Brian Arthur, whose widely cited top-down
models feature uncertainty in the technology transition pathway, such as how
market shares will evolve. Incorporating uncertainty into diffusion processes
marked a major step forward in the research. While uncertainty cannot be
directly and completely observed in diffusion processes (i.e., we can only see
what happened, not what could have happened), it provided an explana-
tion for why some technologies diffused and others did not. For example,
David (1985)’s famous case study of the QWERTY keyboard demonstrated
how society can become locked-in to inferior technological regimes due to
chance events that get amplified by increasing returns. Increasing returns,
or positive feedback mechanisms, describe the phenomenon wherein benefits
of the technology increase in the number of previous adopters.2 For example,
computer operating systems reveal increasing returns in that if one system
gets ahead, i.e., establishes considerable market share, it will be adopted by
more hardware manufacturers and will attract more compatible software, in
turn increasing its market share, and so on. Increasing returns, therefore, is
a catch-all phenomenon due to, among others, network effects, learning-by-
using, learning-by-doing, and associated infrastructure investment feedback
2Increasing returns need not be an exclusively economic idea. From Matthew 25:29, “For
to every one who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who
has not, even what he has will be taken away.” Finding an example of increasing returns in
every aspect of life will come quite easily to the reader.
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loops. Arthur’s work theoretically demonstrated the consequences for trying to
predict technological outcomes or ensure economic efficiency under increasing
returns in a stochastic diffusion process in a way that complemented existing
case studies. Arthur et al. (1987) modeled technological competition as a
nonlinear (stochastic) Polya process, whereby the probability of adoption is
an arbitrary function of the number of previous adopters.3 The authors prove
that the market shares in a nonlinear Polya process will eventually converge
to a stable fixed point of the urn function, as is the case in the standard
Polya model. Arthur (1989) modeled the diffusion process of a technology
by a sequence of adoption decisions made by two types of agents. This
research showed that under increasing returns, technological outcomes cannot
be predicted ex-ante and an economically efficient market outcome cannot be
guaranteed. The evolution of the market is non-ergodic in that small chance
events tip the allocation toward one dominated by a single technology, instead
of being averaged away. We call this path-dependence. Furthermore, there is
a risk of becoming locked-in to a technology pathway with inferior long-run
benefits if there is an early streak of agents who prefer an initially appealing but
slow-to-improve technology. Most importantly, the consequences of increasing
returns both motivate technology policy and indicate how important it is to
design intelligent technology policy.
The concepts of path-dependence and technological lock-in have inspired
numerous case studies, whose insights researchers have distilled into broader,
qualitative frameworks for understanding technology transitions. Further-
more, the recent focus on sustainable energy transitions to mitigate climate
3In the standard Polya process, an urn contains some number of white and black balls.
In each step of the process, a ball is removed and placed back in the urn with an outside
ball of the same color.
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change has led researchers to leverage case studies and qualitative frameworks
to gather insights on designing technology policies to stimulate and accelerate
these transitions. A number of collaborative Dutch researchers have developed
the multi-level perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2002, 2005; Kemp, 1994; Kemp
et al., 2001), which offers a typology by which technology transitions tend to
occur. It distinguishes three interacting levels: niches, socio-technical regimes,
and an exogenous socio-technical landscape. The socio-technical regime is
characterized by path-dependence and stability, which are represented in three
constituent parts: the socio-technical system, actors, and rules. Systemic
developments in the socio-technical landscape are beyond the influence of the
regime and are slow to change. When the existing socio-technical regime is
replaced by another, a technology transition occurs. Radical innovations, i.e.,
innovations which are incompatible with the existing socio-technical regime,
incubate in niches. In these niches, innovations enjoy protection from market
selection and allow the opportunity for the innovation to deviate from the
“rules” of the regime, experiment, and learn. Simultaneous pressure on the
regime at the landscape level helps induce a technology transition. The three
levels and their interactions are illustrated in Figure 1.2. For example, Geels
(2002) explains how early steamships, while inferior to sailing ships, were
adopted by the British Empire’s subsidized mail service, which provided oppor-
tunities for technological development they would not have otherwise enjoyed.
In the following section, we discuss the most popular technology transition to
research – the energy transition. The historical record of energy transitions
demonstrates the ideas of path-dependence and lock-in and the difficulty of
designing technology policy.
10
Figure 1.2. From Geels (2002), “A dynamic multi-level perspective on system
innovations.”
1.4 Energy transitions
The genesis of and motivation for this dissertation began with research
questions arising out of a model of an urban-scale energy system developed in
Chapter 2. To briefly introduce what an energy system is opens a proverbial
can of worms. It can be difficult to draw the boundaries of this system,
since it could be argued that all human activity is driven by the conversion
of energy. However, when we talk about the energy system, especially in
the context of energy transitions, we typically refer to the technologies and
processes used to supply energy resources (e.g., oil, natural gas), convert energy
from one form into another (e.g., electricity generation), and satisfy final
demands for energy, goods, and services (e.g., space heating, transportation,
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food). More broadly, the energy system includes decision making agents such
as policymakers, consumers, and firms, as well as institutions, behaviors,
and norms. It is our largest and most complex socio-technical system; in
fact, it is a system of socio-technical systems. In this section, we briefly
discuss the motivations for studying energy transitions and provide a few
examples that demonstrate the opportunity for advanced modeling approaches
and techniques.
While the availability of cheap and reliable energy appears to be a funda-
mental driver of economic prosperity (Fouquet, 2016b), fossil fuels globally
comprise about 80-85% of global primary energy sources (IEA, 2020; Smil,
2016), the combustion of which is responsible for about 78% of the increase in
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2014). Researching historical
energy transitions has become an avenue through which we might design
climate policy to accelerate transitions to more sustainable energy systems
(Fouquet, 2016a; Grubler, 2012; Grubler and Wilson, 2013; Smil, 2016). Funda-
mentally, researchers have generally agreed that while specific energy tech-
nology transitions at a national scale have occurred in just a few years, energy
transitions remain slow at the global level. It has been suggested that these
protracted transitions are due to carbon lock-in (Fouquet, 2016b; Seto et al.,
2016; Unruh, 2000), wherein, through increasing returns effects such as scale
economies, learning economies, adaptive expectations, and network economies,
fossil fuel energy technologies are deeply entrenched in our energy systems and
remain resistant to change. Seto et al. (2016) identify three main types of
carbon lock-in: 1) infrastructural and technological, 2) institutional, and 3)
behavioral. Ultimately, understanding these lock-in barriers is key to designing
policy that effectively unlocks the system. To illustrate this, take, for example,
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battery electric vehicles, which promise to be an effective decarbonization
technology for land-based transportation. First, on the one hand, petroleum-
based vehicles currently enjoy substantial infrastructure, characterized by high
sunk capital costs (highways, gas stations, etc.), remain cheaper than elec-
tric vehicles, and negative externalities of vehicle emissions are not priced;
on the other hand, a substantial, capital-intensive charging infrastructure is
needed to support diffusion of electric vehicles. And second, social norms and
biased psychological decision making processes would need to be overturned
for rapid adoption of electric vehicles. By no means a comprehensive list, these
numerous lock-in effects imply designing policy to stimulate a transition can
be daunting. Indeed, which barrier to transition should be targeted and by
what means should it be targeted?
The difficulty of designing technology policies is borne out by the erratic
historical record. Some past government campaigns to promote technology
transitions have been lauded as tremendous successes, such as the swift adop-
tion of hybrid seed corn driven by agricultural extension agencies in the U.S.
(Griliches, 1957), or the creation of a leading wind turbine industry in Denmark
(Klaassen et al., 2005). On the other hand, there have been a number of very
expensive failures, including the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation established
to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels during the oil crisis (Anadon
and Nemet, 2014), or the French effort to deploy fast breeder nuclear reactors
(Grubler, 2012). In recent history, Germany’s Energiewende, a federal plan
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% of 1990 levels and achieve 60%
renewable electricity generation by 2050, while phasing-out nuclear power has
stumbled (Morris and Jungjohann, 2016). Indeed, between 2000 and 2015
low-quality lignite coal consumption increased and natural gas (comparatively
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much cleaner) consumption fell, largely to offset low capacity factors of solar
and wind electricity generation (11% and 17%, respectively) (IEA, 2020; Smil,
2016). While emissions did in fact fall 12%, this is likely because the overall
primary energy use decreased; indeed, neighboring countries without such an
Energiewende saw 18% reductions in emissions (Smil, 2016).
In the transportation domain, technology policy has been equally erratic.
For example, in 2012, Denmark provided approximately $33,000 in total elec-
tric vehicle subsidies per vehicle, but electric vehicles made up less than 0.5%
of market share (Sierzchula et al., 2014). In Norway, however, electric vehicles
enjoyed about 3% market share with only $15,000 in subsidies. Clearly, finan-
cial incentives are not necessarily sufficient to induce widespread adoption, and
other factors could be equally or even more important drivers. These energy
transition examples serve to illustrate the complexity of designing optimal
technology policy. Indeed, while the qualitative frameworks for understanding
technology transitions and historical case studies are helpful in painting a fuller
picture, modeling approaches consistently fail to capture key phenomena or
offer practical decision support.
In Chapter 2 we apply an urban-scale energy system optimization model
to identify the least-cost energy transition that meets exogenous emissions
targets. This energy transition is essentially a temporal series of operational
and investment decision for electricity generation and transportation technolo-
gies. While the work generates patterns and insights, indicating where a poli-
cymaker ought to focus decarbonization efforts, methodological assumptions
and limitations mean that certain aspects of technology adoption and diffusion
are not captured. For example, once a technology becomes cost-effective in
the model, it is adopted. These limitations have inspired a closer, theoretical
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perspective of technology transitions that the remaining chapters address.
1.5 The role of policy support
Many governments aim to promote the development and diffusion of new
technologies such as renewable energy sources, medical treatments, agricul-
tural innovations, and alternative fuel vehicles. Economic theory generally
suggests that government intervention is justified in cases of market failure,
including externalities and informational asymmetry. In the more specific
context of policy support for new technologies, Salmenkaita and Salo (2002)
summarize four key policy rationales: market failure (under-investment in
research and development (R&D) because firms are unable to capture all the
benefits of innovation, so private benefits are smaller than social benefits),
systemic failure (coordination problems among R&D players with different
incentives), structural inertia (path-dependence and feedbacks hamper the
pursuit of new technologies), and anticipatory myopia (information about
future opportunities is expensive to acquire, leading to under-investment).
Technology policy is also viewed as a means of addressing negative externalities
that often go unpriced in the market, such as greenhouse gas emissions that
cause climate change (Nemet and Kammen, 2007).
Technology policy, to provide a definition, is the both financial and non-
financial exercise of a policymaker to affect technological change, and it comes
in many forms. Instruments that directly target technologies include public
R&D funding and adoption subsidies to stimulate supply and demand side
innovation, respectively. More general policies like carbon taxes, cap-and-
trade, and renewable portfolio standards do not target a specific technology,
but rather can lead to induced innovation by mandating or raising the incen-
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tives for innovation in a sector of the economy. For example, in Chapter 2 we
specifically consider a quantity constraint on GHG emissions which induces a
change in the power generation mix and vehicle fleet; and in Chapter 4, we
consider a combination of infrastructure investment and adoption subsidies to
directly stimulate adoption of electric vehicles.
To address these failures preventing a desired technology transition, a
policymaker, or other motivated agent, may strategically intervene in the
diffusion process. The success or failure of such policy intervention carries
crucial implications for climate change mitigation, healthcare advances, and
any other aspect of society that technology touches. However, the extant
research on designing optimal technology policy is insufficient. While empir-
ical case studies and qualitative conceptualizations have advanced our under-
standing of technology transitions, they have limited relevance as guides for
making technology policy decisions. They rely on an inductive logic that
attempts to establish qualitative, policy-relevant insights through the synthesis
of case studies of specific experiences across myriad application domains and
contexts. Indeed, poorly designed technology policy, intending to correct a
market or systemic failure, may instead create a government failure, in which
case the intervention actually causes further economic inefficiency (Stiglitz,
2009). The literature largely lacks a quantitative, theoretical modeling frame-
work capable of yielding generalizable guidance for technology policy decisions.
This dissertation addresses this research gap.
1.6 Modeling approaches for designing technology policy
In this section, we provide a brief overview of operations research modeling
approaches for designing technology policy that is intended to complement the
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more technical presentation in the individual chapters. Our survey proceeds
through the methodologies as they are presented in the core chapters of the
dissertation.
First, however, it is worthwhile to remark on the application of operations
research models for technology transitions. As we have described above,
technology transitions involve heterogeneous decision makers with different
objectives; complex technological, economic, and social interactions among
these decision makers; and fundamental uncertainty. Operations researchers
have available to them a suite of methodologies that alone, or in combination,
serve as powerful modeling tools. For example, in Chapter 2 we develop a large-
scale linear program involving thousands of decision variables. In Chapter 3 we
employ Markov decision and reward processes to model the uncertain develop-
ment or diffusion of a technology that incorporates technology policy decision
making. And in Chapter 4, we explore how a policymaker can overcome the
chicken-and-egg problem by formulating a bilevel optimization (or sequential
game) model.
1.6.1 Energy system optimization models
As discussed above, the urgent need to address climate change and curb
anthropogenic emissions has spurred recent work in developing theories of
technology transitions. To address climate change and identify reasonable
mitigation strategies, a thorough understanding of energy systems is necessary.
To that end, energy systems models exist to generate a range of insights and
analyses on the supply and demand of energy and have enjoyed much research
attention in the last half-century. Pfenninger et al. (2014) distinguish four
energy system modeling paradigms: 1) energy system optimization models,
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2) energy system simulation models, 3) power systems and electricity market
models, and 4) qualitative and mixed-method scenarios. In this section, we
focus on energy system optimization models. The sheer complexity of energy
systems is well suited to modeling by large-scale operations research modeling
paradigms, including linear, mixed-integer, and stochastic programs, especially
with growing computing power and intense data collection and forecasting.
Usually applied on the national or global scale, these models contain detailed,
bottom-up representations of the technological components that constitute an
energy system. They are used to explore how energy systems are likely to
evolve – or should ideally evolve – over some specified timeframe, depending
on techno-economic assumptions and policy settings.
An evolution of the energy system is known as a transformation pathway,
defined by the collection of all technology investments and operational deci-
sions. Should the transformation pathway represent a fundamental shift in
the energy system, we would refer to this as an energy transition. Energy
system optimization models are typically constructed to identify the least-cost
transformation pathway that satisfies all energy demands as well as a host
of other constraints. By introducing additional parameters or constraints,
energy system optimization models can be used to analyze a range of energy
and climate policies. Specific questions that they intend to answer include: 1)
Is it possible to achieve an emissions target given available technologies and
constraints on their deployment? 2) What is the economic cost of achieving a
climate policy goal? 3) What technological transformation pathway allows a
policy goal to be accomplished most cost-effectively? Well-known optimization
frameworks include the MARKAL/TIMES family (Loulou et al., 2004; Loulou
and Labriet, 2007; Loulou, 2007), MESSAGE (Messner and Strubegger, 1995;
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Messner and Schrattenholzer, 2000), and OSeMOSYS (Howells et al., 2011).
Chapter 2 addresses the growing importance of cities in climate change
mitigation with the development of an energy system optimization model for
urban-scale decarbonization. Our optimization model determines the least-
cost power and transportation technology pathways to achieve a policy goal
of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions and is used to analyze the Community
Climate Plan adopted by Austin, Texas. Our approach to energy system
optimization is novel in that we are able to capture the synergies between power
and transportation. The power and transportation sectors are the two largest
GHG emitters in the U.S., accounting for 28% and 29% of total emissions,
respectively (EPA, 2017b), and evidence suggests that these shares are even
higher in urban areas. Any serious effort to decarbonize cities will therefore
require monumental changes in how we generate electricity and travel from
place to place. At present, transportation and power are largely decoupled,
at least in the U.S. Petroleum products dominate the fuel mix of the former,
but have been almost completely phased out of the latter. This situation is
likely to change in the future as transportation shifts to alternative fuels that
are more closely linked to the power sector, especially under climate policies
(Anandarajah et al., 2013; Bosetti and Longden, 2013; Edelenbosch et al.,
2017; Pietzcker et al., 2014). Amid this trend, powerful synergies will emerge
whereby mitigation activities in power and transportation mutually enhance
one another. We design our model to leverage these synergies while optimizing
decarbonization pathways.
One such synergy arises with the use of electricity as a transportation fuel.
Powering transportation with electricty causes larger marginal GHG emissions
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reductions as the power sector decarbonizes upstream.4 This is one reason
why most energy-economy models choose to decarbonize electricity generation
before investing significantly to convert transportation fleets to electric vehicles
(Löffler et al., 2017; Pietzcker et al., 2014). Electrification of transportation
would increase overall demand levels in the power sector, necessitating greater
capacity utilization and/or additional capacity investments. Hydrogen fuel cell
vehicles can also provide carbon-free transportation if hydrogen is produced
via electrolysis using renewable electricity (Anandarajah et al., 2013). So, the
hydrogen route to sustainable mobility is also enhanced by decarbonizing the
power sector.
In the reverse direction, uptake of alternative fuel vehicles facilitates the
integration of intermittent renewables into the power sector and provides valu-
able services to the electric grid. Electric vehicle charging can be managed as
a flexible load to absorb renewable electricity during periods of excess supply.
Choi et al. (2013) demonstrate that intelligently scheduling electric vehicle
charging reduces the cost of complying with a renewable electricity standard
in the power sector. Hydrogen production via electrolysis can similarly be
considered a flexible load, occurring when renewable energy is abundant to
provide fuel for hydrogen-based vehicles. In a vehicle-to-grid (V2G) system,
electric vehicle batteries are capable of supplying power to the grid at times of
peak demand or low renewable resource availability. With widespread adoption
of electric vehicles, V2G could encourage further deployment of renewable
technologies and reduce investments in peaking power plants or stand-alone
4Norway has historically dominated electric vehicle per-capita adoption, and its
electricity generation mix is nearly 100% hydroelectric. On the other hand, while China
leads absolute electric vehicle adoption, nearly half of its electricity is generated by coal
plants.
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energy storage technologies (Nunes et al., 2015).
While the energy system optimization model of Chapter 2 captures numerous
decisions for a complex urban energy system, it carries limiting assumptions
about how technology diffusion occurs and the role of a policymaker in supporting
a technology transition. Beyond well known shortcomings of this model, such
as uncertain exogenous parameter assumptions, perfect foresight, and simpli-
fied temporal resolution, this model has limited power in informing optimal
technology policy. First, it is unreasonable that a central planner makes
all capacity investment and operating decisions for both power and trans-
portation. Second, our optimization model essentially applies an exogenous
constraint that mimics the goal of the policymaker, not the means by which she
can actually achieve this policy goal. Third, our model is energy-specific and
numerical: we can only cautiously apply our insights to general energy policy
and the results we do obtain are highly dependent on the parameterization.
And fourth, our optimization framework does not capture other drivers of
adoption besides cost considerations, that arise from complex phenomena
that exist in technology transitions. Indeed, while an energy system opti-
mization model assumes that a technology transition will occur as long as a
new technology becomes cost-effective, we know from empirical observations
that there are a number of market failures that can hinder the diffusion
of a technology even after it becomes economically competitive. The other
modeling approaches, and the models in Chapters 3 and 4 try to obtain insights
on these issues and policy remedies for them.
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1.6.2 Stochastic models of technology adoption and diffusion
The four phenomena discussed above led to the thought that classic Markov
stochastic processes were strong candidates for modeling a technology transi-
tion, with states representing stages of the diffusion process and a transition
probability matrix engendering the uncertainty in success of the technology
transition. Furthermore, decision making capabilities within the stochastic
process could simulate policy intervention: policy intervention could map to
a different transition probability matrix. The highly complex and uncertain
nature of technological change implies that designing effective policy inter-
ventions is very challenging. Although pioneering works modeled technology
transitions as stochastic processes, they did not incorporate technology policy
decision making. In Chapter 3, we address this gap in the literature, designing
a theoretical modeling framework for technology transitions featuring optimal
technology policy decision making.
Modeling technology adoption and diffusion via stochastic processes is
not entirely new. In the literature, we can distinguish between top-down
and bottom-up stochastic models. Top-down models of technological change,
like those of W. Brian Arthur, represent technology dynamics using aggre-
gate measures like market shares of competing alternatives as the endogenous
variables. Our framework goes beyond these earlier treatments by explic-
itly incorporating technology policy decision making under uncertainty. This
allows us to obtain decision rules about optimal policy intervention rather
than merely establish the properties of a stochastic diffusion process. On the
other hand, bottom-up models focus on decision making under uncertainty, but
the decisions being analyzed are the strategic adoption choices of individual
agents in the market rather than a technology policy decision. Typically,
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these model the adoption and timing decisions of an individual with a choice
between two competing technologies whose benefits are uncertain (Kornish,
2006; McCardle, 1985; Smith and Ulu, 2017; Ulu and Smith, 2009). While
these models are well-established in the literature, they do not directly inform
technology policy decision making. Adopters and policymakers face different
decisions and usually have different objectives.
1.6.3 Game-theoretic models of infrastructure-dependent technology
diffusion
In Chapter 4, we narrow our focus on technology transitions to infrastructure-
dependent technologies common in energy, transportation, and telecommuni-
cations systems. Policymakers seeking to promote the diffusion of infrastructure-
dependent technologies are often confronted with the chicken-and-egg problem:
consumers are reluctant to adopt the technology without adequate infrastruc-
ture available, and firms are reluctant to invest in infrastructure without a
sufficient number of adopters. This chicken-and-egg coordination problem can
hinder the diffusion of new technologies and prolong the time-frame over which
existing technological systems remain locked-in.
Policymakers often attempt to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem (as
well as other market failures) by subsidizing both infrastructure investment
and consumer purchases of the new technology. Unfortunately, the existing
literature provides little guidance and few decision support tools for policy-
makers to determine how to optimally allocate public resources toward incen-
tives for infrastructure investment versus consumer purchases. For example,
the U.S. federal government has spent billions of dollars on tax incentives to
promote the diffusion of alternative fuel vehicles and their associated refueling
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and charging stations. From 2009–2013, it spent 16 times as much on vehicle
purchase subsidies as it did on infrastructure investment subsidies (Leibowicz,
2018a). It is difficult to assess whether that was the most beneficial use of
public funds for innovation diffusion, and the existing literature offers few
insights on this important public sector problem. While some previous studies
have analyzed the chicken-and-egg problem and its policy implications, they
tend to be either empirical studies focusing on a particular historical case
study, or structural models that are constructed to examine a specific tech-
nology and omit key decision variables and interactions.
Sequential game modeling is well suited for this case, in which the poli-
cymaker subsidizes both infrastructure investment and consumer purchases of
the new technology. Indeed, in reality, subsidy and adoption decisions are
not simultaneous: first a policymaker sets the subsidy levels, then individ-
uals and firms, having observed the policymaker’s decisions, make their own.
Furthermore, by the very nature of the chicken-and-egg problem, capturing
the strategic interactions between potential adopters and the infrastructure
investor is key. A number of sequential game-theoretic models in one way or
another model this interaction. For example, Yu et al. (2018) use a game-
theoretic framework to model the strategic interactions among three players
– a policymaker, manufacturers, and consumers – where the policymaker
determines both manufacturer and consumer subsidies to maximize consumer
welfare subject to a policy budget constraint. However, their model does not
incorporate the infrastructure supply for the product.
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1.7 Overview
The goal of this dissertation is to advance the operations research modeling
of technology transitions and the role of policy support. Through a variety of
powerful operations research methodologies and relevant case studies, the indi-
vidual projects in this dissertation offer novel models of technology transitions
and insights into real-world technology policy.
The three projects of this dissertation employ operations research methods
to model technology transitions and the role of policy support. The disser-
tation begins with Chapter 2, describing the development of an urban-scale
energy system optimization model. This work prompted a number of research
questions concerning technology transitions that motivated the more funda-
mental, stylized models developed in Chapter 3. Finally, the scope of this
dissertation narrows with the development of a stylized model of optimal
technology policy decision making for infrastructure-dependent technologies.
In fact, the case studies illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4 concern the develop-
ment and diffusion, respectively, of electric vehicles. This is not coincidental:
designing intelligent technology policy to accelerate energy technology transi-
tions is highly relevant today in response to climate change.
While each chapter captures a variety of phenomena affecting technology
transitions and optimal technology policy decision making, there remain thought-
provoking questions that future research can address. We conclude this disser-
tation with proposed research directions and contemplate the high-level, real-
world implications of this work.
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Chapter 2
Decarbonizing power and transportation at
the urban scale: An analysis of the Austin,
Texas Community Climate Plan
2.1 Introduction
Cities are assuming a prominent role in climate change mitigation efforts.
The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group committed to limiting global warming
to 1.5◦C has expanded its membership to 92 cities that encompass 25% of
global GDP and 8% of global carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions
(C40 Cities, 2018a; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2018). Municipal
governments from New York City (The City of New York, 2017) to London
(Greater London Authority, 2016) to Tokyo (Tokyo Metropolitan Government,
2007) are implementing detailed climate action plans to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. Given the concerns and uncertainties surrounding the future
of the Paris Agreement (Rogelj et al., 2016; Tollefson, 2017), the emergence of
cities as mitigation agents is an encouraging trend.
Despite the growing importance of cities in climate change mitigation,
there remains a dearth of rigorous analysis to inform climate policy and miti-
gation strategy development at the city level (Rosenzweig et al., 2010). This
Benjamin Leibowicz contributed to the conceptualization of the topic and provided
the base GAMS code, which was then extended here. A version of this chapter has been
published in Sustainable Cities and Society (Brozynski and Leibowicz, 2018)
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chapter addresses this gap in the literature. We formulate an energy system
optimization model in the Open Source Energy Modeling System (OSeMOSYS)
framework (Howells et al., 2011) to identify cost-effective, urban-scale decar-
bonization pathways. It focuses on power and transportation, and captures
key synergies between mitigation strategies in the two sectors. For our case
study, we apply the model to evaluate the Community Climate Plan adopted
by Austin, Texas in 2015. Austin is a valuable testbed for analysis because
it is a member of the C40 network, has a rapidly growing population, and its
Community Climate Plan established a particularly ambitious goal of net-zero
GHG emissions by 2050.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The literature review
in Section 2.2 covers city climate plans, energy system models, and synergies
between power and transportation. Section 2.3 describes our methodology
including the model and data sources. We present and discuss results in
Section 2.4. Lastly, Section 2.5 concludes the chapter with a summary of
its most salient findings, acknowledgment of limitations, and directions for
future work.
2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 Climate policy approaches
Climate change mitigation can be viewed as a collective action problem
in which individual actors make independent decisions whose outcomes jointly
affect everyone (Ostrom, 2010). Climate change mitigation is a global public
good; the costs are borne locally, but the benefits are distributed globally. The
conventional approach to climate policy thus holds that, without an appro-
priate policy framework at the global scale, individual actors have insufficient
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incentives to curb their own emissions. The desire to establish monocentric
(i.e., global) policy solutions is exemplified by international accords such as
the Kyoto Protocol (Nordhaus and Boyer, 1999) and recent Paris Agreement
(Schleussner et al., 2016). Progress on this scale has been slow, and the road
ahead is precarious. Analysts warn that the Paris Agreement is too weak to
avert dangerous climate change (Rogelj et al., 2016), and even its future is in
doubt after President Trump announced his intention to withdraw the U.S.
from the pact (Tollefson, 2017).
Ostrom (2010) argues in favor of an alternative, polycentric approach
to climate change mitigation. Polycentric efforts involve mitigation activi-
ties undertaken by many actors at diverse scales (e.g., household, municipal,
regional, national, global), as all of these actors contribute to and stand to
suffer from the effects of climate change. A polycentric approach gives commu-
nities freedom to define mitigation strategies that best suit local conditions,
encourage broad participation, and generate desired co-benefits (e.g., improve
air quality, enhance energy access, increase employment). The cumulative
effect of polycentric efforts can be significant at the global scale.
2.2.2 City climate plans
In line with the polycentric approach, many cities around the world have
enacted plans to curb GHG emissions at the urban scale. Notable examples
include the London Plan (Chapter 5) to reduce emissions to 60% below 1990
levels by 2025 (Greater London Authority, 2016), New York City’s commit-
ment to limit global warming to 1.5◦C in alignment with the Paris Agreement
(The City of New York, 2017), and the Austin Community Climate Plan to
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achieve net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 (City of Austin, 2015). The Austin
plan is particularly ambitious, and serves as our case study application for the
model we develop.
Creating an effective city climate plan requires a detailed understanding of
the urban energy system, including an accurate inventory of GHG emissions.
Without a reliable inventory, it is difficult for city planners to identify where
efforts should be directed (Grubler et al., 2012). Ramaswami et al. (2011)
outline several methods of accounting for urban GHG emissions. A “purely
geographic production-based” scheme is likely misleading for cities with large
electricity imports and commuting across municipal boundaries. Furthermore,
how a city’s boundaries are defined may lead to dramatically different GHG
emissions inventories. A more appropriate accounting scheme for cities might
be a “geographic-plus infrastructure supply chain” method that accounts for
emissions which occur upstream in key trans-boundary infrastructures that
serve the city (e.g., electric grid, road transportation network). A third
alternative is “pure consumption-based” accounting that attributes the full
GHG footprints of all goods and services consumed by local households and
firms to the city inventory. For reference, total consumption-based emissions
of 79 C40 cities are 60% greater than production-based emissions, indicating
that cities affect emissions far beyond their physical boundaries (C40 Cities,
2018b). Whether a production-based or consumption-based accounting scheme
is preferable when considering a city’s response to climate change is not imme-
See Stone et al. (2012) for a review of climate plans from the 50 most populous
municipalities in the U.S.
For example, C40 membership applies only to the jurisdictional boundary of the
participating city authority. As an extreme contrast, Melbourne’s jurisdiction is only the
central business district, with an area of 6.2 km2, whereas London’s jurisdiction encompasses
all of Greater London, with an area of 1579 km2.
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diately clear. On the one hand, production-based accounting aligns with
GHG emissions sources over which the city has the most direct influence.
On the other hand, consumption-based accounting incentivizes planners to
foster more sustainable consumption patterns and urban lifestyles. Hillman
and Ramaswami (2010) present GHG inventories for eight major U.S. cities,
including Austin.
2.2.3 Austin Community Climate Plan
Austin is a rapidly growing city with approximately 948,000 inhabitants
in 2016, a sharp increase from 790,000 in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016).
The City of Austin is at the center of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
that is home to roughly 2,056,000 people and growing at more than four
times the rate of the U.S. population as a whole. The MSA is projected to
have a population over 5 million by 2050 (Austin Chamber of Commerce,
2018). Despite its demonstrated commitment to sustainability (described
below), Austin has relatively high per-capita GHG emissions compared to
other U.S. cities (Glaeser and Kahn, 2010). Contributing factors include: a
humid subtropical climate that induces strong air conditioning demand; a
sizable (but rapidly declining) coal share of electricity generation; a dispersed
settlement pattern dominated by single-family, detached houses; and a trans-
portation sector heavily dependent on private automobile use. For addressing
emissions, the Austin municipal government has the unique advantage of
controlling its electric utility, Austin Energy. In fact, it is the eighth largest
publicly owned electric utility in the U.S. (Austin Energy, 2018).
Austin has a strong tradition of promoting sustainability and combatting
climate change. In 2007, the Austin City Council passed a resolution to “make
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Austin the leading city in the nation in the effort to reduce the negative impacts
of global warming” (City of Austin, 2007). Since then, the City Council has
adopted targets to reduce emissions and transition to renewable energy. In
2010, the City Council approved the Austin Energy Resource, Generation,
and Climate Protection Plan to 2020 (Austin Energy, 2010), with a goal of
meeting 35% of all energy needs with renewable resources by 2020. This
renewable share is to feature at least 200 MW of solar power, of which 50% is
local solar and 25% is specifically customer-owned solar. Austin has already
achieved some ambitious goals. For example, all municipal buildings now
operate exclusively on renewable energy.
In 2014, the City Council passed a resolution officially establishing “a goal
of reaching net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050” (City of Austin, 2014).
One year later, the Office of Sustainability produced the Austin Community
Climate Plan (ACCP) (City of Austin, 2015) to formalize and delineate this
vision. The ACCP aims to set Austin on a path of economic and envi-
ronmental sustainability, establish Austin as a global leader in addressing
climate change, and provide an example policy framework for other cities
to follow. Figure 2.1 illustrates the GHG emissions path that the ACCP
establishes through 2050, including interim targets to be reached along the
way. Indeed, Austin plans to exceed the 80% (relative to 2005 levels) reduction
in GHG emissions by 2050 which had been targeted by the Obama administra-
tion and incorporated into its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
to the Paris Agreement. The plan document acknowledges that Austin is
already experiencing climate change impacts including more frequent wildfires
and flooding, persistent drought conditions, violent precipitation, recording-
breaking summer temperatures, more days above 110◦F, and more nights
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Figure 2.1. GHG emissions path through 2050 established in the Austin
Community Climate Plan (City of Austin, 2015).
above 80◦F. It projects that these phenomena will increase in frequency and
magnitude over time. At the city scale, these changes could inflict heavy
economic, social, and environmental costs.
To develop the ACCP, the Office of Sustainability began by ordering a full
GHG inventory for Travis County. This effort followed the recommendations
of the U.S. Community Protocol for Accounting and Reporting of Greenhouse
Gas Emissions (ICLEI, 2012) and measured emissions in the following cate-
gories: 1) use of electricity, 2) use of fuel in residential and commercial air and
water heating, 3) passenger and freight travel, 4) landfills, and 5) industrial
processes. Some emissions sources, however, were excluded: emissions from
the extraction of raw materials, the manufacture and transportation of foods
and goods to Austin, upstream emissions from the extraction and processing
of fossil fuels, air travel, and natural carbon capture (offsetting emissions).
This inventory methodology most closely aligns with the purely geographic
production-based accounting scheme. Based on findings from King County,
Washington, consumption-based accounting could lead to total emissions that
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Figure 2.2. Austin GHG inventory for 2010 (City of Austin, 2015).
are 160% higher (City of Austin, 2015). The GHG inventory results shown
in Figure 2.2 reveal a few high-level characteristics of Austin’s energy system.
First, the use of natural gas as a heating fuel is quite limited in Austin, but
electricity generation accounts for over half of all GHG emissions. Second,
transportation accounts for 35% of emissions, 94% of which are due to on-road
cars and trucks. Third, industrial emissions make up a fairly small share of
the total, and are mainly associated with lime production and semiconductor
manufacturing. So, the obvious sectors to target for reducing emissions are
power and transportation, which combine to produce 86% of Austin’s emis-
sions.
The Office of Sustainability convened four technical advisory groups (elec-
tricity and natural gas, transportation, waste management, and industrial
Austin is heavily dependent on private automobile use for transportation and is plagued
by traffic congestion. In 2016, the average Austinite spent 47 hours in traffic, making Austin
the 13th most congested city in the country.
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processes) to define strategies for cost-effectively reducing emissions. The
ACCP includes a detailed outline of specific mitigation actions that can be
implemented in each sector. Identified actions include improving building
energy efficiencies, investing in energy storage technologies and smart grid
systems, shifting power generation to renewable energy, and demand-side manage-
ment. In 2016, the Office of Sustainability released an Implementation Plan
for Phase I of the ACCP (City of Austin, 2016), the period leading up to the
2020 interim target. It highlights 58 actions from the ACCP that are expected
to contribute to meeting the 2020 target. Austin appears on track to achieve
its near-term goal, primarily because Austin Energy has swiftly increased the
share of renewables in its electricity generation portfolio.
Finally, the ACCP establishes a rigorous reporting cycle, with frequent
revisions, progress reports, and GHG inventories to keep Austin on track to
achieve its net-zero goal. In addition to its core environmental purpose, it is
hoped that the ACCP will help ensure access to affordable energy and alleviate
Austin’s congested transportation networks.
2.2.4 Energy system optimization models
Pfenninger et al. (2014) distinguish four energy system modeling paradigms:
1) energy system optimization models, 2) energy system simulation models, 3)
power systems and electricity market models, and 4) qualitative and mixed-
method scenarios. The framework we develop herein belongs to the first of
these classes.
Energy system optimization models contain detailed, bottom-up repre-
sentations of the technological components that constitute an energy system.
They are used to explore how energy systems are likely to evolve – or should
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ideally evolve – over some specified timeframe, depending on techno-economic
assumptions and policy settings. An evolution of the energy system is known
as a transformation pathway, defined by the collection of all technology invest-
ments and operational decisions. Energy system optimization models are typi-
cally constructed to identify the least-cost transformation pathway that satis-
fies all energy demands as well as a host of other constraints. By introducing
additional parameters or constraints, energy system optimization models can
be used to analyze a range of energy and climate policies. Specific ques-
tions that they intend to answer include: 1) Is it possible to achieve an
emissions target given available technologies and constraints on their deploy-
ment? 2) What is the economic cost of achieving a climate policy goal? 3)
What technological transformation pathway allows a policy goal to be accom-
plished most cost-effectively? Well-known optimization frameworks include
the MARKAL/TIMES family (Loulou et al., 2004; Loulou and Labriet, 2007;
Loulou, 2007), MESSAGE (Messner and Strubegger, 1995; Messner and Schrat-
tenholzer, 2000), and OSeMOSYS (Howells et al., 2011).
Despite the growing importance of city mitigation efforts, energy system
optimization models are typically applied at the national or global scale. In
fact, there are very few examples in the literature describing urban-scale
application of these frameworks. Lin et al. (2010) employ the LEAP model to
study GHG emissions reduction in Xiamen, China. Their model incorporates
a variety of mitigation strategies including clean energy substitution (natural
gas largely replaces coal and diesel in industry and transportation), renewable
energy development, and motor vehicle control. They find that clean energy
substitution is the most effective measure. Comodi et al. (2012) use the TIMES
model to analyze the effects of several climate policies in Pesaro, Italy, a small
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seaside municipality. The authors find that carbon policies promoting the
diffusion of solar technologies reduce energy consumption, but are costly for
residents. Ma et al. (2015) apply the MARKAL model to Shanghai, China,
a city plagued by intense coal use. Under a climate policy, coal is gradually
replaced by natural gas, which reduces emissions. They do not, however,
consider transportation. Rosenzweig et al. (2010) argue that far more research
is needed on urban-scale mitigation in order to guide city governments toward
effective policy solutions. The chapter addresses this gap in the literature,
advancing the application of energy modeling at the city level, and using
this approach to evaluate an enacted city climate plan rather than a set of
hypothetical policy scenarios.
2.2.5 Synergies between power and transportation
The power and transportation sectors are the two largest GHG emitters in
the U.S., accounting for 28% and 29% of total emissions, respectively (EPA,
2017b). Evidence suggests that these shares are even higher in urban areas,
and in Austin these two sectors account for 86% of emissions (see Figure
2.2). Any serious effort to decarbonize cities will therefore require monumental
changes in how we generate electricity and travel from place to place. At
present, transportation and power are largely decoupled, at least in the U.S.
Petroleum products dominate the fuel mix of the former, but have been almost
completely phased out of the latter. This situation is likely to change in the
future as transportation shifts to alternative fuels that are more closely linked
to the power sector, especially under climate policies (Anandarajah et al., 2013;
Bosetti and Longden, 2013; Edelenbosch et al., 2017; Pietzcker et al., 2014).
Amid this trend, powerful synergies will emerge whereby mitigation activities
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in power and transportation mutually enhance one another. We design our
model to leverage these synergies while optimizing decarbonization pathways.
Use of electricity as a transportation fuel causes larger marginal GHG
emissions reductions as the power sector decarbonizes upstream. This is one
reason why most energy-economy models choose to decarbonize electricity
generation before investing significantly to convert transportation fleets to
electric vehicles (Löffler et al., 2017; Pietzcker et al., 2014). Electrification
of transportation would increase overall demand levels in the power sector,
necessitating greater capacity utilization and/or additional capacity invest-
ments. Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles can also provide carbon-free transportation
if hydrogen is produced via electrolysis using renewable electricity (Anan-
darajah et al., 2013). So, the hydrogen route to sustainable mobility is also
enhanced by decarbonizing the power sector.
In the reverse direction, uptake of alternative fuel vehicles facilitates the
integration of intermittent renewables into the power sector and provides valu-
able services to the electric grid. Electric vehicle charging can be managed as
a flexible load to absorb renewable electricity during periods of excess supply.
Choi et al. (2013) demonstrate that intelligently scheduling electric vehicle
charging reduces the cost of complying with a renewable electricity standard
in the power sector. Hydrogen production via electrolysis can similarly be
considered a flexible load, occurring when renewable energy is abundant to
provide fuel for hydrogen-based vehicles. In a vehicle-to-grid (V2G) system,
electric vehicle batteries are capable of supplying power to the grid at times of
peak demand or low renewable resource availability. With widespread adoption
of electric vehicles, V2G could encourage further deployment of renewable
technologies and reduce investments in peaking power plants or stand-alone
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energy storage technologies (Nunes et al., 2015).
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Standard OSeMOSYS
OSeMOSYS is a highly flexible and modular energy system optimization
framework that can be applied to problems ranging in scope from an elec-
tricity microgrid to a comprehensive global energy system (Howells et al.,
2011). It has much in common with other bottom-up, technologically detailed
energy models such as MARKAL/TIMES (Loulou et al., 2004; Loulou and
Labriet, 2007; Loulou, 2007) and MESSAGE (Messner and Schrattenholzer,
2000; Messner and Strubegger, 1995). However, unlike these other models,
the standard OSeMOSYS source code is publicly and freely accessible, and
thus addresses a gap in the existing toolbox while enhancing energy modeling
research transparency. The standard version of OSeMOSYS can be run via
a user-friendly, web-based interface. Nevertheless, research teams have devel-
oped customized OSeMOSYS implementations in a variety of programming
environments to tailor the framework to specific problems. OSeMOSYS appli-
cations appearing in the literature include high renewable penetration in Ireland
(Welsch et al., 2014), electric capacity planning under policy uncertainty (Leibowicz,
2018b), climate resilience of African infrastructure (Cervigni et al., 2015), and
competing objectives in the Saudi Arabian power sector (Groissböck and Pickl,
2016).
OSeMOSYS is formulated as a linear program that determines the least-
cost technology capacity additions and operational schedules that satisfy exoge-
Please see www.osemosys.org for the most up-to-date information about OSeMOSYS.
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nous demands, subject to a host of constraints. The model consists of a
collection of component blocks, each of which can be described at four different
levels of abstraction: 1) a plain English description, 2) an algebraic formula-
tion of the plain English description, 3) an implementation of the algebraic
formulation in a particular programming language, and 4) a parameterization
corresponding to the specific energy system being modeled. For example,
consider the “Energy Balance” component block. In plain English, “Energy
Balance” ensures that in each year, timeslice, and region, production of each
fuel is sufficient to satisfy final demand for that fuel plus use of that fuel as
an intermediate input to other processes. An algebraic formulation of the
essential equation within the “Energy Balance” block is given in Eq. (2.1). In
this study, the third level of abstraction is our implementation of this equation
in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) source code we develop for
OSeMOSYS. The fourth level of abstraction is achieved by parameterizing this
equation using data for our Austin application. A similar breakdown could
be provided for the objective function in Eq. (2.2), which computes the net
present cost of the energy system. Other component blocks model storage,
operating constraints, and emissions accounting.
Energy system optimization models typically divide each year into a computationally
tractable number of representative timeslices. These timeslices allow a model to capture
temporal variability of parameters such as demands and intermittent renewable resource
capacity factors. They also allow a model to solve for simplified operational schedules (i.e.,
dispatch).
In Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2), Y is the set of years, L is the set of timeslices, F is the set
of fuels, R is the set of regions, and T is the set of technologies. Corresponding lower-case
letters refer to elements of these sets.
39












An OSeMOSYS database for a particular application defines “fuels” and
“technologies,” terms which have expansive interpretations in the context of
the model. A“fuel” is any energy commodity, energy carrier, or energy service
that is a process input, process output, or demanded by consumers. The set
of fuels can thus include coal, gasoline, electricity, hydrogen, vehicle miles
traveled (VMT), and so on. A “technology” is any device that converts input
fuels into output fuels. Example technologies that can be defined include coal
power plants that convert coal into electricity, steam methane reforming that
converts natural gas into hydrogen, and internal combustion engine vehicles
that convert gasoline into VMT. Technologies do not necessarily need to have
an input fuel. In modeling an electric utility, for instance, coal is purchased
rather than produced within the model. So, purchasing coal can be represented
as a technology that consumes no input, produces coal as an output, and
has only variable cost (i.e., the exogenously specified coal price). Renewable
resource potentials are represented in much the same manner, except all costs
are zero and quantity constraints are imposed to reflect natural limits on
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available resources. Certain fuels are associated with many different technolo-
gies and demands throughout a database. Electricity can be generated using
many combinations of feedstock and power plant, is demanded by consumers,
and is an intermediate input to technologies such as hydrogen electrolysis,
electric vehicles, and battery electricity storage (for which electricity is also the
output). Each technology in the database is represented by exogenously spec-
ified parameter values for costs (capital, fixed O&M, variable O&M), capacity
factors, residual capacities, efficiencies, lifetimes, capacity and operating limits,
GHG emission rates, and so on.
2.3.2 Model implementation and customization
For this study, we modify the standard OSeMOSYS framework to deter-
mine optimal energy system transformation pathways for achieving decar-
bonization goals at the urban scale. We implement our version of OSeMOSYS
in the GAMS language and solve it using CPLEX. Our GAMS code is based
on an earlier translation of OSeMOSYS into GAMS by Noble (2012), and
extends the code developed by Leibowicz (2018b). We build a database for
Austin and apply OSeMOSYS to evaluate the ACCP. To ensure that our
framework covers the vast majority of GHG emissions in Austin, we fully
integrate a transportation sector into the model. This integration requires
several modifications to the standard, power-centric OSeMOSYS framework.
First, we add constraints to make private transportation non-dispatchable.
While an electric utility can centrally decide how to optimally operate its
generator fleet during every hour of the day, the private vehicle fleet cannot
be optimally coordinated. That is, if there is a mix of different vehicle types
in the fleet, there is no reason to believe that they could be dispatched in
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ascending order of variable cost in order to satisfy the private transportation
demand in a given hour. We handle this distinction by requiring that the
production of private vehicle miles by each vehicle type in any timeslice be
proportional to its share of the overall vehicle fleet. For example, if electric
vehicles comprise 10% of the private vehicle fleet, then 10% of the private
vehicle miles produced in any timeslice must come from electric vehicles. This
constraint would ordinarily make the model nonlinear, as the fleet size and
operational variables are both enodgenously determined within the model. To
preserve linearity, we exogenously calculate the fleet size needed to satisfy the
peak private transportation demand assuming an average travel speed and
capacity factor for all vehicles. In addition, we constrain the number of miles
a vehicle can travel in a given year; the average American drives less than
15,000 miles annually (DOT, 2017).
Second, unlike conventional fossil fuel transportation technologies, electric
vehicles introduce the need to model not only their driving activity, but also
their charging activity. In addition, V2G capability, whereby electric vehicle
batteries can discharge back to the grid, must be modeled in a way that
balances charging, discharging, and driving activity. Indeed, vehicles that
are out driving can neither charge nor provide V2G power. Because electricity
dispatch is determined endogenously, it is also important to coordinate elec-
tric vehicle charging as a flexible load. For example, electric vehicles might
be charged during hours of high renewable power output or low electricity
For example, assuming all vehicles operate at an average speed of 30 mph and 3 million
miles are demanded everyday from 5–6 PM (peak rush hour), then 100,000 vehicles need
to be operating in this hour to satisfy demand. However, only 20% of the available vehicle
fleet is on the road at any time, so the size of the total vehicle fleet should be approximately
500,000.
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demand. Allowing the model to optimize charging schedules may constitute
an important synergy between power and transportation that could facilitate
the integration of renewables into the electricity mix (Choi et al., 2013).
Our formulation includes an electric vehicle battery technology, essentially an
aggregation of all electric vehicles, similar in spirit to the formulation of Zakeri
and Syri (2015). The battery technology charges at a rate consistent with the
aggregate power rating, and the electricity stored is used to power electric
vehicles while driving or provide V2G power while idle. Timeslice-dependent
capacity factors ensure that only idle vehicles can charge. For example, if 10%
of electric vehicles are out driving in a given hour, then the aggregate electric
vehicle battery technology can charge at up to 90% of its maximum rate (that
is, 90% of electric vehicles are plugged in and available to charge). For V2G
discharging, we further reduce these capacity factors to reflect EV owners’
limited willingness to make their vehicles available for V2G at various times.
We parameterize nighttime and daytime V2G capacity factors to be 75% and
25%, respectively, of those for charging the battery. For example, if 90% of
electric vehicles are idle during a nighttime hour, then 75% of these will be
made available for V2G for a resulting capacity factor of 0.9∗0.75 = 67.5%. If
90% of electric vehicles are idle during a daytime hour, then only 25% of these
will be made available for V2G (presumably because their owners want to keep
their batteries charged up in case they need to drive) for a lower capacity factor
of 0.9 ∗ 0.25 = 22.5%. Enabling electric vehicles for V2G comes at the capital
cost of the power inverter installed at home or in the workplace, parameterized
at 1.5 times the cost of power inverters for utility-scale lithium-ion batteries
(Zakeri and Syri, 2015). Our formulation thus allows the model to optimally
schedule electric vehicle charging and V2G discharging, and ensures that these
activities, along with driving, are mutually exclusive for a vehicle in a given
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hour.
Third, we add capacity growth constraints to prevent individual technolo-
gies from scaling up at unreasonably rapid rates as economic and policy param-
eters evolve. Without these constraints, optimization-based energy models are
likely to yield “bang-bang solutions” where the capacity mix changes radically
from one period to another due to a slight change in the relative costs of
technology options. Capacity growth constraints are commonly imposed in
energy system models (Iyer et al., 2015; Wilkerson et al., 2015), but are absent
from the standard version of OSeMOSYS. We include them in our implemen-
tation to place some realistic limits on feasible energy system transformation
pathways. Specifically, we constrain the new capacity addition in the current
period to be less than some fraction of the previous period’s total installed
capacity, plus a start-up value that enables initial capacity investment in new
technologies with no existing capacity.
Fourth, we ensure that the energy system is capable of satisfying demands
even under extreme conditions that are not captured by the representative
timeslices. Reducing all variability throughout the year to hourly profiles
for representative seasonal days necessarily entails aggregation. For example,
the representative timeslices should capture the fact that electricity demand is
higher in summer than in winter for a system with strong air conditioning load,
but the peak demand hour occurring on the hottest summer day would be aver-
aged away in determining the representative summer profile. Alternatively,
by averaging hourly wind capacity factors over a season, the representative
profile would not account for certain hours when wind generation is zero. This
extreme would be problematic for a system heavily reliant on wind turbines.
To address these extremes, we add two constraints to ensure that there is
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adequate capacity to meet demand during the peak load hour of the year, as
well as an hour with zero wind generation and high load. These constraints can
be satisfied by dispatchable generators, renewable installations operating at
their hour-specific capacity factors, demand response, and one quarter of total
storage capacity. The model incurs the cost of any additional capacity required
to cope with these extreme hours, but they are not explicitly incorporated
into the dispatch computation based on representative seasonal days. This
is consistent with the notion that demand peaks drive capacity investments
while typical conditions drive operating costs.
Fifth, we add demand response capability to the model. The ability to
strategically pay customers to reduce load during high-net-load hours will be
increasingly important as the power sector shifts further toward renewables.
Leveraging demand response allows a utility to save on operating cost by
avoiding the use of high-variable-cost peaking plants, and on capital cost by
avoiding additional investments that would otherwise be needed to meet peak
load plus reserve margin. In our implementation, the optimization routine
chooses the amount of demand response to deploy, and these variables get
subtracted from the exogenous hourly demand for a fuel in a given timeslice.
Demand response has a stepped supply curve, so that limited amounts of
demand response are available at three specified cost levels (low, medium, and
high).
Sixth, we integrate purchases of carbon offsets into the model. There
is some ambiguity in the ACCP in that Austin emissions are not required to
decline all the way to zero, but to some near-zero level with the difference made
up by purchasing offsets. Our interpretation is that actual Austin emissions
must decline by at least 90% by 2050, and that offset purchases can account
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for the remainder (up to 10%). By adding an OSeMOSYS technology whose
operation reduces the annual emissions level at a variable cost equal to the
price of carbon offsets, we allow the model to endogenously choose whether
to achieve the last 10% of emissions reductions that the ACCP mandates
by directly eliminating those emissions or by purchasing offsets. The 10%
maximum is imposed as a constraint on the operations of the offset purchasing
technology.
2.3.3 Austin database
We consider the evolution of Austin’s power and transportation sectors in
annual time steps from 2015–2050. The database includes 72 representative
timeslices for each year, corresponding to hourly profiles for representative
summer, winter, and spring/fall days. The use of 24-hour profiles is impor-
tant for faithfully representing intra-day variability in demands and renewable
capacity factors, and for modeling the operation of storage technologies. From
our perspective, this use of timeslices is a major improvement compared to
typical approaches that divide days into far fewer timeslices, such as crude
daytime and nighttime divisions (Lenox et al., 2013). Our hourly profiles are
essential for capturing synergies between the power and transportation sectors,
such as flexible electric vehicle charging and V2G storage.
While the ACCP was executed by the Austin City Council, whose juris-
diction is the City of Austin, the GHG emissions inventory ordered is for all of
Travis County, of which the City of Austin makes up 81% of the population.
Additionally, 97% of Austin Energy’s service area is within the boundaries
of Travis County (see Figure 2.3). Whereas most fossil fuel and solar PV
generation occurs in and around Austin, most wind electricity is imported
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Figure 2.3. Austin Energy Service Map of 2015 (Austin Energy, 2018).
from West and South Texas. Furthermore, Texas transportation data are
only available by county, allowing us to capture most commuting activity.
Therefore, considering the data collection boundaries and Austin Energy’s
service area, we take Travis County as the geographical scope of our analysis.
Table 2.1 lists the technologies included in our Austin database for OSeMOSYS.
Transportation technologies are split into two categories: private transporta-
tion and public transportation. Furthermore, we use two separate “fuels” to
represent private and public transportation demands: VMT and passenger
miles (PM), respectively. These demands cannot substitute for one another;
that is, no portion of private transportation demand can be met by public
transportation vehicles, and vice versa. While substitution could occur in
the long run, transportation demand in Austin is not expected to shift signif-
icantly towards public options due to persistent infrastructural, behavioral,
and settlement pattern lock-in effects (Seto et al., 2016).
The database includes three final demand categories: electricity, VMT
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Table 2.1. Technologies in the OSeMOSYS Austin database.
Power Coal-fired COAL
Plants Gas-fired combined cycle GAS CC






Gas-fired combined cycle with carbon capture and
storage
GAS CC CCS
Integrated coal gasification combined cycle with





Private Gasoline-powered internal combustion GASOLINE
Vehicles Diesel-powered internal combustion DIESEL
Plug-in gasoline-electric hybrid PHEV
Gasoline-electric hybrid HYBRID
Hydrogen fuel cell H2
Electric EV
Public Gasoline-powered internal combustion GASOLINE
Vehicles Diesel-powered internal combustion DIESEL
Compressed natural gas-powered internal combustion CNG
Biodiesel-powered internal combustion BIODIESEL








Electric vehicle batterya EV BATTERY
a The EV BATTERY technology powers electric vehicles during use and can provide V2G
power.
(private transportation), and PM (public transportation). Our database is
unique in that it represents both electricity and transportation demands at
hourly resolution for representative seasonal days. Even other models that
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Figure 2.4. Demand profiles from the Austin, Texas database that are inputs
to the model. The vertical axes measure the percentage of total annual demand
occurring in each timeslice. Transportation demand profiles are the same in all
seasons, while electricity demand profiles are season-specific. Since spring and
fall seasons are combined, the total demand over the two seasons is actually
double the orange line values in Figure 2.4a, which are averages for the two
seasons.
represent electricity using 24-hour profiles tend to include transportation as a
non-time-specific demand. Table 2.2 provides detailed documentation of data
sources for our input parameter value assumptions.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the representative demand profiles that are inputs to
the model. Figure 2.4a shows the average electricity demand profile in each
season. Electricity demand is significantly higher in summer due to Austin’s
humid subtropical climate that induces strong air conditioning load, which
peaks in early evening. Heating loads tend to be limited, but because Austin
residents predominantly use electric rather than natural gas heating, the winter
demand profile has noticeable peaks in the morning and evening. Figure 2.4b
displays transportation demand profiles for VMT and PM. Note that seasons
are not considered, as we have no strong reason to believe transportation
demands vary greatly across seasons. Both VMT and PM fall to nearly zero
during the night. VMT demand is relatively constant during daylight hours,
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Figure 2.5. Visual overview of the OSeMOSYS database constructed for
Austin. The diagram highlights synergies among electricity, hydrogen, and
transportation.
but exhibits small peaks during the morning and evening rush hours. PM
demand is far more concentrated within the rush hours, because a majority
of passengers only use public transportation to commute to and from the
workplace. Future transportation and electricity demands are taken to be
exogenous, and are established based on projections of Austin’s population
growth (Austin Chamber of Commerce, 2018).
Figure 2.5 provides a visual overview of the OSeMOSYS database constructed
for Austin. For clarity, it does not represent individual technologies and fuels,
as there are simply too many of these in the database to incorporate into an
overview diagram. Instead, Figure 2.5 depicts the exchanges that take place
between different sectors in the model. For example, the hydrogen production
and storage sector includes technologies that consume fossil fuels (gray input
arrow) and electricity (green input arrow). The hydrogen they produce (blue
output arrows) is demanded by hydrogen fuel cells in the electricity generation
and storage sector and by hydrogen fuel cell vehicles in the vehicles sector.
In addition, demand response may directly lower electricity demand (light
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blue arrow). Figure 2.5 highlights the numerous synergies among electricity,
hydrogen, and transportation that system optimization can exploit to identify
a universal solution that is superior to the combination of solutions that would
be individually optimal for each sector in isolation.
Table 2.2. Documentation of data sources for input parameter value
assumptions.
Parameter Source
Annual electricity demand ERCOT (2017b)
Annual electricity demand projections ERCOT (2015)
Fraction of annual electricity demand in each timeslice ERCOT (2015)
Annual private transportation demand TXDOT (2016)
Annual private transportation demand projections FHWA (2017)
Annual public transportation demand DOT (2015)
Fraction of transportation demand in each timeslice DOT (2015)
Average wind capacity factor by timeslice ERCOT (2017a)
Average solar capacity factor by timeslice NREL (2016)
Base year power plant capacity mix
Austin Energy
(2017)
Base year private transportation fleet mix TXDMV (2017)
Base year public transportation fleet mix CapMetro (2016)
Power plant conversion efficiencies EIA (2017)
Vehicle efficiencies EIA (2017)
Power plant and fuel cost projections (investment, fixed O&M,
variable O&M)
NREL (2017)




Power plant CO2 emission rates
Schlomer et al.
(2014)
Vehicle CO2 emission rates EPA (2017a)
Battery electricity storage cost assumptions
Zakeri and Syri
(2015)






To evaluate the ACCP, we compare a Climate Plan scenario to a Baseline
scenario. In particular, we seek to quantify the economic cost of the ACCP,
and to assess how the technology mixes of the power and transportation
sectors should evolve over time to achieve its decarbonization goal most cost-
effectively.
The Baseline scenario is a business-as-usual development of the power and
transportation sectors in which investment and operational decisions are opti-
mized in the absence of a carbon policy. The Climate Plan is represented by
imposing an exogenous upper limit on emissions in each year, consistent with
the linear decline path depicted in Figure 2.1. Based on our interpretation,
we assume in our Climate Plan scenario that total annual CO2 emissions must
be reduced to zero by 2050, with carbon offsets at most 10% of the difference
between 2015 emissions and the exogenous upper limit in each year.
In addition to the Climate Plan scenario with a 10% carbon offset allowance,
we also run the model for gradually more stringent variations where the carbon
offset allowance is reduced to 8%, 6%, 4%, 2%, and 0%. While we do not report
all these results in great detail due to space constraints, it is instructive to see
how the policy cost increases as the allowed contribution of carbon offsets is
restricted. Furthermore, we conduct some sensitivity analysis on the price of
carbon offsets. Eliminating the last few percent of emissions could be very
expensive on the margin if offsets are unavailable or their price is high.
2.3.5 Additional scenarios
In addition to the main Baseline and Climate Plan scenarios, we consider
Public Transportation variants featuring significant mode shifting from private
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to public transportation. Specifically, VMT are gradually converted into PM
over the model timeframe so that 50% of VMT from the main scenarios in 2050
is shifted to PM. In converting VMT into PM, we assume that a public bus has
an average occupancy of ten passengers. Indeed, the ACCP advocates shifting
transportation demand from private to public modes as an important climate
change mitigation lever (City of Austin, 2015). The Public Transportation
scenarios thus help us assess the potential benefits of such a transition.
Finally, we also consider Charging Cost variants of our main scenarios in
which the cost of electric vehicle battery chargers and their associated instal-
lation costs are included in the capital costs of electric vehicles, both private
and public. Therefore, the Charging Cost case effectively makes electrified
transportation more expensive.
2.4 Results and discussion
2.4.1 Policy cost
OSeMOSYS determines the least-cost transformation pathway for the inte-
grated power and transportation system. The objective value associated with
the optimal pathway thus represents the net present cost of satisfying the
city’s power and transportation demands over the period 2015–2050. By
comparing the objective values in the Baseline and Climate Plan scenarios,
we can quantify the cost of the policy.
The Baseline scenario results in a net present cost of approximately $89.0
billion. The corresponding value in the Climate Plan scenario (10% carbon
offset allowance) is $91.4 billion. The Climate Plan restricts the feasible set
We assume a relatively standard 5% discount rate.
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of solutions that the model has to choose from, so it is unsurprising that
the policy increases costs. In relative terms, the ACCP raises net present
power and transportation costs by about 2.7%. This economic impact is not
trivial, but in our view, 2.7% is a relatively modest cost given the stringency
of the ACCP. This result demonstrates that power and transportation can be
deeply decarbonized at the urban scale without incurring exorbitant mitigation
costs. It also reflects significant cost reductions in clean energy technologies
over recent years which have made increasingly ambitious emissions targets
economically acceptable.
Ultimately, the policy cost will be borne by residents through some combi-
nation of higher electricity rates, the need to purchase vehicles with lower
emissions, higher public transportation fares, and additional taxes. Mitigation
strategies in the power sector and public transportation can be directly imple-
mented by the city, which controls its electric utility and manages the bus fleet.
Getting residents to purchase less emissions-intensive vehicles would require
complementary policies such as financial incentives, infrastructure deployment
programs, or mandates. Our analysis reveals how the net-zero GHG emissions
goal can be achieved most cost-effectively in terms of the system-wide decar-
bonization pathway, but does not delve into the specific regulations required
to induce all components of that pathway.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the sensitivity of net present cost to the carbon offset
allowance. Reducing the allowance from 10% down toward 0% increases the
stringency of the policy by forcing the system to directly eliminate its last
remaining emissions. Of course, reducing the offset allowance makes the policy
more expensive. Requiring the power and transportation sectors to be totally
carbon-free results in a net present cost of $92.0 billion, roughly $0.6 billion
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Figure 2.6. Sensitivity of the net present cost objective value to the carbon
offset allowance.
more than that with the 10% allowance. The relationship between cost and
offset allowance is roughly linear except for the difference between the 2%
and 0% allowances. The last 2% of emissions are marginally more expensive
to eliminate because they necessitate a lot of additional storage capacity and
even force public transportation (the most expensive demand to decarbonize)
to fully electrify.
We performed some experiments by raising the carbon offset price from
its reference value of $20/tCO2. Interestingly, the offset price has to be many
times higher than this for the model to choose to make less than full use of the
offset allowance. The constraint on offset purchases remains binding until the
price nears $150/tCO2, and some offsets are still purchased even when they
cost $200/tCO2. This observation along with the results in Figure 2.6 indicate




Figure 2.7 shows annual CO2 emissions in the Baseline and Climate Plan
(10% carbon offset allowance) scenarios, broken down into power and trans-
portation. In the Baseline, total emissions continue to rise until 2038, then
decline thereafter. The reductions in later years are confined to the power
sector. The Climate Plan total emissions trajectory follows the policy constraint.
Figure 2.7b exhibits a striking decarbonization pattern with two distinct stages.
The power sector is decarbonized first, with transportation emissions only
beginning to decline significantly around 2040 when very little CO2 remains
in electricity. This decarbonization sequence, advancing from power to trans-
portation over time, is consistent with prior modeling results at higher spatial
scales (Löffler et al., 2017; Pietzcker et al., 2014) and the notion that trans-
portation exhibits strong carbon lock-in (Seto et al., 2016). Austin should
focus near-term decarbonization efforts on the power sector (as it is currently
doing through Austin Energy), knowing that transportation emissions will
need to be addressed in the future once alternative fuel vehicles are cheaper
and upstream emissions are lower. This lesson is likely generalizable to most
cities.
2.4.3 Power
Figure 2.8 illustrates how the electricity generation mix evolves over time
in the Baseline and Climate Plan scenarios. In both cases, there is no new
investment in coal power plants. This is significant since coal plants are
responsible for 84% of power sector emissions and 53% of all emissions in
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Figure 2.7. Annual CO2 emissions in the Baseline (a) and Climate Plan
(b) scenarios, broken down into power and transportation. Carbon offset
purchases appear as a negative area because they contribute to satisfying the
Climate Plan constraint (dashed black line).
Figure 2.8. Evolution of the electricity generation mix in the Baseline (a)
and Climate Plan (b) scenarios.
the 2015 base year.
In the Baseline scenario, GAS CC capacity is continually added through
2036. It is clearly the technology of choice in the near-term, matching the
current trend favoring natural gas in the U.S. power sector. The GAS CC
Coal-fired electricity generation experiences a sharp dip in 2016 due to the natural gas
price forecast, which returns to a forecast price of $2.95/MMBtu in 2016 after an observed
price of $3.22/MMBtu in the 2015 base year. This explains the noticeable kink in Figures
2.7 and 2.8 at 2016.
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generation share begins at approximately 11% in 2015, reaches a peak of 75% in
2039, then declines to its terminal value of 36% in 2050. Optimistic projections
for future solar PV costs make it the preferred generation technology in the
later years even in the absence of climate policy. By 2050, solar PV accounts
for 64% of total generation, with the rest fueled by natural gas. Due to its
lower capacity factors, solar PV actually occupies 83% of the terminal capacity
mix.
The early years of the Climate Plan scenario see substitution of GAS
CC generation for coal electricity, which drops to 4% of the total by 2027
and is completely phased out by 2045 despite a brief utilization resurgence
prior to 2030 to accommodate rapid growth of intermittent wind and solar.
Wind and solar PV expand aggressively, so much so that they begin displacing
GAS CC generation in 2026. This sequence confirms the role of natural gas
as a transition fuel in the power sector, aiding decarbonization in the near-
term by substituting for coal, but ultimately giving way to renewables once
the emissions target intensifies and renewables become more cost-competitive.
After the initial years, renewables increasingly dominate the generation mix,
and the 2050 mix consists of 40% wind and 58% solar PV (with GAS CC
reduced to 2% of generation).
The rapid growth of solar PV begins sooner in the Climate Plan scenario
than in the Baseline, but its overall outlook is bullish in either case due to
favorable cost projections. Interestingly, the policy context has the biggest
impact on the competition between GAS CC and wind for the rest of the future
generation mix. The renewable portion of 2050 generation in the Baseline is
entirely solar PV with no wind. In contrast, the 2050 Climate Plan mix
incorporates substantial wind generation. The reasoning is that when renew-
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able penetration is very high, the temporal complementarity between wind
and solar PV is very valuable for ensuring that loads can be satisfied. Wind
capacity factors in Texas are highest at night when solar PV is unavailable.
The picture that emerges is that, in this setting, whether wind and solar
PV are substitutes or complements depends on the total share of renewable
generation.
It should be noted that total installed capacity in 2050 is greater in
the Climate Plan scenario (25.6 GW) than in the Baseline (20.0 GW). This
is a consequence of the comprehensive transition to intermittent renewable
electricity technologies in the former, which have lower capacity factors than
GAS CC. Indeed, by 2050, solar PV and wind capacities are 18.22 GW and
6.82 GW, respectively.
2.4.4 Transportation
Figure 2.9a reveals that private transportation in the Baseline scenario
continues to be dominated by gasoline vehicles through 2050. Unlike the power
sector, which eventually begins to decarbonize driven by purely economic
considerations even in the absence of climate policy, the transportation sector
appears unlikely to undergo major change without a policy stimulus. The
Climate Plan results in Figure 2.9b show that electric vehicles are the most
cost-effective technology for decarbonizing private transportation. Their adop-
tion is initially slow and electric vehicles still only account for 4% of the market
in 2030. Once the focus of decarbonization shifts from power to transportation,
however, electric vehicles diffuse rapidly. They reach 24% market share in 2040
and a much larger 80% in 2050.
The public transportation mix evolves almost identically in the Baseline
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Figure 2.9. Evolution of the private vehicle mix in the Baseline (a) and
Climate Plan (b) scenarios.
and Climate Plan scenarios, as shown in Figure 2.10. In both cases the
fleet shifts strongly to biodiesel buses, which are evidently the most cost-
competitive option given our cost and performance assumptions. Public trans-
portation does not respond to the policy because the extreme capital cost
differential between carbon-free bus technologies and biodiesel is too large to
surmount. The public transportation demand is small but expensive to decar-
bonize, so carbon offset purchases are allocated first to public transportation,
second to the remaining 20% of private transportation that is still fueled by
gasoline, and lastly to the 2% of electricity generation that is still fueled by
natural gas.
2.4.5 Demand response, energy storage, and electric vehicle charging
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show the optimal seasonal electricity dispatch results
for 2020 and 2050, respectively. The subfigures compare the Baseline (left
column) and Climate Plan (right column) scenarios. In addition to power plant
dispatch, they depict demand response, battery electricity storage charging
and discharging, and electric vehicle charging. V2G deployment is not selected
as part of the optimal transformation pathway in either scenario. Demand
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Figure 2.10. Evolution of the public vehicle mix in the Baseline (a) and
Climate Plan (b) scenarios.
response and storage discharging appear as areas above the x-axis, since they
effectively contribute to meeting the exogenous electrical loads (represented
by the dotted black lines). Storage charging and electric vehicle charging
appear as areas below the x-axis, since they add to the exogenous electrical
loads. Figures 2.11 and 2.12 therefore reveal how the ability to intelligently
schedule and coordinate demand response, energy storage, and electric vehicle
operations facilitates cost-effective decarbonization.
Demand response does not feature prominently in the dispatch results for
either year, though a small amount of demand response is called upon to meet
the summer peak electricity demand in 2020 in the Baseline scenario. Never-
theless, the availability of demand response plays a major role in satisfying the
two extreme hour constraints and thus ensuring that the system can cope with
a particularly high load or a lack of renewable generation. This is not visible
in the dispatch results for the representative seasonal days. The main benefit
of demand response is therefore to reduce investment in additional peaking
capacity rather than to save money on operating costs.
Energy storage plays a crucial role in the long-term evolution of Austin’s
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Figure 2.11. Seasonal power sector dispatch results for 2020 in the Baseline
(left column) and Climate Plan (right column) scenarios. Dotted black lines
represent exogenous electrical loads, which do not include demand response
(teal area).
energy system. The Baseline transformation pathway includes 28 GWh of
battery storage capacity by 2050. The Climate Plan (10% carbon offset
allowance) induces further deployment of battery storage, reaching 36 GWh of
capacity by 2050. At the end of the timeframe, solar PV makes up a substantial
share of generation in both the Baseline and Climate Plan scenarios. In this
context, optimal battery operation essentially follows the availability of solar
PV. All the 2050 dispatch profiles in Figure 2.12 feature battery charging
during the day when solar PV is abundant, and discharging to satisfy the
exogenous load at night when solar PV is unavailable.
The electric vehicle charging results in the right column of Figure 2.12
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Figure 2.12. Seasonal power sector dispatch results for 2050 in the Baseline
(left column) and Climate Plan (right column) scenarios. Dotted black lines
represent exogenous electrical loads, which do not include battery storage
charging (blue area below x-axis), battery storage discharging (blue area above
x-axis), or electric vehicle charging (teal area below x-axis).
demonstrate another synergy between power and transportation under the
ACCP. Similar to how batteries charge in a context of high solar PV pene-
tration, optimal electric vehicle charging takes place over the daytime hours
when solar PV is abundant. In reaching this outcome, our model implicitly
assumes that there are no temporal restrictions on electric vehicle charging,
and that charging infrastructure is widely available. We thus interpret our
findings to imply that, as the power sector incorporates more solar genera-
tion, it will become increasingly important to provide electric vehicle charging
infrastructure at workplaces so that coordinated charging can be aligned with
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solar power output.
Finally, although the jagged pattern of solar PV generation in Figure 2.12d
may appear strange, it simply reflects the abundance of solar PV capacity
relative to the demand for electricity in the intermediate (spring/fall) season.
There is more than enough solar PV capacity to meet load, charge battery
storage, and charge electric vehicles during the daytime, and none of these
activities entails variable cost. So, the model can choose from a variety
of dispatch schedules during the daytime hours that all result in the same
objective value; the pattern observed in Figure 2.12d is one of these.
2.4.6 Public transportation and charging cost scenarios
In the Public Transportation scenarios, biodiesel buses remain the tech-
nology of choice for public transportation. However, with the modal shift
toward public transportation, gasoline vehicles remain the dominant tech-
nology for private transportation, albeit steadily decreasing to 54% of the
private vehicle fleet in 2050 (the rest of which is electric). Since VMT ulti-
mately decline by 50% in the Public Transportation case, it is less critical to
deeply decarbonize private transportation. Also, since the higher occupancy
of buses means that ten VMT convert into one PM, there are far fewer total
vehicles and total vehicle miles in the Public Transportation scenarios. This
leads to substantial cost savings in terms of both the absolute net present
energy system costs as well as the additional cost of the Climate Plan relative
to the Baseline. In the Public Transportation setting, the net present cost is
roughly $75.5 billion in the Baseline scenario and $77.3 billion in the Climate
Plan scenario. The comparable objective values in the main scenarios were
$89.0 billion and $91.4 billion. The policy cost of the Climate Plan beyond
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Figure 2.13. Evolution of the private vehicle mix in the Baseline (a) and
Climate Plan (b) scenarios, with battery charger costs included
that of the Baseline thus decreases from $2.4 billion (2.7% in relative terms)
to $1.8 billion (2.4% in relative terms) due to the transition toward public
transportation. As previously stated, these benefits stem from the reductions
in total vehicles and total vehicle miles enabled by the higher occupancy of
buses, rather than changes in the public transportation technology mix. Of
course, this Public Transportation setting is entirely hypothetical, and it would
likely require major investments in public transit coupled with more compact
or transit-oriented land use. It does demonstrate, however, the significant
benefits that could result from such a modal shift.
In the Charging Cost scenarios, we include the costs of charging stations
and associated installations that consumers typically incur when they purchase
electric vehicles. We see no change in the public vehicle fleet, because electric
buses were not even chosen in the main scenarios. However, in the Climate
Plan scenario, the Charging Cost induces a resurgence of hybrid vehicles in
the private vehicle mix beginning around 2030. As Figure 2.13b shows, hybrid
vehicles later reach a maximum share of 15% in 2045. In the final years of
the timeframe, the CO2 constraint becomes stringent enough that additional
hybrid investments are no longer tenable, and electric vehicles increasingly
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dominate despite added costs for chargers and their installation. Net present
energy system cost under the Climate Plan is roughly $0.4 billion higher in
the Charging Cost setting than with the main set of assumptions.
2.5 Conclusion
We developed an energy system optimization model in the OSeMOSYS
framework to determine cost-effective decarbonization pathways at the urban
scale. For our case study, we used the model to evaluate the Austin Community
Climate Plan (ACCP), which establishes a goal of net-zero GHG emissions
by 2050. As a member of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group with a
rapidly growing population and a particularly ambitious climate plan, Austin
serves as a valuable testbed for analysis. Our findings thus contribute much-
needed insights on how cities can develop sound climate policies and implement
effective mitigation strategies. Furthermore, the OSeMOSYS platform we
extend is an open source tool, and our hope is that more municipal agencies
will employ energy system models to assess potential policy prescriptions.
We find that the ACCP increases net present power and transportation
costs by 2.7% relative to business-as-usual. This economic impact is not
trivial, but it does demonstrate that even the particularly ambitious net-
zero emissions by 2050 goal can be achieved at modest cost. The optimal
decarbonization pathway consists of two sequential stages: the power sector is
decarbonized first, then the focus shifts to transportation. The ACCP hastens
the elimination of coal from the power sector, initially through substitution
by natural gas, but increasingly via the expansion of renewables. Solar PV
actually comprises a majority of the 2050 generation mix even in the absence
of climate policy, based on optimistic cost projections alone. The primary
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long-run impact of the ACCP on electricity is the replacement of natural
gas with wind, which is an effective complement to solar PV under high
renewable penetration due to their contrasting temporal profiles (wind at
night, solar PV during the day). Once electricity decarbonizes, private trans-
portation transitions to electric vehicles, which are less costly in these later
years. Capital cost differentials between carbon-free and conventional options
are more extreme in public transportation, which is therefore insensitive to the
policy context, even under a scenario of significant modal shift from private
to public transportation. Intelligent and coordinated scheduling of battery
electricity storage and electric vehicle charging play important roles in the
low-carbon transition. Battery storage charges during the daytime when solar
PV is abundant and discharges at night when solar PV is unavailable. Optimal
electric vehicle charging also occurs during the daytime to align with solar PV
availability, which implies that making charging infrastructure available at
workplaces would provide substantial system-wide value. Our model does not
select V2G or hydrogen technologies in its optimal decarbonization pathways.
Of course, these findings must be interpreted in light of the limitations of
the model and database. Our framework has a supply-side focus that does not
explicitly incorporate demand-side decarbonization levers (except for demand
response) such as end-use appliance efficiency, building efficiency, or urban
land-use regulation. Seasonal 24-hour profiles represent intermittent renewable
resources and fluctuating demands at higher resolution than most examples
in the literature, but they still cannot capture the full range of variability
that exists in reality. Due to a lack of available data, our database does not
include smaller sources of Austin emissions such as industrial processes, direct
natural gas consumption for heating, or landfills. There is not, however, a
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methodological limitation that precludes modelers from including such tech-
nologies. Exogenous parameter assumptions become more uncertain as the
analysis timeframe approaches its 2050 horizon. The optimization algorithm
assumes perfect foresight, which masks these uncertainties and is known to
influence model results (Wilkerson et al., 2015).
Our research team has continued to develop these energy system opti-
mization tools to address these limitations. For example, Leibowicz et al.
(2018) consider end-use technology options for satisfying disaggregated energy
service demands in the building sector, such as space heating and cooling,
water heating, and lighting. In addition to both supply- and demand-side
decarbonization levers, the authors consider how building thermal efficiency
upgrades reduce space heating and cooling demands, thus exploiting important
synergies within a comprehensive portfolio of emissions mitigation strate-
gies. For example, the authors find that upgrading to a LEED Gold stan-
dard of building thermal efficiency reduces the cost of a climate policy by
37% compared to a case of no improvement in buildings’ thermal efficiency.
Jayadev et al. (2020) explore electricity infrastructure pathways from the
present to 2050 and derive policy-relevant insights. And Jones and Leibowicz
(2019) distinguish shared autonomous vehicles from privately owned vehicles
to explore the contributions of shared autonomous vehicles to climate change
mitigation. These additional features allow us to analyze a broader portfolio
of mitigation strategies, though obtaining accurate data at the urban scale is
always a formidable challenge.
In the context of this dissertation, our optimization framework does not
capture other drivers of adoption besides cost considerations that arise from
complex phenomena that exist in technology transitions. Indeed, in our energy
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system optimization model, once a technology becomes cost-effective it is
adopted. For example, among the available vehicle technologies in the Austin,
TX database, factors hypothesized to be influential in adoption decisions, such
as individuals’ sensitivities to EV charging times and range preferences, are not
modeled. In the following chapters, we take a step back and develop high-level,
theoretical models of technology transitions to address these shortcomings.
Despite its limitations, this study has contributed much-needed research
on city climate plans and urban-scale mitigation pathways. We hope that
our insights will provide helpful policy guidance for municipal governments as
cities take on a more prominent role in climate change mitigation.
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Chapter 3
Markov models of policy support for
technology transitions
3.1 Introduction
Many governments aim to promote the development and diffusion of new
technologies such as renewable energy sources, medical treatments, agricultural
innovations, and alternative fuel vehicles. Economic theory generally suggests
that government intervention is justified in cases of market failure, including
externalities and informational asymmetry. In the more specific context of
policy support for new technologies, Salmenkaita and Salo (2002) summarize
three key policy rationales: market failure (underinvestment in research and
development (R&D) because firms are unable to capture all the benefits of
innovation, so private benefits are smaller than social benefits), systemic failure
(coordination problems among R&D players with different incentives), and
structural inertia (path-dependence and feedbacks hamper the pursuit of new
technologies). Technology policy is also viewed as a means of addressing
negative externalities that often go unpriced in the market, such as greenhouse
gas emissions that cause climate change (Nemet and Kammen, 2007).
Globally, governments collectively spend trillions of dollars per year on
Benjamin Leibowicz contributed to the conceptualization of the topic. A version of this
chapter has been published in European Journal of Operational Research (Brozynski and
Leibowicz, in press).
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R&D efforts and incentives for consumers to adopt new technologies. However,
designing policies that effectively stimulate technology transitions and generate
net benefits is extremely challenging due to the highly complex and uncer-
tain nature of technological change. Technology transitions, which Geels
(2002) defines as “major technological transformations in the way societal
functions ... are fulfilled,” are demonstrably complex processes involving simul-
taneous change along technological, economic, institutional, social, and behav-
ioral dimensions, which must be aligned for a technology transition to occur.
Outcomes are impossible to predict in advance. R&D is an inherently risky
enterprise, and even when a technologically superior alternative does arise, its
success in the market is not guaranteed. The difficulty of designing technology
policies is borne out by the erratic historical record. Some past government
campaigns to promote technology transitions have been lauded as tremendous
successes, such as the swift adoption of hybrid seed corn driven by agricultural
extension agencies in the U.S. (Griliches, 1957), or the creation of a leading
wind turbine industry in Denmark (Klaassen et al., 2005). On the other
hand, there have been a number of very expensive failures, including the U.S.
Synthetic Fuels Corporation established to reduce dependence on imported
fossil fuels during the oil crisis (Anadon and Nemet, 2014), or the French
effort to deploy fast breeder nuclear reactors (Grubler, 2012).
There is a rich, interdisciplinary literature on technology transitions, most
of which consists of retrospective case studies, empirical data analyses, and
qualitative frameworks. Early on, researchers including Ryan and Gross (1943),
Coleman et al. (1957), and Griliches (1957) began to formalize the study
of technology diffusion as a complex process that plays out gradually across
communities of heterogeneous, interacting agents. Everett Rogers (1962) synthe-
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sized and popularized these ideas in his seminal book Diffusion of Innovations,
and distilled from existing case studies some lessons for how governments
and firms can purposefully accelerate diffusion. Through his case study of
the QWERTY keyboard layout, David (1985) demonstrated that society can
become locked-in to inferior technological regimes due to chance events that
get amplified by increasing returns. These concepts have become central to
policy studies and debates in diverse domains. In energy and climate change,
many case studies continue to draw policy insights from past successes and
failures (Grubler and Wilson, 2013), and scholars frequently suggest how tech-
nology policies should be designed to overcome carbon lock-in and accelerate
sustainability transitions (Seto et al., 2016; Unruh, 2000, 2002). Ambitious
researchers have attempted to integrate the insights obtained through case
studies into unified conceptual frameworks, such as the multi-level perspective
for understanding socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2002, 2005).
While these empirical case studies and qualitative conceptualizations have
advanced our understanding of technology transitions, they have limited rele-
vance as guides for making technology policy decisions under uncertainty.
They rely on an inductive logic that attempts to establish qualitative, policy-
relevant insights through the synthesis of case studies of specific experiences
across myriad application domains and contexts. Indeed, poorly designed tech-
nology policy, intending to correct a market or systemic failure, may instead
create a government failure, in which case the intervention actually causes
further economic inefficiency (Stiglitz, 2009). What the literature largely
lacks is a quantitative, theoretical modeling framework capable of yielding
generalizable guidance for technology policy decisions. Our present work
addresses this research gap. To ensure generality and analytical tractability,
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our models are necessarily quite abstract as presented. Undoubtedly, they
omit many factors and details which would be important considerations in any
real-world application. However, despite these shortcomings, our case study
on lithium-ion batteries demonstrates that our approach can support practical
policy decisions. Therefore, we view our theoretical framework and the policy
insights we derive from it as complementary to the existing literature, and
believe they represent a significant step toward a quantitative, integrated
theory of technology transitions and the role of policy.
In this chapter, we develop a theoretical framework for evaluating tech-
nology policy interventions under uncertainty that yields highly general, analyt-
ical results. The decision maker we primarily envision is a government body
considering spending public funds to promote the diffusion of a new technology.
In a cost-benefit approach, we explore the circumstances under which the
social benefits of intervention exceed the costs. Nevertheless, our models are
flexible enough to offer relevant insights to other decision makers with a vested
interest in the successful development or diffusion of a new technology, such
as a firm considering spending money on product development or advertising
to disseminate a new product throughout the market.
We adopt a top-down perspective and construct two Markov models of
technology transitions that incorporate policy support decisions. The first
model is a Markov reward process (MRP) where technology policy intervention
requires a one-time, upfront cost. The second is a Markov decision process
(MDP) where technology policy incurs a cost every time the process is in
a state targeted by the policy. In our analysis of both models, we focus
on the policymaker’s willingness to pay (WTP) for portfolios of technology
policies that improve the probabilities of the technology transition advancing
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at different stages. We find that the two models share intuitive similarities,
but that the behaviors of their optimal decision rules diverge due to their
different cost accounting mechanisms. More generally, our most fundamental
contribution to the literature is to bring an operations research approach
to technology policy analysis and offer a theoretical framework capable of
producing general, analytical, decision-relevant insights.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we
review the existing literature on models of technology transitions, diffusion,
and policy, and highlight the similarities and differences between these previous
studies and our analysis. We present our MRP and MDP models in Section
4.3 and derive key analytical results in Section 3.4. The numerical examples
in Section 3.5 demonstrate how our framework can be used to determine the
optimal technology policy portfolio, and allow us to explore how the optimal
portfolio varies with certain parameters. In Section 4.5, we demonstrate the
practical application of our models by conducting a case study on lithium-ion
batteries for electric vehicles. We conclude in Section 3.7 with a summary of
our most important findings and contributions to the literature.
3.2 Literature review
We review four branches of the literature in the following four subsec-
tions: (1) top-down stochastic models of technology diffusion, (2) bottom-
up stochastic models of technology diffusion, (3) economic models of optimal
technology policy intervention, and (4) large-scale numerical policy analysis
models featuring technology policies.
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3.2.1 Top-down stochastic models of technology diffusion
Top-down models of technological change represent technology dynamics
using aggregate measures like market shares of competing alternatives as the
endogenous variables. Rogers (1962) popularized the use of logistic diffusion
curves to model the cumulative adoption of an innovation over time. In the
operations research literature, a pioneering and highly influential contribution
was the Bass Model (Bass, 1969). In this formulation, the fraction of remaining
potential adopters who adopt an innovation at a given time is a linear function
of the number of previous adopters. The model thus captures the inertia by
which technology diffusion initially accelerates, then slows down as the market
saturates. Bass derives analytical results for key properties of a diffusion
process (e.g., peak sales time, expected adoption time) and shows that the
model fits empirical data on consumer durables quite well. Many extensions
of the Bass Model appear in the literature, such as versions with marketing
decision variables (Bass et al., 1994), multiple product generations (Jiang and
Jain, 2012; Norton and Bass, 1987), or stochastic demand (Niu, 2006).
While Bass (1969) describes the aggregate behavior of his model as being
driven by probabilistic adoption decisions at the individual level, his model is
ultimately a deterministic one. The formal analysis of technological change
as a stochastic process was really initiated by W. Brian Arthur, whose widely
cited top-down models are similar to our own in that they feature uncertainty
in the technology transition pathway, such as how market shares will evolve.
Arthur et al. (1987) formulate and analyze a nonlinear Polya urn process
model that captures the path-dependency of technological competition due to
increasing returns. In the standard Polya process, the probability that the next
adopter will choose technology A is equal to A’s current market share. The
75
nonlinear Polya process is a generalization in which technological competition
is governed by adoption probabilities that are arbitrary functions of the current
market shares. The authors prove that the market shares in a nonlinear
Polya process will eventually converge to a stable fixed point of the urn
function, as is the case in the standard Polya model. Arthur and Lane (1993)
use this nonlinear Polya process framework to study the effect of increasing
returns via an information contagion mechanism. Information contagion is
the phenomenon by which prospective adopters supplement publicly available
information about competing technologies with private information obtained
by sampling past adopters of these technologies. The authors prove that the
probability that the next purchase will be technology A, for example, is given
by a polynomial urn function of A’s current market share, which settles to a
stable fixed point of this urn function. Notably, the outcome can be complete
dominance by one technology even if all competing technologies are identical.
Which technology comes to dominate is not predictable ex ante.
Arthur (1989) represents the competition between two technologies, A
and B, as a sequence of adoption decisions made by two types of agents. The
benefit that each agent type derives from a technology is a linear function of
the number of previous adopters of that technology, with the constant terms
reflecting initial preferences of agent types A and B. An agent type is selected
with equal likelihood in each period, and adopts the technology that gives her
the higher benefit. Arthur shows that under increasing returns (i.e., benefits
increase in the number of previous adopters), this stochastic model has some
daunting consequences for trying to predict technological outcomes or ensure
economic efficiency. The evolution of the market is non-ergodic in that small
chance events tip the allocation toward one dominated by a single technology,
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instead of being averaged away. There is a risk of becoming locked-in to a
technology pathway with inferior long-run benefits if there is an early streak
of agents who prefer an initially appealing but slow-to-improve technology.
Similar to these previous formulations, our models are top-down, dynamic,
stochastic representations of technological change. Our framework goes beyond
these earlier treatments by explicitly incorporating technology policy decision
making under uncertainty. This allows us to obtain decision rules about
optimal policy intervention rather than merely establish the properties of a
stochastic diffusion process.
3.2.2 Bottom-up stochastic models of technology diffusion
One branch of the operations research literature models technology diffu-
sion as a stochastic process, but from the perspective of the individual agents
making adoption decisions. Like ours, these bottom-up models focus on deci-
sion making under uncertainty, but the decisions being analyzed are the strategic
adoption choices of individual agents in the market rather than a technology
policy decision. The studies discussed below examine the structure of optimal
technology adoption decisions and explore how optimal decisions are affected
by model parameters.
Kornish (2006) constructs a model where an individual considers a choice
between two competing technologies that are both subject to positive network
effects. In each period, the individual either adopts one of the technologies,
or opts to wait. While this individual’s decisions are explicitly modeled, the
behavior of other agents in the market is represented as a nonlinear Polya
urn function (Arthur et al., 1987). Committing to a technology entails a key
tradeoff. It is better to begin deriving benefits sooner rather than later, but
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by waiting, the individual can observe which technology is proving to be most
popular and thus capture its positive network effects. Kornish finds that the
optimal strategy is of a threshold type with respect to the number of previous
adopters of each technology. She then explores how stronger network effects
influence the optimal strategy.
Several more recent papers also model individual technology adoption
decisions, but do not focus on the implications of increasing returns for the
competition among technologies. Instead, these papers emphasize the role that
information gathering plays in the adoption process of a single (or sometimes
dependent) technology. Employing a real options approach to the timing of
adoption decisions, this literature seeks to understand why superior technolo-
gies historically suffer from slow or incomplete adoption. McCardle (1985)
considers a firm’s adoption decision on a new technology with uncertain prof-
itability. The firm will optimally gather information to reduce the level of
its uncertainty about the technology’s profitability until an adopt or reject
threshold is met. Interestingly, it is possible for an optimally-behaving firm
to adopt a technology that is ultimately unprofitable. Farzin et al. (1998)
assume that a technology advances according to a compound Poisson process,
and uncover the existence of a threshold-based optimal policy. Huisman (2001)
analyzes several adoption models in which the income stream to a firm follows
a geometric Brownian motion. Cho and McCardle (2009) extend real options
models to the case in which multiple dependent technologies are evolving,
showing that the economic dependencies that define cost relationships within
the firm, in addition to uncertainties beyond the firm, can significantly influ-
ence the timing of adoption. Ulu and Smith (2009) analyze a sequential
decision problem in which an individual chooses to adopt a new technology,
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reject it, or wait under uncertain benefits. When she decides to wait, she
obtains a new distribution on the benefits via Bayesian updating. The authors
show that a better technology may not actually make the consumer better off
once the costs of information gathering and the adoption process are taken into
account. Smith and Ulu (2017) extend their earlier analysis by investigating
how risk aversion affects the optimal adoption strategy. Finally, Smith and Ulu
(2012) compare and contrast three models (NPV, single-purchase, and repeat-
purchase) of an individual’s technology adoption decision under uncertain
future costs and quality, modeled as Markov process transitions. They find
that in the repeat-purchase or “upgrades” model, technological improvements
that make the consumer better off may also discourage adoption.
We emphasize that, while models of technology adoption decisions are well-
established in the literature, they do not directly inform technology policy deci-
sion making. Adopters and policymakers face different decisions and usually
have different objectives. Instead, our work leverages Markov modeling to
inform technology policy decision making from the perspective of a policy-
maker.
3.2.3 Economic models of optimal technology policy intervention
Two branches of the economics literature feature models used to derive
optimal technology policies. In general, compared to operations research
models like ours, these economic models represent time and uncertainty in
less detail (if at all), but consider more specific policy instruments, strategic
competition among multiple firms, and welfare impacts. Their limited repre-
sentations of time, but rich representations of innovating firms, make them
better suited to assess supply-side technology policies like R&D subsidies
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than demand-side interventions intended to spur faster and more thorough
adoption.
Optimal technology policies are explored in the industrial organization
literature on R&D rivalry games. These models typically include two stages.
In the first stage, competing firms make R&D investment decisions that affect
their production costs in stage two, when they compete in the market by
choosing production quantities. Leahy and Neary (1997) analyze optimal
policy intervention in one such oligopoly model. They consider the first-best
policy featuring both R&D and product subsidies, as well as the second-best
policy featuring only an R&D subsidy. The authors determine that strategic
behavior by firms justifies higher subsidies unless R&D spillovers are weak
and firms’ actions are strategic substitutes. Tishler and Milstein (2009) work
within a similar framework, but incorporate new product R&D in addition
to cost-reducing R&D, and add uncertainty by treating R&D outcomes as
random variables. Between the two stages, firms observe the realizations of
their R&D investments. The authors elucidate opposing forces with respect
to competition and innovation: a strategic effect that increases R&D effort
with competition and a demand reduction effect (due to competition among
substitute products) that decreases R&D effort with competition. The impli-
cation is that firms may spend excessively on R&D to escape competition when
rivalry is intense. Leibowicz (2018c) constructs a model featuring both cost-
reducing and new product R&D with stochastic outcomes, similar to the model
of Tishler and Milstein (2009). However, Leibowicz considers the implications
of suboptimal policy magnitudes, and how far from optimal these policy levels
can be yet still improve social welfare relative to the laissez-faire scenario.
A second branch of the economics literature that addresses optimal tech-
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nology policy is endogenous growth theory. Based on earlier, highly influ-
ential models like those of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991),
and Aghion and Howitt (1992), subsequent authors have explicitly character-
ized optimal technology policy interventions within endogenous growth frame-
works. Thompson and Waldo (1994) derive the optimal R&D subsidy in a
model that allows firms to capture market share from rivals, but does not
exhibit complete dominance by one firm. Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999)
analyze a quality ladder growth model in which vertical innovations can earn
firms temporary monopolies on producing intermediate goods. If industry
leaders and followers have access to different R&D technologies, then the
optimal policy portfolio subsidizes R&D expenditures of all firms, subsidizes
production of industry leaders, and taxes profits of followers. Furthermore,
Thompson (2000) develops a multi-country model and shows that the optimal
policy approach is an R&D subsidy for technological leaders but a tax on
technological laggards.
3.2.4 Numerical policy analysis models
Numerical policy analysis models in various application domains feature
technology policy decisions, sometimes under uncertainty. This is particularly
true in the energy and climate policy modeling literature, from which the exam-
ples below are drawn. Integrated assessment models (IAMs) represent linked
energy, economic, and earth systems to enable quantitative analysis of long-run
energy and climate policies. Continued model development has led many IAMs
to incorporate endogenous technological change. Some of these formulations
include R&D investment decision variables, where R&D can lower the future
costs of climate change mitigation. IAMs are large-scale models that must
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be solved numerically. They are domain-specific and produce results that are
parmaterization-dependent. Therefore, unlike the more parsimonious models
covered above, or our models in this chapter, IAMs do not yield analytical and
generalizable results. Their technology policy decisions are embedded within
much broader constellations of decision variables. Furthermore, while some
IAM frameworks feature uncertain R&D outcomes, they do not incorporate
uncertainty into the technology diffusion process.
Blanford (2009) develops an energy technology R&D decision framework in
which an IAM is used to quantify the benefits of achieving various technology
cost and performance levels. Given these benefits, Blanford determines the
optimal portfolio of R&D investments, where increasing investment raises the
probability of successfully achieving a cost or performance target. Baker et al.
(2020) use robust portfolio decision analysis to identify energy technology
R&D portfolios that are non-dominated over multiple sets of expert beliefs
about probability distributions on R&D outcomes. Minimized cost objective
values for achieving climate stabilization at 2◦C are obtained from an IAM and
used to establish the relative benefits of different R&D results. Bosetti et al.
(2009) explicitly incorporate R&D decision variables into the World Induced
Technical Change Hybrid (WITCH) IAM, and show that large energy R&D
investments are required for the breakthrough innovation needed to mitigate
climate change. Bosetti and Tavoni (2009) develop a version of WITCH where
R&D effectiveness is stochastic, and find that this uncertainty justifies higher
R&D investments and leads to lower climate policy costs.
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3.3 Models
We formulate two closely related, but fundamentally different, Markov
models of policy support for technology transitions. The first is a Markov
reward process (MRP) and the second is a Markov decision process (MDP).
Before we discuss the differences between the two models, we first describe
their similarities.
Each model features discrete time, an infinite horizon, and a discrete state
space. In fact, both models include the same three states corresponding to
progressively more advanced stages in the diffusion or development of a tech-
nology.Indeed, our models can flexibly represent either the diffusion (tracked
by market shares and adoption) or development (tracked by performance and
cost characteristics) of a technology, or some combination of the two (i.e.,
performance and cost can be thought of as co-evolving with the diffusion
process). State 1 is the initial state. For a diffusion application, State 1 could
represent the stage when a technology is ready for commercialization, but has
not yet achieved any appreciable level of market share. For a development
application, State 1 could represent a relatively immature technology with
poor performance and/or cost characteristics. State 2 is interpreted as an
intermediate stage of the process, and State 3 represents the completion of the
technology transition, saturating at either some maximum level of adoption
(for diffusion) or final performance and/or cost benchmarks (for development).
Implicitly, we assume that these levels of adoption or development of the
technology are exogenously defined and known. To streamline our exposition
of the models and analytical results in this section and the next, we primarily
use the terminology associated with a technology diffusion process; however,
we emphasize that our models apply equally well to technology development,
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as demonstrated by our case study in Section 4.5.
The stochastic process proceeds probabilistically through the states, via
Markov process state transitions, and effectively ends when it reaches State
3, which is absorbing. It is possible to regress from State 2 back to State 1,
which represents a technology that achieves limited market acceptance, never
makes it to widespread diffusion, and ultimately fails. Remaining in State
1 can be interpreted either as a single technology taking more time to begin
market penetration or improve its technical characteristics, or as the failure
of one candidate technology followed by the emergence of another candidate.
Regardless, the full process of beginning in State 1 and ending in State 3
represents one technology transition.
It is worthwhile to clarify that we depict three states simply because this is
the smallest state space that allows us to address our questions of interest. In
principle, there could be many more states in these Markov models to capture
the technology transition process in greater resolution, including, for example,
laboratory and prototype stages, where substantial public R&D funds are
directed, in addition to an early commercialization stage. However, from our
perspective, expanding the state space would make the analysis much more
cumbersome without fundamentally altering the insights that can be obtained
from the models. Furthermore, in a practical application, the definitions of
the states are flexible as long as they are consistent; they are interpreted by
the modeler based on the particular application and available data.
The policymaker receives a reward in each time period depending on the
In a technology development application, one might assume that the probability of
regressing is zero (i.e., if a technology achieves better performance and cost, there is little
reason to believe that this progress would be lost).
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destination of that period’s transition. More advanced stages of the diffusion
process confer higher rewards. The policymaker’s objective is to maximize
the total expected discounted reward over an infinite horizon, incentivizing a
faster progression from State 1 to State 2, and ultimately to State 3.
Policy interventions are represented in both models as paying for more
favorable transition probabilities. Therefore, the policymaker must consider
both the costs and benefits of intervention before determining whether it is
justified. Note that we are not concerned with the particular form of the
policy instrument, which could be a subsidy for consumer adoption, funding
for cost-reducing or performance-enhancing R&D, or something else entirely.
Since we focus only on the costs and benefits of policy intervention, our models
are capable of considering a range of different policy instruments, resulting in
a parsimonious and flexible modeling approach. Our analysis will focus on
the WTP for policy interventions at various stages of the diffusion process.
Characterizing the WTP helps decision makers determine at which stage(s),
if any, policy is justified.
The fundamental distinction between the MRP and MDP models is the
way they incorporate technology policy costs. In the MRP model, the policy
cost is incurred once, upfront, as a lump sum payment. Essentially, the
policymaker must compare the additional total expected discounted reward of
the MRP under the (more favorable) policy parameterization of the transition
probability matrix to the one-time cost of the policy. In the MDP model,
policy costs are incurred every time the diffusion process is in a state targeted
by the intervention. In reality, the MRP and MDP models are best suited
to different types of policy instruments. For example, R&D investment which
permanently enhances the performance of a technology seems well aligned
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Figure 3.1. Diagram of our Markov reward process (MRP) model.
with the persistent effect of the one-time investment in the MRP, whereas an
adoption subsidy during a particular phase of the technology life cycle seems
to correspond better to the recurrent cost accounting of the MDP.
3.3.1 Markov reward process model
Figure 3.1 presents a diagram of our MRP model. Here, we explain the
notation, then define the WTP in the MRP context.
Every realization of the diffusion process begins in State 1. With proba-
bility p, the process transitions from State 1 to State 2, or with the comple-
mentary probability 1−p, the process stays in State 1 for an additional period.
Once in State 2, the process transitions back to State 1 with probability s,
transitions to State 3 with probability q, or remains in State 2 for an additional
period with probability 1 − q − s. We depict the transition from State 2
to State 1 with a dashed line because we also consider a special case where
this transition cannot occur. State 3 is absorbing and thus represents the
completion of the technology transition. For a value system, we associate
rewards r2 and r3 with transitions to States 2 and 3, respectively, assuming that
r3 > r2. The policymaker maximizes the total expected discounted reward of
the MRP, with constant discount factor δ, minus the upfront cost of whichever
policy intervention she undertakes.
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Each possible policy intervention corresponds to a parameterization of
the MRP’s transition probability matrix, as well as the one-time policy cost.
Let the set of possible policy interventions be denoted M = {µ0, µ1, µ2, µ12},
where µ0 = {p, s, q}, µ1 = {p′, s, q}, µ2 = {p, s′, q′}, and µ12 = {p′, s′, q′}.
Parameterization µ0 represents the laissez-faire status quo of the system and
has zero cost. The subscripts on the other elements of M indicate which
transition probabilities change under selection of that policy intervention.
For example, selecting policy intervention (parameterization) µ1 increases the
transition probability from State 1 to State 2 from the status quo probability
p to the higher probability p′. We only consider policy probabilities that are
more favorable than status quo probabilities, so that p′ > p, q′ > q, and s′ < s.
To clearly distinguish our analysis of the MRP model from that of the
MDP model, we let vµkMRP (i) denote the “value to go” at state i of the MRP
under parameterization µk. Our analysis in the next section will focus on the
quantity WTP µkMRP , which is the willingness to pay for policy intervention µk
in the MRP model. Definition 3.1 formally defines WTP µkMRP .





The policymaker’s WTP for policy µk is thus equal to the difference
between the total expected discounted rewards under policy µk and under
the status quo µ0 (which is equivalent to the difference between their values
to go from State 1, where the process always begins). If the cost of policy µk
We do not consider a policy, for example, that improves the regressive transition
probability s, but not also q, i.e. {p, s′, q}. In order to limit the policy comparisons we
make, we assume that policy intervention targeting a state affects all transition probabilities
out of that state simultaneously. Perhaps in an extended case study, such “split” policies
could be considered, despite the inherent difficulty in parameterization.
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Figure 3.2. Diagram of our Markov decision process (MDP) model.
is below WTP µkMRP , then policy µk is preferred to the status quo. Otherwise,
policy µk is a suboptimal choice.
3.3.2 Markov decision process model
Figure 3.2 presents a diagram of the MDP model. Unlike in the MRP
model, the set of policy interventions in the MDP is the set of infinite horizon
stationary policies in the traditional MDP sense. This set is Π = {π0, π1, π2, π12},
where the subscripts have the same meaning as in the MRP model. Each of
the policies is described by an underlying transition probability matrix as well
as the costs of taking the specified policy actions every time the process is
in an affected state. The policies are given by π0 = {p, s, q}, π1 = {p′, s, q},
π2 = {p, s′, q′}, and π12 = {p′, s′, q′} with associated costs cπ1MDP in State 1,
cπ2MDP in State 2, and c
π12
MDP in both States 1 and 2, respectively. For example,
under policy π1 = {p′, s, q}, the transition probability from State 1 to State
2 increases from p to p′ and a cost cπ1MDP (negative reward) is incurred every
time the process is in State 1. Note that we assume that, for policy π12,
identical costs are incurred for policy intervention in States 1 and 2. For the
same reason given above in the MRP model, we do not consider other possible
policy combinations such as {p, s′, q}.
We let vπkMDP (i) denote the value to go at state i of the MDP under policy
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πk. We are interested in the willingness to pay for a particular policy πk,
formalized in Definition 3.2.




MDP (1) = v
π0
MDP (1)}.
The policymaker’s WTP for policy πk is the recurring policy cost in all
states affected by πk that makes the policymaker indifferent between imple-
menting this policy intervention or doing nothing (π0). In other words, if the
recurring policy cost associated with policy πk is exactly WTP
πk
MDP , then the
total expected discounted reward under πk will be the same as that under the
status quo. If cπkMDP < WTP
πk
MDP , then the policymaker prefers policy inter-
vention πk to the laissez-faire approach. Otherwise, policy πk is suboptimal.
In the case of policy π12, Definition 3.2 remains valid since the cost of policy
action in State 1 is equal to the cost of policy action in State 2.
It is important to recognize that WTP µkMRP and WTP
πk
MDP are not directly
comparable, since the two thresholds are defined differently due to the distinct
cost accounting schemes of the MRP and MDP models. The former is a
one-time, upfront cost, while the latter is the cost of policy actions within
the MDP that can be incurred numerous times. However, our results reveal
key similarities and differences between the two models, providing powerful
insights into technology policy decision making with upfront or recurring costs.
While the interpretation of WTP in the MRP model is immediately intuitive, care
should be taken when interpreting WTP in the MDP. For example, if the policymaker
chooses policy π1 in the MDP model, the policymaker does not in fact pay c
π1
MDP , but
a discounted random stream of cπ1MDP in different periods. Regardless, analysis of the
WTP allows a comparison among policies (principally, against taking no intervention) and
a comparison between the MRP and MDP models themselves. In reality, as is demonstrated
in the numerical analysis in Section 3.5 and the case study in Section 3.6, the optimal




In this section, we first derive the WTPs in both models, then derive
several key analytical results that describe the behaviors of both models and
reveal important differences between them.
3.4.1 Analysis of the Markov reward process model
We start by deriving WTP µ1MRP , the amount the policymaker is willing
to pay upfront for the policy intervention targeting State 1. We must first
determine the State 1 value functions under parameterizations µ0 and µ1.
The Bellman equations that define the value functions of the MRP under
parameterization µ0 are

vµ0MRP (1) = pr2 + δ(1− p)v
µ0
MRP (1) + δpv
µ0
MRP (2),
vµ0MRP (2) = (1− q − s)r2 + qr3 + δsv
µ0
MRP (1) + δ(1− q − s)v
µ0
MRP (2) + δqv
µ0
MRP (3),




Rewards are received upon transitions to States 2 and 3, and are discounted
to the present by discount factor δ. By symmetry, we do not need to solve the
other three sets of Bellman equations corresponding to parameterizations µ1,
µ2, and µ12 separately, since the one-time policy cost does not directly affect
the total expected discounted reward.
We solve the Bellman equations by substitution and obtain the analytical
solution
vµ0MRP (1) =
pr2 + δpqr3/(1− δ)
(1− δ + δq + δs)(1− δ) + δp(1− δ + δq)
. (3.2)
90

















Special case WTP µ2MRP
(r3−r2)(q′−q)δp
(1−δ+δq′)(1−δ+δq)(1−δ+δp)





Then, we deriveWTP µ1MRP according to Definition 3.1, and the result is reported
in Table 3.1. Intuitively, under our assumption that p′ > p, WTP µ1MRP is always
positive. We also consider the special case in which the regressive transition
from State 2 back to State 1 (dashed line in Figure 3.1) is not allowed (i.e.,
s = s′ = 0). Table 3.1 includes the expression for WTP µ1MRP under this special
case as well.
Derivations of the WTP expressions for the other MRP policy interven-
tions, which are procedurally analogous, are provided in the appendix. The
analytical results for their WTPs in the general and special (i.e., s = s′ = 0)
cases are all included in Table 3.1.
3.4.2 Analysis of the Markov decision process model
We now proceed through the derivation of the WTPs in the MDP model.
First, we consider WTP π1MDP , the amount the policymaker is willing to pay for
policy intervention targeting State 1, incurred every time the diffusion process
is in State 1. We must first determine the value functions of the MDP under
91
policy π0, given as the solution to the Bellman equations

vπ0MDP (1) = pr2 + δ(1− p)v
π0
MDP (1) + δpv
π0
MDP (2),
vπ0MDP (2) = (1− q − s)r2 + qr3 + δsv
π0
MDP (1) + δ(1− q − s)v
π0
MDP (2) + δqv
π0
MDP (3),




Because stationary policy π0 represents the status quo of the system, it has
no associated costs, and the solution to the Bellman equations is the same as
it was in the MRP model under parameterization µ0 (see Eq. (3.2)).
We solve the Bellman equations for vπ0MDP (1), the total expected discounted
reward when stationary policy π0 is chosen and the process begins in State 1.
Its solution is
vπ0MDP (1) =
pr2 + δpqr3/(1− δ)
(1− δ + δq + δs)(1− δ) + δp(1− δ + δq)
. (3.4)
Now we solve the Bellman equations associated with policy π1,

vπ1MDP (1) = −c
π1
MDP + p
′r2 + δ(1− p′)vπ1MDP (1) + δp′v
π1
MDP (2),
vπ1MDP (2) = (1− q − s)r2 + qr3 + δsv
π1
MDP (1) + δ(1− q − s)v
π1
MDP (2) + δqv
π1
MDP (3),




to determine the total expected discounted reward when stationary policy π1
is chosen. Note that cπ1MDP is the cost incurred under stationary policy π1
whenever the process is in State 1.
We solve the system in Eq. (3.5) by substitution, obtaining the the
total expected discounted reward when stationary policy π1 is chosen and
the process begins in State 1, vπ1MDP (1), as
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Special case WTP π2MDP
(q′−q)(r3−r2)
1−δ+δq





′qr3/(1− δ)− cπ1MDP (1− δ + δq + δs)
(1− δ + δq + δs)(1− δ) + δp′(1− δ + δq)
. (3.6)
We can now derive WTP π1MDP by applying Definition 3.2 and solving for
cπ1MDP . Relative to not intervening, the policymaker is willing to pay WTP
π1
MDP
every time the process is in State 1 in exchange for replacing the transition
probability p out of State 1 with the more favorable probability p′. The
expressions for the WTPs in the general and special (i.e., s = s′ = 0) cases
are provided in Table 3.2, for this policy π1 as well as the other MDP policies.
The derivations of the WTP expressions for policies π2 and π12, which are
procedurally analogous, are provided in the appendix.
Note that MDP stationary policy πk and MRP parameterization µk induce
exactly the same underlying transition probability matrix. However, the mech-
anism of accounting for policy cost is fundamentally different and so WTP πkMDP
and WTP µkMRP are not directly comparable policy decision thresholds.
3.4.3 Analytical results common to both the MRP and MDP models
Using the WTP results derived above, we analytically characterize key
behaviors which are common to both the MRP and MDP models in this
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subsection, then establish their most important differences in Section 3.4.4.
In our cost-benefit approach, the magnitudes of the rewards received in
States 2 and 3 are major drivers of the policymaker’s WTP for policy inter-
vention. We therefore begin with Proposition 3.1, which characterizes the
effects that the state rewards have on the policymaker’s WTPs for policy
intervention. We first note that all WTPs for policy intervention are linear in
both rewards r2 and r3, a direct consequence of the Bellman equations used
to derive the WTP expressions. We would not expect this to be the case
if, for example, the policymaker were risk-averse and were maximizing the
total expected discounted utility of rewards. Furthermore, we find that while
WTPs are always increasing in the absorbing state’s reward (r3), they are not
necessarily increasing in the intermediate state’s reward (r2). Whether WTP
is increasing or decreasing with respect to r2 depends on a tradeoff between
competing mechanisms, which we describe below.
Proposition 3.1. All WTPs in both models increase linearly with r3, but
the WTPs for policy interventions targeting State 2, or States 1 and 2, can
decrease linearly with r2.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The policies targeting State 1 only, µ1 and π1, raise the transition proba-
bility from State 1 to State 2 (from p to p′), meaning that r2 rewards tend to be
earned sooner in less discounted periods. Hence, the WTPs for State 1 policies
are increasing in the r2 state reward. Similarly, these policy interventions mean
that State 3 tends to be reached sooner, so their WTPs are also increasing in
For interested readers, a comprehensive comparative statics analysis of all WTP
expressions with respect to the model parameters is included in the appendix.
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r3. However, policies targeting State 2 only (µ2 and π2) raise q to q
′, meaning
that less time is spent in State 2, and therefore the State 2 reward is collected
less often. Indeed, the policymaker is paying to leave State 2 faster, and the
incentive to do this is weaker if the reward for being in State 2 is higher. On
the other hand, in the general case, policy intervention also decreases s to s′,
which can make the process spend more time in State 2 by opposing regression
to State 1. We find, then, that the reactions of WTP µ2MRP and WTP
π2
MDP to a
change in r2 depend on the tradeoff between the intervention increasing q to q
′
but decreasing s to s′. Therefore, the behaviors of these WTPs with respect to
r2 depend on the particular parameterization. Finally, the policies that target
State 2 imply reaching State 3 sooner, so their WTPs are always increasing in
r3.
For policies targeting both States 1 and 2, there exists a similar tradeoff
with respect to the intermediate state reward r2. Working to increaseWTP
µ12
MRP ,
raising p to p′ and decreasing s to s′ imply that more time is spent collecting
r2 in State 2. Working in the opposite direction, increasing q to q
′ causes less
time to be spent in State 2. Again, the behavior of this WTP with respect to
r2 depends on the particular parameterization.
Next, we turn to the effects of the status-quo transition probabilities –
those which are improved upon via policy intervention – on the WTPs for the
policies. In Proposition 3.2, we find that the WTPs in both models increase
at an accelerating rate as the status-quo transition probabilities of advancing
from states targeted by the policies (i.e., p for policies µ1 and π1, and q for
Establishing the behaviors of WTPπ12MDP analytically has proven far less tractable than
that of WTPµ12MRP . Nevertheless, based on numerical results, this WTP appears to share
many of the features of the µ12 policy in the MRP model.
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policies µ2 and π2) decrease toward zero.
Proposition 3.2. In both models, as the status-quo transition probability of
the diffusion process advancing from a stage declines toward zero, the WTP
for the policy targeting this stage increases at an accelerating rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
While it is immediately intuitive why the WTPs for State 1 policy inter-
ventions decrease with p and WTPs for State 2 policy interventions decrease
with q, the second-order property of these relationships is a noteworthy conse-
quence of the model structure considering how few assumptions are required
to support it. Another way to interpret these results is that overestimating
the status-quo transition probability will be more problematic for cost-benefit
analysis than underestimating this parameter. While the analysis of WTP π12MDP
is not analytically tractable, we are able to prove that WTP µ12MRP also increases
more and more steeply as the status-quo p and q transition probabilities decline
towards zero.
We now shed light on the implications of the possibility of regressing from
State 2 to State 1. Including the possibility of regressing enriches our model’s
ability to inform technology policy.
Proposition 3.3. In both models, as the status-quo probability (s) of the
regressive transition from State 2 to State 1 increases, the WTP for State
2 intervention increases, though this effect is diminishing on the margin.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Policy intervention in State 2 works to not only increase the transition
probability from State 2 to State 3, but also to decrease the probability of
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regressing from State 2 to State 1. Naturally, then, increases in s, the status-
quo transition probability, induce increases in WTP (Proposition 3.3). The
higher the status-quo transition probability s is, the more time the process
spends oscillating between State 1 and State 2, increasing the expected time
to absorption. Therefore, the value of the component of State 2 policy interven-
tion that increases the transition probability from State 2 to State 3 dimin-
ishes, since it is rendered more ineffective by the high regressive transition
probability. Hence, while the WTP increases with the status-quo regres-
sive transition probability, its increases are diminishing on the margin. This
oscillation between early and intermediate stages may be interpreted as the
technology succumbing to the “valley of death,” in which early commercial
demonstration of the technology beyond protected niches fails due to market
and innovation system failures. In directly stimulating the diffusion process
through, for example, public R&D money, a policymaker can prevent a slip
into the valley of death (Weyant, 2011). However, allocating public funds
for a technology at this stage can be controversial. For example, government
failures through “technology pork barrel” spending and limitations on “picking
the winner” may make policymakers hesitant about continuing to support
individual technologies (Nemet et al., 2018). While it is beyond the scope of
this chapter to assess specific policy formulations, our analytical results provide
general insights on the relative values of supporting technology deployment at
different stages.
3.4.4 Analytical results that highlight differences between the MRP
and MDP models
The previous subsection analytically established several key properties
that are common to both the MRP and MDP models. Here, in Proposition
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3.4, we identify the most striking difference between the two models, which
carries significant policy implications.
Proposition 3.4. With respect to the effectiveness of policy intervention (i.e.,
how much it improves the transition probabilities), the WTPs exhibit dimin-
ishing returns in the MRP but constant returns in the MDP.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
For State 1 policy interventions, WTP µ1MRP exhibits diminishing returns
with respect to raising the policy-enhanced transition probability p′, whereas
WTP π1MDP exhibits constant returns. We attribute this contrast to the different
cost accounting mechanisms. The total cost of stationary policy π1 is directly
related to the time spent in State 1, which is not the case for µ1 in the MRP
model. Therefore, beyond the benefits of reaching states with rewards r2 and
r3 faster, replacing p with the higher probability p
′ in the MDP model has
the additional benefit of pushing the process out of State 1 and thus avoiding
more periods incurring the policy cost cπ1MDP . This additional motivation to
move out of State 1 in the MDP is not present in the MRP case. As a general
technology policy insight, we believe that the added importance of moving the
diffusion process along when a lack of progress would imply recurring policy
costs is important to recognize.
For policies targeting State 2, increases in q′ and decreases in s′ also
generate constant returns in the MDP model, but diminishing returns in the
MRP model. The logic is analogous to the above discussion about policies
targeting State 1, and once again marks a major difference between policy
interventions in the MRP and MDP frameworks.
Again, while we are able to analytically prove that WTP µ12MRP for the
MRP policy targeting both States 1 and 2 exhibits diminishing returns with
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respect to p′ and q′, establishing a similar result for WTP π12MDP is analytically
intractable. Furthermore, in order for our WTP approach to make sense for
the MDP model (as structured by Definition 3.2), the policy costs incurred in
States 1 and 2 need to be equal. This restrictive assumption may not be very
realistic. So, to gain some insight into policy π12 that targets States 1 and 2
simultaneously in the MDP, in Section 3.5 we compute numerical results for
the most general MDP model in which policy costs in States 1 and 2 can differ.
We elaborate on other key differences between the MRP and MDP models
in Propositions 3.5 and 3.6, which explore the implications of the possibility
that the diffusion process regresses. First, in Proposition 3.5, we find that,
while the WTP for policy intervention in State 1 decreases monotonically
with the regressive transition probability in the MDP model, the effect on the
WTP is non-monotonic in the MRP model.
Proposition 3.5. Increasing the probability of the regressive transition (s)
decreases the WTP for State 1 intervention monotonically in the MDP, but its
effect on the WTP for State 1 intervention is non-monotonic in the MRP.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
In the MRP model, until s reaches some constant C2, incremental increases
in s raise the policymaker’s WTP for policy intervention targeting State 1.
So, in this region of s, a higher s implies a more urgent need to push the
technology transition out of State 1. However, beyond this constant C2,
WTP µ1MRP actually declines in s. The fact that the WTP does not increase
with s over the entire allowable domain of s is actually straightforward to
interpret. Indeed, as s gets very close to one, the policy intervention targeting
C2 may lie outside (0, 1− q), the allowable domain of s.
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State 1 becomes ineffective; even when the technology diffusion process reaches
State 2, it would be far more likely to regress to State 1 than to advance to
State 3 and complete the transition. There is thus limited value in increasing
the transition probability out of State 1 to p′ if s is very high.
However, in the MDP model, WTP π1MDP is monotonically decreasing every-
where with respect to the regressive transition probability s, which was not
the case in the MRP model. The contrast is fairly intuitive. A higher value
of s means that the diffusion process is more likely to return to, and spend
more overall time in, State 1. In the MDP model, spending more time in
State 1 means incurring the policy cost cπ1MDP more often, thus making policy
π1 less attractive. Hence, this contrast is due to the different cost accounting
mechanisms. A policymaker, then, would need to pay careful attention to
the probability of regressing if she is considering policy intervention that
targets State 1 via an up-front policy cost. If this probability of regressing is
particularly high, policy intervention targeting State 2’s regressive transition
probability may be more effective in supporting the technology transition.
In Proposition 3.5 above, we found that the effect the regressive transition
probability has on the WTP for State 1 policy intervention is non-monotonic
in the MRP model. This non-monotonic behavior is, in fact, unique to the
MRP model, as presented in Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 3.6. Including the regressive transition induces a non-monotonic
relationship between the WTP and the non-targeted, status-quo transition prob-
abilities in the MRP model only.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
We begin with policies targeting State 1. The µ1 policy intervention only
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increases the transition probability from the initial to the intermediate diffu-
sion stage (p′), but is made more valuable by a higher transition probability
from intermediate to complete diffusion (q). With no danger of regressing
from State 2 back to State 1, a higher q always implies a greater WTP. The
interpretation is not immediately intuitive; no matter how high q becomes,
incremental increases in q always add value to µ1, though diminishing on the
margin. However, if there is a danger of regressing from State 2 back to State
1 (i.e., s > 0), then there may exist a C1 ∈ (0, 1 − s) such that WTP µ1MRP
reaches a maximum at q = C1, then falls thereafter. In other words, there
may exist a point at which further increases in q actually reduce the benefit of
policy intervention in State 1, since q is already quite high and the technology
transition could possibly regress repeatedly from State 2 back to State 1. In
the MDP model, however, WTP is always increasing with respect to q and
always decreasing with respect to s. Again, as described under Proposition
3.5, we attribute this to the different cost accounting mechanisms.
For policies targeting State 2 in the MRP model, we also find non-monotonic
behavior if there is a possibility of regressing. If there is no danger of regressing
from State 2 back to State 1 (i.e., s = 0), then the policymaker is willing to pay
more for State 2 policy intervention as p increases. A higher p implies that the
process transitions faster from the initial to the intermediate diffusion stage,
which is targeted by µ2. Therefore, the full technology diffusion process will
be completed faster, and policy intervention in State 2 to accelerate the final
transition to State 3 becomes more valuable because it now tends to occur in
less discounted time periods. However, this need not be the case if there is
C1 may lie right of (0, 1− s), in which case the general and special cases have identical
first-order behavior in q.
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a danger of regressing back to State 1 (i.e., s, s′ > 0). In particular, it may
be the case that when p > C3, a value where WTP
µ2
MRP reaches a maximum,
further increases in p actually reduce the value of policy intervention µ2 to
raise the probability of advancing from the subsequent, intermediate stage. In
other words, if there is a danger of regressing from State 2 back to State 1 and
p is high enough, then the later-stage policy intervention µ2 could lose some
of its benefit.
In the MDP model, however, there is no non-monotonic behavior. Instead,
a tradeoff captures how the WTP behaves with the transition probability p.
Under stationary policy π2, the policy cost is incurred whenever the diffusion
process is in State 2. If there is no possibility of regressing from State 2
back to State 1, then once the process transitions to State 2, the total cost
of the policy no longer depends on p. However, in the general case, there are
two possibilities. WTP π2MDP is either concave increasing or convex decreasing
in p; which tendency prevails depends on a tradeoff. If the difference s′ −
s is relatively large, then policy π2 significantly reduces the probability of
regressing. In this case, as p increases, WTP π2MDP decreases because the
consequences of regressing to State 1 – which the policy helps avoid – are
less dire. With a higher p, the process is less likely to remain in State 1 for
long. On the other hand, if the difference q′−q is relatively large, then increases
in p make π2 more valuable by driving the process toward the affected State 2
faster. Therefore, the policy tends to act in less discounted time periods, and
WTP π2MDP increases with p. So, the behavior of the WTP with respect to p
depends on whether π2 has a greater effect on raising q or reducing s. This
The inequality that represents this tradeoff can be found in Appendix A.6.
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important tradeoff appeared in our analysis of the possible non-monotonicity
of WTP µ2MRP in p.
3.5 Numerical examples
In this section, we fully parameterize the most general MDP model, including
the policy costs, and solve the MDP numerically to explore how the optimal
technology policy portfolio varies over the parameter space. Instead of analyzing
the WTP thresholds, as we did in the previous section, here we determine
which policy portfolio maximizes the total expected discounted reward for each
parameter setting. The policymaker has two technology policy interventions
available. One intervention targets State 1, the other targets State 2, and
their costs (c1MDP and c
2
MDP , respectively) need not be equal. The decision
alternatives for the policymaker are then the four possible policy portfolios,
each of which is a stationary policy for the MDP: do not intervene and settle
for the status quo (π0), implement only the intervention targeting State 1
(π1), implement only the intervention targeting State 2 (π2), or implement
both interventions simultaneously (π12). We compute the optimal policies
numerically via policy iteration. The figures we present and discuss below,
which we call optimal policy mappings, illustrate how our model can be used
to guide technology policy decision making in the most general context.
We begin with Figure 3.3, which shows how the optimal policy varies
with the status quo transition probabilities p and q. Figure 3.3(a) on the
The policy iteration algorithm for solving MDPs iterates over policies, monotonically
improving the value functions, which leads to guaranteed convergence if there are finite
numbers of states and actions Bertsekas (2012). The WTP quantities derived in Section 3.4
are relative measurements, so to find the strictly best policy, we employ the policy iteration
algorithm.
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left represents the general case where the regressive transition from State
2 back to State 1 is possible, and Figure 3.3(b) on the right corresponds
to the special case where this transition is ruled out. The color at a given
(p, q) location indicates which technology policy portfolio is optimal for that
parameterization. If both p and q are low, it is optimal for the policymaker
to intervene in both states. If p is low but q is high, the policymaker should
choose to implement the State 1 intervention only, since intervention in State
2 is no longer warranted. Comparing the left and right plots, though, when
s > 0 in the general case, the policymaker requires a higher value of q to
forgo policy intervention in State 2. Next, when p and q are both high, the
policymaker should take no actions. The region where it is optimal to not
intervene is smaller in the general case on the left than in the special case
on the right. Indeed, the possibility of regressing from State 2 back to State
1 is an additional motivation to raise the probabilities of advancing through
the diffusion process, especially from State 2 where the regressive transition
originates. We draw from this an important conclusion: when the regressive
transition from State 2 back to State 1 is allowed, the State 2 Only and States
1 and 2 regions are larger, whereas the State 1 Only and No Intervention
regions are smaller.
Figure 3.4 is an optimal policy mapping with the same format as Figure
3.3, but here the policymaker locates a position with respect to the status-
quo transition probability from State 1 to State 2 (p) and the cost of policy
intervention in State 1 (c1MDP ). Clearly, it is never optimal to pay any amount
to intervene in State 1 if the policy-induced transition probability p′ is less than
p, the region to the right of the vertical dashed line in the figure. Furthermore,
as the policy cost increases, the domain of p over which it is optimal for the
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Figure 3.3. Optimal policy mapping with respect to the status quo transition
probabilities p and q. The plot on the left (a) is the general case with s > 0
and the plot on the right (b) is the special case with s = 0. The baseline
parameterization is p′ = 0.5, q′ = 0.5, s = 0.2, s′ = 0, c1MDP = 20, c
2
MDP = 30,
r2 = 50, r3 = 100, and δ = 0.95. The dashed lines represent the policy-
enhanced transition probabilities p′ and q′. Because s is fixed at 0.2 for this
sensitivity analysis, q on the y-axes cannot exceed 0.8, lest the transition
probability matrix be ill-defined. Therefore, we have depicted an upper bound




Figure 3.4. Optimal policy mapping with respect to the status quo transition
probability p and the recurring cost of State 1 policy intervention c1MDP . The
plot on the left (a) is the general case with s > 0 and the plot on the right (b) is
the special case with s = 0. The baseline parameterization is p′ = 0.5, q = 0.25,
q′ = 0.35, s = 0.1, s′ = 0, c2MDP = 50, r2 = 50, r3 = 100, and δ = 0.95. The
dashed line represents the policy-enhanced transition probability p′.
policymaker to intervene shrinks. In the special case with s = 0, the only
policies which are ever optimal are the laissez-faire approach and intervening
in State 1 only. In the general case with s > 0, however, when p is low and
c1MDP is high, it can be optimal for the policymaker to intervene in both States
1 and 2 or even to target State 2 only. Intuitively, when the cost of policy
intervention in State 1 is high enough, it is valuable to reduce s from State 2 so
that this high cost is incurred less often. In other words, an expensive policy
that targets State 1 should be complemented by an intervention in State 2 to
help prevent the recurrence of high policy costs from spending a lot of time in
State 1. Again, we see that the possibility of the diffusion process regressing
significantly alters the optimal policy landscape.
Figure 3.5 presents a similar optimal policy mapping with respect to the
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status-quo transition probability and policy cost, but for State 2 instead of
State 1. When q and c2MDP are both small, it is optimal to intervene in both
States 1 and 2. With a higher cost, it is no longer optimal to select the policy
portfolio that targets both states. It is very interesting that, as the State 2
policy intervention becomes more expensive, it is often the State 1 intervention
that is abandoned rather than the State 2 intervention. Under this particular
parameterization, obtaining more favorable transition probabilities from State
2 appears to be inherently more valuable. Another striking feature of Figure
3.5 are the different optimal policies to the right of the vertical dashed lines
(q′ = 0.5) in the general case with s > 0 on the left and the special case with
s = 0 on the right. In the special case, there is no reason to pay any amount to
replace q with a lower q′, so it is optimal to intervene in State 1 only. However,
in the general case, under some circumstances, it is actually optimal for the
policymaker to reduce q if it comes with a lower s. Essentially, the policymaker
improves her prospects by accepting a lower probability of advancing from
State 2 to State 3 in exchange for a lower probability of regressing from State
2 back to State 1. This unintuitive behavior begins to disappear as c2MDP
increases and the option of not intervening takes over. As before, a consistent
theme we observe in the results is that the possibility of regressing from a more
advanced stage to an earlier one critically alters the diffusion process and the
optimal policy approach.
3.6 Case study: Lithium-ion batteries
While our models are quite abstract to permit analytical results, the model
primitives (states, transition probabilities, policy intervention costs, and state
rewards) can be interpreted and parameterized to inform technology policy
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Figure 3.5. Optimal policy mapping with respect to the status quo transition
probability q and the recurring cost of State 2 policy intervention c2MDP . The
plot on the left (a) is the general case with s > 0 and the plot on the right
(b) is the special case with s = 0. The baseline parameterization is p = 0.1,
p′ = 0.2, q′ = 0.5, s = 0.1, s′ = 0, c1MDP = 65, r2 = 50, r3 = 100, and δ = 0.95.
The dashed line represents the policy-enhanced transition probability q′.
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in reality. In this section, we demonstrate the practical applicability of our
approach by conducting a case study on technology policy for lithium-ion (Li-
ion) batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) using the MDP model. Note that this
case study demonstrates the application of the MDP model to a technology
development process, rather than diffusion.
The timely decarbonization of the transport sector is one of the most
challenging components of climate change mitigation, as the current perfor-
mance and cost characteristics of batteries mean that EVs are struggling to
displace their gasoline-fueled counterparts. Several expert elicitation studies
have attempted to quantify the uncertainties in Li-ion battery development by
surveying numerous experts in the field (Few et al., 2018; Verdolini et al., 2018).
While each expert elicitation follows its own methodology, scenario definitions,
and outcome metrics, the results of these studies can serve as useful inputs
to stochastic decision making frameworks like our Markov models. As it is
outside the scope of this study to conduct our own expert elicitation designed
specifically to parameterize our models, we adapt the expert elicitation results
from Baker et al. (2010) to fit our parameter definitions. The Baker et al.
(2010) study provides experts’ subjective assessments of the probabilities of
successfully achieving two well-defined technological endpoints, conditional on
two public R&D funding scenarios for Li-ion batteries. To demonstrate the
application of our MDP model to the Li-ion battery case, we parameterize it
using the probability assessments of one of the experts surveyed in that study,
shown in Table 3.3.
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Public R&D funding scenario
$30M/yr over 10 years $70M/yr over 10 years
Probability of achieving Low Endpoint 0.2105 0.3209
Probability of achieving High Endpoint 0.0656 0.1503
Table 3.3. Expert 5’s subjective probability assessment on Li-ion battery
technology from Baker et al. (2010).
3.6.1 Case study parameterization
We let States 2 and 3 in our MDP represent the Low and High Endpoints,
respectively, from Baker et al. (2010). In their paper, each endpoint is defined
according to capital cost, power density, specific energy, lifetime, and recharge
rate benchmarks. State 1 represents the current state of Li-ion technology at
a capital cost of $384/kWh, the baseline figure for 2010 referenced by Baker
et al. (2010). Even the Low Endpoint represents significant technological
improvements relative to the characteristics at the time of publication of the
elicitation study. To translate the subjective probability assessments into
transition probabilities between states in our MDP model, we assume that
(1) transitions occur in five-year intervals, (2) there is no possibility of the
development process regressing from State 2 to State 1 (i.e., the special case
s = s′ = 0), and (3) the development process with no policy intervention
Baker et al. (2010) defined these endpoints through discussions with experts. The Low
Endpoint’s characteristics are: specific energy of 150 Wh/kg, power density of 460 W/L,
lifetime of 8 years, recharge rate of 6 hours, and capital cost of $200/kWh. The High
Endpoint’s characteristics are: specific energy of 200 Wh/kg, power density of 600 W/L,
lifetime of 10 years, recharge rate of 3 hours, and capital cost of $125/kWh.
Our case study thus corresponds to a policymaker in 2010 making technology policy
decisions on Li-ion batteries based on the state of the technology and information available
in that year. While we would have preferred to present a more forward-looking case study,
more recent expert elicitation results in the form required by our models could not be
identified. As a demonstration of applying our model using expert elicitation results as
inputs, our case study suffices.
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(status-quo transition probabilities p and q) models the development of Li-
ion EV batteries under the lower $30M/yr funding scenario. Therefore, the
recurring cost of policy intervention in both States 1 and 2 is $200M, which
represents the $40M/yr incremental cost of the more aggressive R&D funding
scenario maintained over a five-year period duration. To determine the p and
q transition probabilities, we equate the total probability of reaching State
2 in two periods (10 years) to 0.2105, the expert’s probability assessment of
reaching the Low Endpoint in 10 years under the baseline funding trajectory.
Next we equate the total probability of reaching State 3 in two periods (10
years) to 0.0656, the expert’s probability assessment of reaching the High
Endpoint in 10 years under the baseline funding trajectory. We determine the
p′ and q′ transition probabilities the same way, except we use the probability
assessments under the higher ($70M/yr) funding trajectory. We solve the
system of equations

0.2105 = (1− p)p+ p(1− q),
0.0656 = pq,
0.3209 = (1− p′)p′ + p′(1− q′),
0.1503 = p′q′
(3.7)
by substitution to determine all transition probabilities p, p′, q, and q′.
Finally, we parameterize the state rewards r2 and r3 based on the five-
year total cost savings on Li-ion EV battery capacity deployment in the U.S.
resulting from being at the Low ($200/kWh) or High ($125/kWh) Endpoint,
respectively, compared to the baseline capital cost ($384/kWh). For example,
In theory, we could choose any (smaller) interval length for transitions, but five-year
intervals were chosen because they yield a relatively simple quadratic system of equations
to solve for the transition probabilities.
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Table 3.4. Complete parameterization of the MDP model for the Li-ion












assuming an average annual U.S. deployment of 0.62M EVs per five-year
interval (IEA, 2019) and an average battery capacity of 30 kWh, the reward in
State 2 is r2 = ($384/kWh−$200/kWh)∗30 kWh∗0.62M∗5 yrs = $17, 112M.
This accounting is in line with our model’s objective: to determine if and
when additional public R&D funding is warranted. In other words, the model
assesses whether the expected cost savings from deliberate investments to
accelerate the development of Li-ion EV batteries outweigh the costs of these
policy interventions. Finally, we choose a standard discount factor of 0.95.
The complete parameterization of the MDP model is given in Table 3.4.
3.6.2 Case study results
Based on the parameterization in Table 3.4, we calculate the expected
total discounted rewards for the four possible technology policies in Table 3.5.
The optimal policy, therefore, is to fund public R&D for Li-ion batteries at
the higher $70M/yr rate until the High Endpoint (State 3) is achieved.
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Table 3.5. Expected total discounted rewards for the four possible policies in
the Li-ion battery case study. It is optimal for the policymaker to fund R&D
at $70M/yr in both States 1 and 2.
State 2




Table 3.5 reveals that the net benefits of increasing early public R&D
funding (State 1) for Li-ion batteries are particularly large, and that the
net benefits of later R&D funding (State 2) are less pronounced (though
still positive). Furthermore, we have arrived at the optimality of high levels
of R&D funding using a conservative parameterization of the state rewards,
making our case study’s conclusions rather persuasive. First, we only consider
the application of Li-ion batteries to EVs. In reality, improvements in Li-ion
batteries would spill over to other applications, such as grid-scale electricity
storage to balance intermittent renewable generation, increasing benefits at no
additional cost. Second, we only consider EV battery deployment in the U.S.
Improvements driven by U.S. R&D spending would likely generate benefits
in other countries as well. Third, our case study assumes a fixed annual
deployment of Li-ion batteries in EVs. Reducing battery costs would stimulate
more extensive adoption of the technology, thus raising benefits. Fourth, our
crude estimation of benefits only considers direct capital cost savings due to
cheaper batteries in EVs. The monetized environmental benefits of reduced
air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions are not counted in our rewards.
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3.6.3 Future case studies
Our case study has demonstrated how the results of expert elicitation
studies can be used to parameterize the inputs to our Markov models. However,
some limitations arose due to the fact that we had to adapt the results of an
existing expert elicitation study to the specific structure of our MDP model.
To address these shortcomings, a future elicitation could be carried out that
clearly defines the relevant attributes of the technology in each of the states,
and designs the study to directly elicit the transition probabilities conditional
on policy decision alternatives. Questions necessary to elicit the reward values
could be included within the expert elicitation, or the rewards could be esti-
mated separately through the type of calculation we performed above, or
through the use of a more sophisticated model (e.g., an energy-economy model
that maps technology characteristics to minimized total cost objective values).
Most generally, our case study suggests that expert elicitations will be most
useful for informing policy when they are structured in harmony with a decision
making model that can directly incorporate their results as inputs.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have developed and analyzed two Markov models of
technology transitions to obtain generalizable insights into technology policy
decision making under uncertainty. We emphasize that our framework is a
cost-benefit analysis approach, instead of, for example, a cost-effectiveness
approach in which the policymaker faces a fixed policy budget. The first model
was a Markov reward process (MRP) that represents policy interventions with
one-time, upfront costs, while the second model was a Markov decision process
(MDP) that describes policy interventions with recurring costs. We derived
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analytical expressions for the willingness to pay (WTP) for policy interventions
that improve the probabilities of the technology diffusion or development
process advancing at various stages. We then analytically established key
similarities and differences between the two models. Next, we numerically
solved the most general MDP model to explore how the optimal technology
policy portfolio varies over the input parameter space. Finally, we applied
the MDP model to a case study on lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries for electric
vehicles (EVs).
We view the models themselves as our most significant contributions to
the literature. They constitute a theoretical framework for analyzing tech-
nology policy decision making under uncertainty that complements previous
case studies, empirical data analyses, qualitative models, and domain-specific
studies. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first authors to analytically
investigate technology policy decision making using an MDP methodology.
Despite our theoretical bent, the case study serves to demonstrate that our
models can be parameterized to provide practical decision support to poli-
cymakers. We believe that technology policy formulation is a very important
topic that can benefit a great deal from the continued application of operations
research tools.
Limiting assumptions are inevitable in this type of theoretical modeling
exercise designed to yield analytical results. The Markov assumption could
be limiting if the complete history of technology policy support influences
the current transition probabilities. The stationary transition probabilities
assumed in our models cannot accommodate probabilities that are affected
by the passage of time in addition to the state and policy action. Our state
rewards are also assumed to be exogenous and known, while remaining constant
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over time, limiting their ability to reflect changes in market size. Indeed,
beyond uncertainty in the diffusion or development process of a technology,
future research could consider modeling uncertainty in the model’s primi-
tives including the policy costs, state rewards, and the transition probabilities
themselves. Furthermore, we have assumed that our policymaker is risk-
neutral. Combining such uncertainty with a policymaker’s risk attitude may
generate valuable insights and lead to a stronger decision tool for informing
real-world technology policy. Nevertheless, our results all permit intuitive
explanations, as described throughout the chapter. The WTP thresholds
were derived by treating technology policy as a cost-benefit problem, so their
usefulness as decision guides would not necessarily extend to cost-effectiveness
settings where a fixed total budget for policy interventions is defined ex ante.
In that case, not every policy that generates net benefits could be pursued
simultaneously, so only the interventions with the greatest benefits relative
to costs should be implemented. Furthermore, our cost-benefit approach
to technology policy decision making omits other factors confounding policy
design such as political pressures and macroeconomic and geopolitical trends.
In terms of the specific results we obtain, the MRP and MDP models
demonstrate some intuitive similarities. WTPs vary linearly with the rewards.
They always increase with respect to the reward for being in the complete
diffusion stage, but the WTP for policy intervention in the intermediate stage
can decrease with the reward obtained in this stage since this reward makes
completing the diffusion process less urgent. As the status-quo probability of
the diffusion process advancing from a stage declines toward zero, the WTP
for policy targeting this stage increases more and more steeply.
The possibility of regressing from the intermediate stage back to the initial
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stage has a substantial impact on the behaviors of both models, and carries
important policy implications. In general, this possibility makes policy inter-
vention less valuable in the initial stage but more valuable in the intermediate
stage. With a danger of regressing from the intermediate stage back to the
initial stage, the policymaker has a higher WTP to raise the probability that
the diffusion process will advance from the intermediate stage to the complete
diffusion stage. The numerical results reveal that the presence of the regressive
transition in the MDP model makes policy intervention in the intermediate
stage an important complement to earlier intervention in the initial stage.
Without the former, the latter could incur policy costs repeatedly as the
process makes it to the intermediate stage only to return to where it began.
In fact, under certain circumstances, the policymaker would even be willing
to pay for an intervention that actually reduces the probability of advancing
from the intermediate stage to the complete diffusion stage if it comes with a
sufficiently large reduction in the probability of regressing back to the initial
stage. The possibility of regressing is also a necessary condition for all of the
non-monotonic behaviors we uncovered.
The structural properties of the MRP and MDP models exhibit a few
notable differences that suggest how policymakers ought to think differently
about technology policy interventions with one-time versus recurring costs.
The most striking difference is that, as the enhanced transition probabilities
that intervention would purchase improve further, the resulting increases in
WTP are subject to diminishing returns in the MRP, but are subject to
constant returns in the MDP. The added value of incremental increases in
the probabilities of advancing do not diminish in the MDP because the desire
to avoid incurring policy costs repeatedly is an additional motivation to move
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the diffusion process forward. The same reasoning explains why the MDP is
more powerfully affected by the possibility of a regressive transition than the
MRP is.
Despite the abstract nature of our models, which provide a valuable theo-
retical framework for analyzing technology policy decision making under uncer-
tainty, they can be applied to real technology problems as demonstrated by
our case study on Li-ion batteries. However, the case study highlighted how
expert elicitations and decision making models really ought to have harmonized
structures (with the expert elicitation results directly incorporated into a
decision making model as inputs) in order to more usefully inform policy.
Moving forward, we hope that other operations researchers will be attracted to
the technology policy topic, as it has substantial relevance to some of society’s
grandest challenges.
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A bilevel optimization model of
infrastructure-dependent technology adoption:
Overcoming the chicken-and-egg problem
4.1 Introduction
Many technologies in sectors such as energy, transportation, and telecom-
munications require large infrastructure systems to deliver benefits to adopters
and to society at large (Hughes, 1987). Some emerging infrastructure-dependent
technologies promise substantial social benefits, and policymakers are thus
interested in allocating public funds to support their diffusion. Relevant
examples today include 5G-enabled telecommunication devices and battery
electric vehicles (BEVs). The 5G wireless revolution, with its faster speed
and lower latency than previous technologies, promises novel applications such
as remote surgery and coordinated autonomous vehicle fleets (Cheng, 2019).
However, 5G-enabled end-user devices remain more expensive than previous
generation 4G alternatives, and the deployment of 5G radio hardware by U.S.
carriers is limited to a select few urban areas. Similarly, BEVs promise to
decarbonize transportation while achieving superior performance with lower
maintenance costs than vehicles fueled by gasoline (Higgins et al., 2017).
However, BEVs remain more expensive than their gasoline counterparts and
suffer from a dearth of high-voltage and ubiquitous charging points necessary
for mass adoption.
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A major obstacle facing the diffusion of infrastructure-dependent technolo-
gies is the “chicken-and-egg” problem (Huétink et al., 2010; van Bree et al.,
2010). On the one hand, consumers are reluctant to adopt a new technology
when the infrastructure required to support it is insufficiently developed. At
the same time, firms are hesitant to invest in the required infrastructure –
which is typically capital-intensive and high-risk – when there are too few
current adopters to make infrastructure provision profitable. The chicken-
and-egg problem is one example of the coordination failures that are invoked
as a justification for government policy intervention to support innovation
and diffusion (Salmenkaita and Salo, 2002). It is often accompanied by addi-
tional justifications such as the positive externalities stemming from network
economies of scale (Arthur, 1989) and learning-by-doing (van Benthem et al.,
2008), or the desire for a technology transition to avoid the negative external-
ities associated with incumbent technological systems (e.g., carbon emissions)
(Butter and den Hofkes, 2006; Nemet and Kammen, 2007).
Absent appropriate policy intervention, the chicken-and-egg problem can
result in existing technological systems remaining locked-in despite the emer-
gence of more appealing alternatives (Geels, 2002; Unruh, 2000). Policymakers
often attempt to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem (as well as other
market failures) by subsidizing both infrastructure investment and consumer
purchases of the new technology. Unfortunately, the existing literature provides
little guidance and few decision support tools for policymakers to determine
how to optimally allocate public resources toward incentives for infrastructure
investment versus consumer purchases. For example, the U.S. federal govern-
ment has spent billions of dollars on tax incentives to promote the diffusion of
alternative fuel vehicles and their associated refueling and charging stations.
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From 2009–2013, it spent 16 times as much on vehicle purchase subsidies as it
did on infrastructure investment subsidies (Leibowicz, 2018a). It is difficult to
assess whether that was the most beneficial use of public funds for innovation
diffusion, and the existing literature offers few insights on this important public
sector problem. While some previous studies have analyzed the chicken-and-
egg problem and its policy implications, they tend to be either empirical studies
focusing on a particular historical case study, or structural models that are
constructed to examine a specific technology and omit key decision variables
and interactions. This is the research gap that we address in this chapter.
To this end, we formulate a stylized model of technology policy decision
making from the perspective of a policymaker who seeks to stimulate the
market penetration of an infrastructure-dependent technology. Our model is
a bilevel optimization problem in which a policymaker (leader) maximizes net
social benefits by setting the levels of two incentives: a subsidy for a profit-
maximizing firm (follower) to invest in infrastructure that raises the benefit
of adoption to consumers, and a direct subsidy for consumers to adopt the
technology. Consumer uptake is then a function of the firm’s infrastructure
provision and the direct subsidy for consumer purchases. The policymaker’s
objective consists of benefits which scale with the level of adoption, minus the
costs of the policy incentives themselves.
We analytically derive the firm’s optimal infrastructure investment response
to the upper-level policy decisions, and show that the bilevel model is equiv-
alent to a quadratic program. To bypass non-convexity, we develop a custom
solution strategy based on decomposition, and find that it performs better
than directly applying an off-the-shelf solver to the potentially non-convex
problem. Finally, we present a case study on the diffusion of BEVs and obtain
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insights into how a policymaker should optimally allocate resources to charging
infrastructure and vehicle incentives.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we review
the most relevant literature on technology diffusion, infrastructure-dependent
technologies, and the chicken-and-egg problem. We formulate our bilevel
model in Section 4.3 and derive analytical insights in Section 4.4. To demon-
strate the ability of our model to inform real-world technology policy, we apply
it to a case study of BEVs in Section 4.5. To conclude, we summarize our main
contributions and identify future research directions in Section 4.6.
4.2 Literature review
The relevant literature on technology transitions is vast, spanning qualita-
tive and quantitative methods as well as numerous empirical case studies. In
order to firmly ground our modeling approach in the literature and establish
its novelty, we organize this literature review into four subsections. Section
4.2.1 provides fundamental background on technology transitions and the
role of policy support. In Section 4.2.2, we review empirical case studies of
infrastructure-dependent technology diffusion. Section 4.2.3 discusses notable
analytical models of these processes. Section 4.2.4 reviews game-theoretic
models of infrastructure-dependent technology transitions, and comments on
unanswered research questions as well as the similarities and differences between
our approach and existing models.
4.2.1 Technology transitions and policy support
The 5G wireless and BEV technologies mentioned in Section 4.1 are exam-
ples of potential technology transitions, which Geels (2002) defines as “major
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technological transformations in the way societal functions ... are fulfilled.”
A technology transition is the outcome of complex processes of technological
competition and diffusion, which are subjects of a rich and interdisciplinary
literature that had its origins in the mid-twentieth century but has recently
become popular again due to its obvious relevance to climate change mitiga-
tion.
In the economics literature, Schumpeter (1939) theorized that innovations
are combinations developed within an economy and built on the existing stock
of knowledge, leading to “creative destruction” in which markets reorient
and redesign themselves during the relentless process of disruptive innovation.
Early technology diffusion research consisted mostly of empirical case studies
published in the sociology literature. In their influential study, Ryan and Gross
(1943) investigated the diffusion of hybrid seed corn and found that neighbors’
experience with the innovation was the most common motivation for adoption,
and that the cumulative distribution of adoption timing followed an S-curve.
Coleman et al. (1957) studied the diffusion of a new drug among physicians,
finding that social networks among physicians played a large role in a physi-
cian’s decision to prescribe the drug early in the adoption process. These
seminal works helped inspire innovation diffusion concepts and terms such as
logistic S-curves, “innovator adopters,” increasing returns, positive reinforce-
ment, and network effects that remain in use today. Efforts to synthesize early
empirical research and develop an analytical framework for diffusion processes
culminated in Everett Rogers’s seminal book Diffusion of Innovations, in
which he conceptualized technology diffusion as a complex process that plays
out gradually across communities of heterogeneous, interacting agents (Rogers,
1962).
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In the operations research literature, the Bass Model (Bass, 1969) repre-
sented the diffusion process of a technology for which the rate of adoption
among agents who have not yet adopted is a linear function of the number of
previous adopters. Its formulation reflects the distinction between innovator
adopters who are self-motivated to choose a new technology, and immitator
adopters who are encouraged to adopt by their observations of others who
have already done so. Bass showed that his model fit the observed diffusion
processes of many consumer durables, and a number of extensions to the Bass
Model have since been proposed (Jiang and Jain, 2012; Niu, 2006; Norton and
Bass, 1987). Later, Arthur et al. (1987) modeled technological competition as a
nonlinear (stochastic) Polya process, whereby the probability of adoption is an
arbitrary function of the number of previous adopters. Arthur (1989) modeled
the diffusion process of a technology by a sequence of adoption decisions
made by two types of agents. This research showed that under increasing
returns (i.e., benefits increase in the number of previous adopters), techno-
logical outcomes cannot be predicted ex-ante and an economically efficient
market outcome cannot be guaranteed. The evolution of the market is non-
ergodic in that small chance events tip the allocation toward one dominated
by a single technology, instead of being averaged away. Furthermore, there is
a risk of becoming locked-in to a technology pathway with inferior long-run
benefits if there is an early streak of agents who prefer an initially appealing
but slow-to-improve technology.
These concepts of path-dependence and lock-in have inspired numerous
case studies, whose insights researchers have distilled into broader, quali-
tative frameworks for understanding technology transitions. Furthermore,
the recent focus on sustainability transitions to counter climate change has
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led researchers to leverage case studies and qualitative frameworks to gather
insights on designing technology policies to stimulate and accelerate these
transitions. The multi-level perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2002, 2004, 2005) offers
a typology by which technology transitions tend to occur. It distinguishes
three interacting levels: niches, socio-technical regimes, and an exogenous
socio-technical landscape. The socio-technical regime is characterized by path-
dependence and lock-in, which are represented in three constituent parts: the
socio-technical system, actors, and rules. Systemic developments in the socio-
technical landscape are beyond the influence of the regime and are slow to
change. When the existing socio-technical regime is replaced by another, a
technology transition occurs. Radical innovations, i.e., innovations which are
incompatible with the existing socio-technical regime, incubate in niches. In
these niches, innovations enjoy protection from market selection and allow the
opportunity for the innovation to deviate from the “rules” of the regime, exper-
iment, and learn. For example, Geels (2002) explains how early steamships,
while inferior to sailing ships, were adopted by the British Empire’s subsidized
mail service, which provided opportunities for technological development they
would not have otherwise enjoyed. Simultaneous pressure on the regime at the
landscape level helps induce a technology transition.
For example, van Bree et al. (2010) operationalize the MLP using a co-
evolutionary model to identify scenarios under which alternative fuel vehicles
(AFVs), such as hydrogen fuel cell and battery-electric automobiles, are able
to achieve a technology transition. The authors identify three barriers to intro-
duction at the niche level: (1) the chicken-and-egg problem, (2) mismatch with
consumer preferences, and (3) high cost. These concepts have been central
to policy studies and debates in the energy and climate domains, especially
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assessments of policy prescriptions for accelerating the market penetration of
clean technologies (Grubler and Wilson, 2013).
4.2.2 Empirical studies of infrastructure-dependent technology diffu-
sion
The recent literature on the diffusion of infrastructure-dependent tech-
nologies contains many empirical case studies and other analyses focusing on
alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs), which are particularly relevant to our BEV
case study in Section 4.5. For example, Yeh (2007) compares the adoption of
natural gas vehicles in eight countries, finding that once natural gas refueling
stations reach critical coverage, adoption incentives become more effective.
Neaimeh et al. (2017) use a regression model to show that fast chargers may
overcome barriers to BEV diffusion, and advocate for policies supporting fast
charger deployment. Using an agent-based model for the diffusion of BEVs,
Silvia and Krause (2016) find that a hybrid policy of adoption subsidies,
expansion of the public charging network, and full electrification of government
fleets is the most successful policy for encouraging adoption. In a case study
of BEV adoption in Norway, Mersky et al. (2016) discover that access to
BEV charging infrastructure, being adjacent to major cities, and incomes
have the greatest predictive power for BEV uptake. Based on an agent-
based simulation model, van der Vooren et al. (2012) find that policymakers
should allocate substantial resources toward public support of infrastructure
providers. Certainly, diffusion of AFVs requires large-scale infrastructure
investment before adoption can become widespread, and policymakers need to
successfully coordinate adoption and infrastructure support. For an excellent
review of approaches for modeling the market diffusion of AFVs and their
refueling infrastructures, see Gnann and Plötz (2015), which also identifies
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several general features that are important to include in these models.
Beyond AFVs, the empirical literature examines a variety of other infrastructure-
dependent technologies. Gil et al. (2012) present a case study of how novel
technologies, such as new designs for aircraft stands and radio frequency
identification for baggage handling, were considered in the large-scale, multi-
stakeholder infrastructure project of Heathrow Airport’s Terminal 5. Wolf
and Seebauer (2014) study the adoption of electric bicycles in Austria, finding
that adoption depends strongly on ease of use, appropriate infrastructure, and
adopters’ attitudes toward the environment and physical activity. Suri (2011),
employing a data set on maize farmers in Kenya, finds that farmers’ adoption
of superior hybrid maize and fertilizers is not only driven by higher expected
yields, but also by the distribution network for inputs and availability of infras-
tructure. Leibowicz (2018a) analyzes historical data on the diffusion dynamics
of transport systems (canals, railroads, motor vehicles, and airplanes) in the
U.S. He documents a consistent pattern whereby the diffusion of infrastructure
precedes the adoption of vehicles, which precedes the expansion of travel. This
finding highlights the importance of infrastructure provision as a precondition
for broad adoption.
4.2.3 Analytical models of infrastructure-dependent technology diffu-
sion
Similar to the pioneering models discussed above (Arthur et al., 1987;
Arthur, 1989; Bass, 1969), Brozynski and Leibowicz (in press) model tech-
nology diffusion from a top-down perspective, but explicitly incorporate tech-
nology policy decision making under uncertainty. To do so, they construct
Markov reward process and Markov decision process models that capture
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policies with different cost structures. The states in the models represent
different stages in the diffusion process, and policies are included as costly
interventions that raise the probabilities of advancing. The authors derive
analytical results and present a case study on lithium-ion batteries for electric
vehicles.
A distinct but related branch of the operations research literature models
adoption decisions from the bottom-up perspectives of consumers or firms
deciding whether or not to adopt a new technology. These models also focus
on decision making under uncertainty, but the decisions being analyzed are the
strategic adoption choices of individual agents in the market rather than tech-
nology policy designs. The studies discussed below all examine the structure
of optimal technology adoption decisions and explore how optimal decisions
are affected by model parameters. This literature is relevant because the
benefits of adoption and their resulting influence on the timing of adoption
are important considerations for overcoming the chicken-and-egg problem.
Kornish (2006) constructs a model where an individual considers a choice
between two competing technologies that are both subject to positive network
effects. In each period, the individual either adopts one of the technologies
or opts to wait. While this individual’s decisions are explicitly modeled, the
behavior of other agents in the market is represented as a nonlinear Polya
urn function (Arthur et al., 1987). Committing to a technology entails a key
tradeoff. It is better to begin deriving benefits sooner rather than later, but
by waiting, the individual can observe which technology is proving to be more
popular and thus capture its positive network effects. Kornish finds that the
optimal strategy is of a threshold type with respect to the number of previous
adopters of each technology. She then explores how stronger network effects
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influence the optimal strategy. Ulu and Smith (2009) analyze a sequential
decision problem in which an individual chooses to adopt a new technology,
reject it, or wait under uncertain benefits. When she decides to wait, she
obtains a new distribution on the benefits via Bayesian updating. The authors
show that a better technology may not actually make the consumer better off
once the costs of information gathering and the adoption process are taken into
account. Smith and Ulu (2017) extend their earlier analysis by investigating
how risk aversion affects the optimal adoption strategy. Finally, Smith and Ulu
(2012) compare and contrast three models (net present value, single-purchase,
and repeat-purchase) of an individual’s technology adoption decision under
uncertain future costs and quality, modeled as Markov process transitions.
They find that in the repeat-purchase or “upgrades” model, technological
improvements that make the consumer better off may actually discourage
adoption.
4.2.4 Game-theoretic models of infrastructure-dependent technology
diffusion
Methodologically, the studies in the literature which are most closely
related to our own are those that use game-theoretic (i.e., multi-agent) models
to represent the interactions between a policymaker and market agents. Some
of these specifically model a policymaker and a profit-maximizing firm. Alizamir
et al. (2016) assess the design of cost-effective and socially optimal feed-
in tariff policies intended to stimulate the diffusion of renewable electricity
technologies. In their modeling framework, the policymaker commits to a
sequence of time-specific contract prices, and heterogeneous investors decide
whether and when to invest in the renewable technology. Their approach also
captures positive reinforcement mechanisms that are characteristic of diffusion
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processes, including investment costs that are determined endogenously via
a nonlinear learning curve, and information contagion effects wherein the
number of uninformed investors who become active at time t is proportional
to the cumulative installed capacity at time t− 1. Because the purported goal
of a typical feed-in tariff program is to incentivize diffusion of the renewable
technology, the authors explore two objectives for the policymaker, one in
which an exogenous adoption target must be reached at the lowest possible
cost, and another in which grid parity must be achieved at the end of the
time horizon and social welfare is maximized. Their findings provide partial
justification for current feed-in tariff implementations, but suggest that the
current practice of maintaining constant profitability for investors is rarely
optimal.
Chemama et al. (2019) similarly explore optimal supply-side policy, in
which the policymaker reduces the supplier’s production cost via a production
subsidy over two periods in order to reach an endogenously defined level of
adoption while minimizing the subsidy program cost. The suppliers respond
with profit-maximizing production quantities by solving a multi-period newsvendor
problem. Their study specifically examines the tradeoff between committing to
a time-specific subsidy plan up front versus a flexible policy that adapts after
uncertain demand is realized. Indeed, the anticipation of a policy revision
lowers the supplier’s production target and may increase the total subsidy
program cost. Their analytical results indicate that when the policymaker
commits to a fixed policy, it encourages suppliers to produce earlier, and
additional spending reduces adoption level uncertainty. Finally, they present
a case study on an existing solar subsidy program.
While the studies above investigate optimal supply-side policies, Cohen
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et al. (2016) analyze how to optimally set consumer subsidies under demand
uncertainty. In their two-stage Stackelberg game, the policymaker minimizes
the expected subsidy program cost to satisfy an exogenous adoption target
by announcing a consumer subsidy for a product offered by the manufac-
turer. The manufacturer is a price-setting newsvendor who maximizes profit
in response. They find that if the policymaker ignores demand uncertainty,
she will under-subsidize and miss the desired adoption target. Moreover,
the authors demonstrate that consumer subsidies are a sufficient mechanism
to coordinate the policymaker and manufacturer, i.e., prices and quantities
coincide in a decentralized model (independent, profit-maximizing manufac-
turer) and a centralized model (a central planner makes the price and quan-
tity decisions). Using a similar Stackelberg game methodology, Bian and
Zhao (2020) evaluate different supply-side policy instruments by comparing
an environmental subsidy based on a manufacturer’s emissions abatement to
an emissions tax levied on the manufacturer based on its emissions. They find
that the manufacturer performs better under the subsidy program, but that
the net emissions are higher than under the tax program if abatement is costly
and emissions sufficiently damaging.
In contrast to the studies discussed above, which focus on either supply- or
demand-side policy, our model incorporates both. Similarly, Yu et al. (2018)
use a game-theoretic framework to model the strategic interactions among
three players – a policymaker, manufacturers, and consumers – where the
policymaker determines both manufacturer and consumer subsidies to maxi-
mize consumer welfare subject to a policy budget constraint. They find that in
order to maximize consumer welfare, it is optimal to only subsidize customers
when the product has a well established market price, but otherwise subsidize
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manufacturers. The papers most directly related to ours involve a responsive
private industry player who makes infrastructure investment decisions, rather
than product manufacturing decisions. Along these lines, Ma et al. (2019)
explore whether product subsidies and service infrastructure subsidies are
complementary or substitute instruments for a policymaker. Their model is
a multi-period Stackelberg game in which a monopolistic firm responds to
the policymaker’s subsidies by choosing the quantity of clean technology to
supply as well as making a binary decision on whether to invest in service
infrastructure that benefits the clean technology product. The consumer in
turn decides whether and in which stage to adopt the technology. As in
our model, the policymaker maximizes utility, accounting for the benefits to
the environment of clean technology adoption and the policy expenditure.
They find that the optimal subsidy strategy follows a sandwich rule in which
the policymaker subsidizes infrastructure and consumers if the infrastruc-
ture deployment cost is moderate, but otherwise subsidizes the consumers
only. Additionally, if the investment cost is sufficiently low, the firm supplies
infrastructure even without a subsidy and therefore the policymaker prefers
to subsidize the consumer only. Ji and Huang (2018) also develop a model
which is similar in spirit to ours. They present a two-stage Stackelberg game,
specific to electric vehicle adoption, where a policymaker decides on price
subsidies for consumers and production subsidies for a provider of charging
stations. Due to the computational complexity of their modeling approach,
their results are limited to numerical simulations and do not appear to be
solved optimally. Rather, the policymaker’s decision variables are modulated
and the best simulated solutions are reported.
Several other studies use game theory principles to analyze the interactions
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among policymaker, profit-maximizing firms, and adopters. Yu et al. (2016)
model the diffusion of BEVs as a two-player sequential game between potential
adopters and a profit-maximizing charging infrastructure firm. As the leader,
the firm maximizes profit by choosing among a set of potential sites where it
can invest in charging infrastructure, and on prices for charging. The authors
obtain a threshold rule for the optimal purchasing decision and a closed form
expression for the BEV market share. Furthermore, the number of charging
stations the firm optimally deploys increases when a welfare-maximizing social
planner determines the set of charging station locations to build by regulation.
The effects of adoption and investor subsidies are considered via exogenous
sensitivity analysis, indicating that consumers’ sensitivity to price determines
whether adoption or investor subsidies are preferred. Encarnação et al. (2018)
formulate an evolutionary game theory (EGT) model of BEV diffusion in
which governments, private suppliers, and consumers each choose whether to
cooperate (support BEVs) or defect (not support BEVs), and an equilibrium in
mixed strategies is a representation of BEV market share. Most importantly,
they find that it is most efficient for demand for BEVs to precede supply
and that reaching full adoption requires coordination across the three sectors.
Their model is an analytical framework based on a population dynamics EGT
model, but does not strictly determine optimal policy.
This review of the literature reveals the need for a general, theoretical
model for the diffusion of infrastructure-dependent technologies, and analytical
insights on technology policies for overcoming the chicken-and-egg problem.
The following section presents the bilevel model that we develop to address
this gap in the literature.
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4.3 Methodology
We formulate a stylized model of technology policy decision making from
the perspective of a policymaker who seeks to stimulate the market penetration
of an infrastructure-dependent technology. Our model is a bilevel optimiza-
tion problem in which a policymaker (leader) maximizes net social benefits
by setting the levels of two incentives: a subsidy for a profit-maximizing
firm (follower) to invest in infrastructure that raises the benefit of adoption
to consumers, and a direct subsidy for consumers to adopt the technology.
Consumer uptake is then a function of the firm’s infrastructure provision
and the direct subsidy for consumer purchases. The policymaker’s objective
consists of benefits which scale with the level of adoption, minus the costs of
the policy incentives themselves.
Figure 4.1. High-level model overview. Arrows represent the mechanisms
through which each player influences other players’ decision making problems
(policymaker and infrastructure firm) or endogenous outcomes (adopters).
Figure 4.1 provides a high-level visual overview of the model, including
its endogenous variables and the ways that the players influence one another.
The policymaker, who acts first, can employ two types of financial incentives,
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illustrated as the orange arrows in Figure 4.1. First, the policymaker can
indirectly stimulate adoption by providing a per-unit investment cost subsidy
πI (in $/unit) for the infrastructure firm. Under the right market conditions,
this investment subsidy reduces the infrastructure firm’s marginal cost, thereby
increasing its optimal level of infrastructure investment y. As illustrated by the
red arrow in the figure, higher infrastructure investment by the firm induces
greater consumer adoption of the technology. This is why we refer to the
infrastructure subsidy πI as an indirect mechanism for promoting consumer
adoption, since it must first “pass through” the infrastructure firm’s decision
making before influencing consumers. Second, the policymaker can directly
stimulate adoption by offering consumers a per-unit adoption subsidy πA (in
$/unit). Taken together, the policy allocation (πA, πI) is chosen to maximize
net social benefits, where benefits are proportional to adoption x(πA, y), minus
the costs of the incentives themselves. According to the bilevel formulation,
the policymaker is assumed to have complete knowledge of the infrastructure
firm’s problem and is able to perfectly anticipate y∗(πA, πI), the firm’s profit-
maximizing infrastructure investment response to any policy allocation.
We now present the mathematical formulation, beginning with the repre-
sentation of adoption and moving upward to the infrastructure firm’s problem
and then the full bilevel model.
4.3.1 The adoption level
As described above, the adoption subsidy and quantity of infrastructure
provided determine the level of adoption, which we denote as x(πA, y). We
define the adoption level, which is measured in absolute units (e.g., thousands
of adopters), as
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x(πA, y) = βcπA + βby(πA, πI) +K. (4.1)
The number of adopters is therefore a linear function of (1) the adoption
subsidy offered by the policymaker, πA; (2) the amount of infrastructure
provided by the infrastructure firm, y(πA, πI); and (3) a constant term, K, to
reflect, for example, “innovator adopters” who would purchase the technology
without any subsidy or infrastructure available.1 The interpretation of the
coefficients is straightforward: βc > 0 represents the additional adopters
resulting from a unit increase in the adoption subsidy, whereas βb > 0 repre-
sents the additional adopters resulting from a unit increase in infrastructure
investment. Broadly, βc and βb measure the sensitivity of the adoption level to
the cost and benefit of the technology, respectively. In other words, the adop-
tion subsidy reduces the cost of the technology, while infrastructure investment
enhances the benefits of adoption. Indeed, the subscripts c and b refer to the
cost and benefit terms in the adoption level function.
4.3.2 The infrastructure firm’s problem
Consistent with the bilevel structure of our model, we first describe the
lower-level problem solved by the infrastructure firm, since its optimal solu-
tion will be anticipated by the policymaker in the upper-level problem. The
infrastructure firm is represented as a monopolist who sets the price of using
the infrastructure. Having observed the policymaker’s incentives, the firm
1A linear function is chosen for analytical tractability and straightforward
implementation in a case study. For example, numerous empirical studies have used linear
regression to estimate the effects of various factors on BEV adoption, and we use these to
parameterize our case study in Section 4.5. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that assuming a
linear relationship entails a loss of generality.
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chooses the profit-maximizing level of infrastructure investment. The firm
faces constant marginal cost c − πI , where c is the per-unit cost of building
infrastructure and πI is the policymaker’s infrastructure subsidy. The firm’s
revenue function needs to reflect that, as the number of adopters changes, so
too should the demand curve for use of the infrastructure. Mathematically, the
price of the infrastructure service is represented as a function p(x, y), which
is increasing in the number of adopters x (shift of the demand curve) and
decreasing in the amount of infrastructure y (movement along the demand
curve). However, because the firm has some ability to affect the market size
through the βby(πA, πI) term in Eq. (4.1), a tension emerges. Investing in more
infrastructure simultaneously raises the market price because it increases the
number of adopters who use the infrastructure, but reduces the market price
because the demand curve is downward-sloping. Ultimately, the price function
p(x, y) must be decreasing in the quantity of infrastructure to ensure a valid
profit maximization problem. To capture these competing mechanisms, we
require a well-defined relationship among the market price of the infrastructure
service, the quantity of infrastructure built, and the number of adopters. The
adoption level x(πA, y) is related to the inverse demand curve for infrastructure
service p(·) and the infrastructure investment y(πA, πI) through
x(πA, y) = ap(·) + by(πa, πI), where a, b > 0. (4.2)
By substituting the definition of x(πA, y) from Eq. (4.1) into Eq. (4.2)








It is necessary to assume that b−βb > 0, for otherwise the inverse demand
curve would not be downward-sloping; indeed, the difference b − βb reflects
the competing mechanisms discussed above that determine the behavior of
the market price for infrastructure use. Looking at Eq. (4.3), we can see how
each parameter affects the demand curve. First, increasing βc, πA, or K shifts
the linear inverse demand curve upward. That is, if the parameters lead to
an exogenous increase in the number of adopters – whether through greater
sensitivity to the adoption subsidy (βc), a higher adoption subsidy (πA), or
a higher number of innovator adopters (K) – the infrastructure firm enjoys a
higher price for the same level of investment. Second, if potential adopters’
sensitivity to infrastructure provision (βb) increases, the firm enjoys a higher
price for the same level of investment, and this price differential is magnified
at higher levels of investment (i.e., the linear inverse demand curve rotates
upward around the price-axis intercept). Finally, Eq. (4.3) reveals the roles
that parameters a and b play in determining the behavior of the inverse demand
curve. Parameter b only appears in its slope coefficient. Increasing b implies
a steeper slope, reducing the price of the infrastructure service. Increasing a
implies a flattening of the demand curve, whereby the price is reduced at lower
levels of infrastructure provision but raised at higher levels of infrastructure
provision.













y − (c− πI)y.
(4.4)
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The infrastructure provision decision variable, which must be non-negative,
is written as y(πA, πI) to remind readers that it is chosen in response to the
upper-level policy allocation.
4.3.3 The bilevel optimization model
The policymaker chooses the allocation (πA, πI) to maximize the social
benefits of adoption, less the costs of the incentives themselves. The cost
of the policy allocation is x(πA, y)πA + y(πA, πI)πI , where the first term is
the expenditure on consumer adoption subsidies (total adoption policy cost)
and the second term is the expenditure on infrastructure investment subsidies
(total infrastructure policy cost). It is important to emphasize that, because
the policy decisions πA and πI influence the endogenous levels of adoption
and infrastructure provision, they entail both direct and indirect costs. The
adoption subsidy πA has a direct cost, but it also influences the number of
adopters, which in turn influences the quantity of infrastructure built, thereby
affecting both the total adoption policy cost and the total infrastructure policy
cost. Similarly, the infrastructure subsidy πI has a direct cost, but also
influences the firm’s infrastructure provision, which in turn influences the
number of adopters, thereby also affecting both the total adoption policy cost
and the total infrastructure policy cost. This discussion highlights the interde-
pendence of the two policy instruments, with numerous feedback mechanisms
determining their joint costs and benefits. In practice, it is essential for the
policymaker to account for their interdependent nature.
We assume that the social benefit is simply proportional to the number of
adopters, where the parameter α captures the marginal social benefit of each
additional adopter. For example, to preview our BEV case study in Section
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4.5, a policymaker could view α as the monetary reduction in the social cost of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions resulting from the replacement of a gasoline
vehicle by a BEV.
Finally, the upper-level problem entails a few straightforward constraints.
First, the adoption and infrastructure subsidies need to be non-negative. Second,
the infrastructure subsidy πI cannot exceed the marginal infrastructure invest-
ment cost c, for otherwise the firm would face a negative cost. Third, in line
with the bilevel framework, the infrastructure firm’s optimal response serves as




α(βcπA + βby +K)− [(βcπA + βby +K)πA + yπI ] ,












y − (c− πI)y.
(4.5)
Reflecting on the formulation, it is important to emphasize that our cost-
benefit paradigm allows the policymaker flexibility to determine the total
amount of public funds to dedicate to supporting the diffusion of this tech-
nology, in addition to the decision about how to divide them between two
incentives. Alternative formulations could include a cost-effectiveness approach
that determines the least costly policy allocation that induces a desired adop-
tion level, or a pure resource allocation problem structured to maximize adop-
tion (and thus benefits) by dividing a fixed budget between the two policy
channels. Of these alternatives, we consider our cost-benefit framework the
most comprehensive in terms of its ability to inform policy.
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Before proceeding, it is worth acknowledging some of the main limitations
of our stylized model. First, we only consider two specific forms of technology
policy intervention which are both financial subsidies. There are many other
monetary and non-monetary policy instruments available in the real world
which are outside the scope of the model. Second, our model is a static
sequential game. There is no representation of time, and therefore no strategic
decision making from one period to the next as the diffusion process evolves
dynamically. Third, our model is deterministic. In a broad sense, technology
transitions are subject to many uncertainties that powerfully influence their
prospects for success. In a narrower sense, policy interventions targeting
firms and consumers can have stochastic outcomes, as their responses are
often difficult to predict. Fourth, the bilevel framework inherently assumes
that the policymaker has complete knowledge of the infrastructure firm’s
problem. In reality, policymakers are usually unable to observe firms’ own
costs, demand curves, and so on. Fifth, as previously mentioned, the model
assumes that several relationships are linear to ensure analytical tractability
and compatibility with empirical studies that have estimated parameters for
case study applications. Despite these limitations, our bilevel model is highly
general and is able to yield analytical insights, which we derive in the next
section.
4.4 Analysis
4.4.1 Solution to the infrastructure firm’s problem
In the lower-level problem, the infrastructure firm chooses how much
infrastructure to invest in, y(πA, πI), in response to the policy allocation
(πA, πI) chosen by the policymaker, in order to maximize its profit. We denote
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by y∗(πA, πI) the optimal response to the policymaker’s decisions, since the
firm’s revenue and cost are affected by the subsidy levels.
From the inverse demand curve in Eq. (4.3), the firm’s marginal revenue




y, which decreases linearly with y. The firm’s
marginal cost is MC = c− πI , which is constant. Equating marginal revenue
with marginal cost, we obtain y∗(πA, πI) =
−a(c−πI)+βcπA+K
2(b−βb)
. To ensure non-
negativity, we require −a(c − πI) + βcπA + K ≥ 0. Rearranging, this non-
negativity condition is equivalent to βcπA+K
a
≥ c − πI . In Proposition 4.1, we
completely specify the firm’s optimal response y∗(πA, πI).







≥ c− πI ,
0, o.w.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.1.
Interpreted through the MR = MC condition, the non-negativity condi-
tion says that the positive (constant) term of the firm’s marginal revenue (i.e.,
βcπA+K
a
) must exceed the marginal cost; otherwise, marginal cost would always
exceed marginal revenue and the firm’s optimal response would be y∗(πA, πI) =
0. We note that this condition involves the upper-level decision variables
(πA, πI), reflective of the influence that the policymaker’s decisions have on
the firm’s optimal response. For example, when the policymaker increases πA,
the demand curve shifts upward, in turn raising the firm’s marginal revenue.
Because marginal cost is constant, the firm responds by increasing its infras-
tructure investment to reach the MR = MC condition; indeed, by examining
the comparative statics of y∗(πA, πI), we see this positive relationship (i.e.,
∂y∗(πA,πI)
∂πA
> 0). When the policymaker increases πI , the firm’s marginal
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cost decreases, leading the firm to increase infrastructure investment until
the MR = MC condition is reached. Again, by examining the comparative




If the policymaker does not choose a policy allocation that allows the
MR = MC condition to be satisfied, then the firm’s optimal response is
y∗(πA, πI) = 0. Finally, we note that the policymaker choosing πI = c does not
create a mathematical or economic anomaly. While the firm’s marginal cost
at this choice is 0 – in other words, it can scale investment y to infinity at zero
cost – it still faces a downward-sloping demand curve and therefore chooses
the quantity (or equivalently, price) to satisfy the MR = MC condition. This




4.4.2 Reformulation of the bilevel model into a quadratic program
Proposition 4.1 specifies the firm’s optimal response y∗(πA, πI). If the
policy allocation is chosen such that the −a(c− πI) + βcπA +K ≥ 0 condition
holds strictly, then the firm supplies a positive quantity of infrastructure.
Hence, we refer to this condition as the inducement condition, as it is necessary
and sufficient to induce the firm to invest in infrastructure. In this section, we
show that the bilevel optimization model is equivalent to a quadratic program
that can be convex or non-convex depending on the parameters.
To solve the policymaker’s upper-level problem and ultimately determine
an equilibrium, we construct two distinct optimization programs, in which (1)
the policymaker chooses an allocation (πA, πI) such that it is not optimal for
the firm to invest, and (2) the policymaker chooses an allocation such that it
could be optimal for the firm to invest in infrastructure. We refer to these
as the non-inducement and inducement programs, respectively, with optimal
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objective values z∗NI and z
∗
I . Each program corresponds to one of the two
cases outlined in Proposition 4.1, distinguished by whether the inducement
condition is satisfied or not. By dividing the upper-level problem into these two
cases, we can directly substitute the corresponding optimal response y∗(πA, πI)
into the policymaker’s objective function, thus converting the bilevel program
into a single-level optimization problem. It follows, then, that the optimal
solution to the policymaker’s problem is found by comparing the solutions
to the non-inducement and inducement programs, and choosing the policy
allocation that yields the higher objective function value. Mathematically, the
optimal solution to the bilevel model of Eq. (4.5) is z∗ = max(z∗NI , z
∗
I ).
It is not necessarily suboptimal for the policymaker to choose an allocation
such that the firm does not invest in infrastructure. As described in Section
4.3.3, when the firm invests in infrastructure, it directly increases the total
infrastructure policy cost, and indirectly increases the total adoption policy
cost, borne by the policymaker. Depending on the parameter values, these
additional costs of inducing infrastructure investment may or may not be
justified by the resulting social benefits.
In the non-inducement program,
z∗NI = max
(πA,πI)
−βcπ2A + (αβc −K)πA + αK,
s.t. βcπA+K
a





the policymaker is constrained to choose a policy allocation (πA, πI) such that
the inducement condition is not satisfied and the firm’s optimal response
is y∗(πA, πI) = 0. In this case, we have reformulated the bilevel model by
applying backwards induction, substituting the optimal response y∗(πA, πI) =
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0 into the policymaker’s objective function, and noting immediately that the
infrastructure subsidy decision variable πI does not appear in the objective
function. This is intuitive; conditional on the firm not being induced to
invest in infrastructure, the level of the infrastructure subsidy is irrelevant.
In addition to the bounds on πA and πI , we also ensure that the firm’s optimal
response cannot be positive.
Figure 4.2. Illustrations of the feasible regions of the non-inducement (gray
area) and inducement (green area) programs in two cases. The non-inducement
program is feasible in case (A) but infeasible in case (B).
Now, we investigate whether the non-inducement program in Eq. (4.6)
is even feasible. This depends on where the inducement threshold line lies
in relation to the bounds on πA and πI . In Figure 4.2, we illustrate the
two possible cases. In Figure 4.2A, the feasible region of the non-inducement
program is denoted by the gray shaded area (within the non-negativity bounds
and beneath the inducement threshold). In Figure 4.2B, the inducement
threshold lies below and to the left of the origin. Where the inducement
threshold lies, and specifically whether or not it passes through the positive
quadrant, depends on the sign of c− K
a
. Examining Figure 4.2 and the firm’s
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optimal response given in Proposition 4.1, we see that c − K
a
reflects the
market conditions facing the firm and the per-unit infrastructure investment
cost c. If c − K
a
< 0, then the firm will invest in infrastructure regardless
of the policymaker’s allocation (πA, πI), even if it is (0, 0) and there are no
subsidies. This is demonstrated in Figure 4.2B; the non-inducement program
is in fact infeasible and any feasible solution to the inducement program
(green area) is guaranteed to include positive infrastructure investment. We
can intuitively interpret why the comparison between c and K
a
determines
whether infrastructure investment is guaranteed even in the absence of policy
incentives. This will be true if the price-axis intercept of the infrastructure
firm’s demand curve (marginal revenue) lies above the flat marginal cost curve.
Having more innovator adopters (higher K) or a lower a value both raise
marginal revenue, and having a lower infrastructure investment cost c shifts
the flat marginal cost curve downward. Both of these effects favor having
an MR = MC intersection in the positive quadrant. In other words, K
a
is
the largest per-unit investment cost for which the firm finds it profitable to
supply infrastructure in the absence of policy intervention. If c exceeds K
a
,
then the firm will not invest in infrastructure without policy support. Remark
4.1 summarizes this case.
Remark 4.1. If c − K
a
< 0, then the non-inducement program is infeasible,
the inducement program is feasible, and by elimination, z∗ = z∗I .
Next, we examine the case where the non-inducement program is feasible,
that is, when c− K
a
> 0, as illustrated by the gray area in Figure 4.2A. In Eq.
(4.6), we see that πI does not affect the objective z
∗
NI and so can be set to
πI = 0, which leads to the widest possible feasible region for πA; the lower and
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upper bound constraints 0 ≤ πI ≤ c can also be safely eliminated, yielding
z∗NI = max
πA
−βcπ2A + (αβc −K)πA + αK,
s.t. πA ≤ ac−Kβc ,
πA ≥ 0,
(4.7)




determine the optimal solution to the non-inducement program, we simply
compare this local maximum with the objective values at the lower and upper
bounds for πA. Remark 4.2 summarizes the cases.
Remark 4.2. If c − K
a



















Remark 4.2 shows that there are three possible candidate solutions to
the non-inducement program, depending on the parameterization. Because
πI disappears from the policymaker’s objective function if y
∗(πA, πI) = 0, the
inducement program captures the same market outcome as the non-inducement
program along the inducement threshold line. For example, if the optimal solu-
tion to the non-inducement program is π∗A =
αβc−K
2βc






is feasible in the inducement program (it lies on the induce-






in the non-inducement program. In other words, for every feasible solution πA
in the non-inducement program, we can draw a vertical line from the point
(πA, πI = 0) to the inducement threshold such that every point along this
line has the same objective value. Essentially, the non-inducement program
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is redundant, as the inducement program captures the possibility of the poli-
cymaker choosing the allocation such that y∗(πA, πI) = 0 because its feasible
region includes the inducement threshold line. This concept is summarized
in Remark 4.3, which says that, if c − K
a
≥ 0, then the solution to the non-
inducement program gives a lower bound on the policymaker’s objective value
in the bilevel model.
Remark 4.3. If c− K
a
≥ 0, then z∗NI ≤ z∗I . Therefore, z∗ = z∗I .
Combining the results from Remarks 4.1 – 4.3, we have shown that the
general bilevel model given in Eq. (4.5) is mathematically equivalent to the
inducement program, which is written in Proposition 4.2.








































Proof. See Appendix C.2.2.
The quadratic program (QP) in Eq. (4.8) has just two variables and only
linear constraints. While it is a small problem, we would like to establish
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whether or not it is convex. If it is a convex QP, then that would guarantee
that any local maximum is also the global maximum, and make the program
easy to solve using interior point methods encoded in many commercial solvers.
It turns out that our QP is non-convex in general, although it can be convex
depending on the parameter values. In Proposition 4.3, we provide a necessary
and sufficient condition for convexity. In the next section, we discuss the impli-
cations of non-convexity for guaranteeing that we obtain the global maximum,
and develop a custom solution strategy to bypass the non-convexity issue.
Proposition 4.3. The quadratic program in Eq. (4.8) is convex if and only
if 8βcab− 6βbβca ≥ β2ba2 + β2c .
Proof. See Appendix C.2.3
4.4.3 Custom solution strategy
As summarized in Proposition 4.3, our QP reformulation of the bilevel
model is non-convex in general, which raises practical concerns about being
able to guarantee a globally optimal solution. Indeed, many commercial and
open-source solvers may only identify a local maximum, or otherwise fail to
return a solution.2 Furthermore, first-order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
may not be sufficient conditions for a global maximum under non-convexity.
To circumvent the complications of solving a non-convex program, we develop
a custom solution strategy that guarantees global optimality. This solution
strategy, which is presented below, entails the evaluation of four single-variable
QPs.
2The commercial solver Gurobi 9.0, which is invoked for comparison in Section 4.5,
employs a bilinear branch-and-bound technique by which non-convex QPs can be solved to
global optimality.
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I + h3πAπI + h4πA + h5πI + h6,
s.t. βcπA+K
a





where h1 < 0, h2 < 0, and h3 < 0, but the signs of the remaining coefficients h4,
h5, and h6 are a priori indeterminate and therefore depend on the particular
parameterization of the model. See C.1 for algebraic expressions for these
coefficients in terms of the fundamental parameters.
Our solution strategy begins with a reduction of the two-variable QP into
a single-variable QP in which the πI variable is fixed. By fixing πI , and
rearranging the objective function by removing the constant terms h2π
2
I +
h5πI + h6, we arrive at the conditional problem
z∗(πI) = h2π
2




A + (h3πI + h4)πA,
s.t. βcπA+K
a
≥ c− πI ,
πA ≥ 0,
(4.10)
in which πA is the decision variable and the objective is maximized given
the fixed value of πI . This conditional model of Eq. (4.10), in which πI







lies in the feasible region ∀ πI such that 0 ≤ πI ≤ c,
and h1 < 0 implies convexity.
The solution to the conditional problem of Eq. (4.10) can be used to
determine the solution to the original problem of Eq. (4.8) (which we will





That is, z∗(πI) is the optimal objective value for a particular πI , and the
unconditional problem selects the πI ∈ [0, c] that yields the largest optimal
objective value in the conditional model.
Our solution strategy proceeds by determining the analytical solution to
the conditional problem, π∗A(πI) with optimum z
∗(πI), which we then substi-
tute into the unconditional problem of Eq. (4.11). We obtain a single-variable
QP (πA is eliminated) with linear constraints that is equivalent to the original
two-variable quadratic model of Eq. (4.8).
With the approach laid out, we now derive the analytical solution to the
conditional problem. Intuitively, since the cross-product term πAπI appears
in Eq. (4.9), the fixed level of πI affects both the feasible region (through
the inducement threshold constraint) and the objective function (through the
linear term) of Eq. (4.10). We therefore begin by determining how the sign
of the linear term, h3πI + h4, affects the optimal solution π
∗
A(πI). First, if
h3πI + h4 ≤ 0, the maximum of the concave objective function occurs at a
πA < 0 and the function decreases monotonically for πA ≥ 0. So, in this case,
the optimal solution π∗A(πI) is at whichever of the two bounds (πA ≥ 0 or
πA ≥ ac−K−aπIβc ) is stricter, as in,
π∗A(πI) =
{



















solves Eq. (4.10). Here, the local maximum of the objective function, which
is attained at πA =
−h3πI−h4
2h1
> 0, is compared to the objective value at
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the bound πA ≥ ac−K−aπIβc . Together, Eqs. (4.12) and (4.13) describe the
complete analytical solution to the conditional model of Eq. (4.10). While
we now have π∗A(πI) expressed as a linear function of πI , there are three
possible candidate solutions; which is the true solution to the conditional
model depends on whether certain conditions on πI are met. To solve the
unconditional optimization problem of Eq. (4.11), we must therefore examine
four distinct single-variable quadratic programs, each of which is constructed
by substituting one of the possible candidate solutions π∗A(πI) into the objective
function of the conditional model, with the corresponding conditions required
on πI , as defined in Eqs. (4.12) and (4.13). We will denote each of these four
programs as “A1”, “A2”, “B1”, and “B2”, where A and B respectively denote
which of h3πI + h4 ≤ 0 or h3πI + h4 > 0 holds, and 1 and 2 respectively
denote whether the first or second case in the specification of π∗A(πI) (i.e., in





I + h5πI + h6,
s.t. h3πI + h4 ≤ 0,




is constructed by substituting π∗A(πI) = 0 into the objective function of the
conditional model from Eq. (4.10) and additionally constraining πI with h3πI+
h4 ≤ 0 and ac−K−aπI ≤ 0. The objective function is maximized by choosing
πI , where as always, 0 ≤ πI ≤ c must also hold. We denote the optimal
solution to Program A1 as z∗A1, which is computationally treated as negative
infinity if the program is infeasible. The remaining programs A2, B1, and B2





















s.t. h3πI + h4 ≤ 0,




























































In summary, we solve the unconditional problem of Eq. (4.11) by decom-
posing it into four distinct programs, solving each one, and comparing their
objective values. That with the greatest objective value determines the solu-
tion (π∗A, π
∗
I ) and the optimum z
∗. Mathematically, the solution strategy rests
on







Intuitively, each program explores a different one-dimensional subspace of the
feasible region for (πA, πI), dramatically reducing the search space of the
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original model. For example, Program A1 explores the part of the feasible
region where πA = 0 and 0 ≤ πI ≤ c, Programs A2 and B2 explore the feasible
region along the inducement threshold line, and Program B1 explores possible
interior solutions. Indeed, if we determine that a program is infeasible, we
guarantee that the unconditional solution does not lie within that exploration
region. In Section 4.5, we illustrate this procedure when we apply our solution
strategy to the BEV case study.
Most importantly, our solution strategy effectively circumvents the possible
non-convexity of the QP in Eq. (4.8), thereby guaranteeing a global maximum.
To see this, we examine the convexity of the four single-variable programs.
First, Program A1 is a convex optimization problem since h2 < 0 by assump-
tion. Second, Programs A2 and B2 are convex if and only if b− βb > 0, which
is again true by assumption. Finally, Program B1 is convex if and only if
8βcab−6βbβca ≥ β2ba2 +β2c , which is the same condition required for convexity
of the original model in Eq. (4.8). In practice, however, non-convexity of
Program B1 does not carry the same troubling consequences as non-convexity
of the original model. Indeed, suppose that Program B1 is non-convex, i.e., the
objective function to be maximized is concave-up. Then, a global maximum
must exist at either the lower or upper bound on πA, and it therefore suffices
to simply evaluate the objective function value at these bounds and choose
the greater of the two. In Proposition 4.4, we summarize these findings that
guarantee a global maximum with our solution strategy.
Proposition 4.4. Programs A1, A2, and B2 are convex. Program B1 is
convex if and only if 8βcab − 6βbβca ≥ β2ba2 + β2c . If Program B1 is feasible
but non-convex, then the solution is determined by evaluating the objective
function at the lower and upper bounds on πA, and choosing whichever of the
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two gives the greater objective value.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.4.
In practice, it is straightforward to determine which programs are infea-
sible, in which case it is not even necessary to pass the program to a solver.
For example, if h4 < 0, then Programs B1 and B2 are infeasible, and only A1
and A2 need to be evaluated.
Because of (1) the reduced solution search space, (2) the ease with which
infeasibility is established, (3) the ease with which single-variable QPs are
solved, and (4) the guarantee of terminating with a global maximum even
under non-convexity, we hypothesize that our solution strategy will outperform
solving the original two-variable, possibly non-convex QP directly using an off-
the-shelf solver. This hypothesis is tested in the next section, where we apply
our model to a case study on technology policy for supporting the diffusion of
BEVs.
4.5 Case study: battery electric vehicles
The timely decarbonization of the transport sector is one of the most chal-
lenging components of climate change mitigation, as the current performance
and cost characteristics of batteries mean that electric vehicles are struggling to
displace their gasoline-fueled counterparts. National, regional, and municipal
governments have already implemented many policies to encourage adoption
of BEVs. For example, California’s Executive Order B-48-18 proposes an
investment of $9 million to deploy 250,000 EV charging points by 2025, the
U.S. Department of Energy’s Vehicle Technologies Office supports battery
R&D funding, and the Government of Canada has allocated $225 million
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for purchase incentives of up to $3750 per vehicle (IEA, 2019). While a
number of empirical studies have found that, among other variables, consumer
adoption subsidies and the availability of charging points have predictive power
for EV adoption levels, there is no modeling framework that suggests how
public funds should be optimally allocated between adoption subsidies and
infrastructure investment subsidies. Indeed, Sierzchula et al. (2014) note that
cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit analysis is needed to determine if such policies
are actually efficient in a societal and economic sense. Here, we address this gap
in the energy policy literature on supporting EV diffusion by parameterizing
and applying our bilevel framework to a relevant real-world case study. We
begin by explaining the parameterization, then analyze the case study results
to derive insights for BEV incentive policies, and finally compare our solution
strategy developed in Section 4.4 to solving the original, possibly non-convex
QP using an off-the-shelf solver.
4.5.1 Parameterization
In this case study, the infrastructure-dependent technology under consid-
eration is the battery electric vehicle (BEV) and the associated infrastructure
is the Level II AC public charging point, the most common public charging
technology at present. The geographic scope of our case study is the entirety of
the United States, and so the policymaker is understood to make her decisions
based on national costs and benefits.
The policymaker’s objective function in Eq. (4.5) specifies that the benefit
of the implemented technology policy is proportional to the number of BEV
adopters it results in, as captured by the α parameter. In this parameteri-
zation, α represents the incremental benefit (due to reduced GHG emissions)
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when a BEV is purchased instead of a conventional internal combustion engine
vehicle (ICEV). In Table 4.1, we calculate α as the social cost of carbon at
$50/tonne CO2 multiplied by the difference in CO2 emissions between the
ICEV and BEV, over their lifetimes, assuming standard efficiencies, vehicle
lifetimes, and annual vehicle miles traveled.3 In this calculation, we include
upstream electricity generation emissions for the BEV, based on the average
carbon intensity of electricity generation in the U.S. Thus, in our parame-
terization, α = $1549.44; i.e., the social climate benefit generated by the
adoption of one BEV instead of one ICEV is worth approximately $1550. The
number of innovator adopters, or those who will adopt the BEV technology
even if there were neither an adoption subsidy nor infrastructure subsidy, is
parameterized at 2.5% of the pool of potential adopters n, taken here to mean
the approximate number of new light-duty vehicle (LDV) annual sales in the
U.S. (approximately 17.2 million); i.e., K = 431, 856. This slice of the pool of
potential adopters is consistent with the Rogers (1962) adopter classification
and has been used in other numerical analyses of electric vehicle adoption (e.g.,
see Priessner et al. (2018)). As a reference point, BEVs enjoyed approximately
2% market share in the U.S. in 2018 (EVAdoption, 2019).
Since our model depicts only one type of infrastructure, we assume that
the charging points are of the Level II AC public charger type, which typically
have a power rating of 3.6 kW. Schroeder and Traber (2012) provide a rich
accounting of the economics of electric vehicle chargers, from which we have
arrived at a standard cost of approximately $5500 per charger4, which is typical
3While the scope of our case study is at the U.S. national level, the social cost of carbon
used to parameterize α is a global estimate.
4Strictly speaking, the $5500 cost per charger is a market price, rather than a true cost.
Due to the relatively young market for charging points and the dearth of data, we have not
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across a variety of sources. Indeed, Level II AC chargers are likely to be the
prevailing technology for charging point infrastructure over the next decade
(IEA, 2019).
To determine potential adopters’ sensitivity to adoption subsidies (βc) and
the availability of charging points (βb), we use the linear regression results
obtained by Sierzchula et al. (2014). Their study examines the relationship
between BEV market share and a number of socioeconomic factors expected
to be influential determinants of BEV market share in 30 national markets
in 2012, including financial incentives (registration and circulation subsidies);
the number of charging points corrected for population; national differences in
environmentalism; gasoline, diesel, and electricity prices; urban density; and
several others. The authors conclude that financial incentives and availability
of charging infrastructure were the only statistically significant predictors of
BEV market share at the p < 0.05 level.5 The model specification is log-linear,
in which the dependent variable, BEV market share, is log-transformed; the
independent variables are linearly specified. They find that a $1000 increase
in financial incentives would cause a country’s BEV market share to increase
by 0.06%, and each additional charging station per 100,000 residents would
increase BEV market share by 0.12%. In Table 4.1, we use these regression
coefficients to calculate the adoption parameters βc and βb, which require us
to also define the population size N . We find that βc = 10.36 and βb = 5.92.
In other words, an additional dollar of adoption subsidy promised to potential
been able to find reliable estimates for the latter.
5The regression has an R2 of 0.792 and the data point for the United States is not an
outlier. Further, in a model sensitivity test, the authors remove both the financial incentives
and the availability of charging points independent variables and find that the model loses
most of its explanatory power.
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adopters results in approximately 10 additional adopters and an additional
charging point results in approximately 6 additional adopters.
Finally, it remains to parameterize a and b. Parameters a and b appear in





effects can be intuited through it. For example, an additional charging point
built will decrease the market price by b−βb
a
, the slope of the demand curve.
Additionally, the price intercept if πA = 0 is
K
a
. For the same reason that
we are unable to find reliable estimates for the true cost of charging points,
parameterizing this demand function, and thus obtaining precise estimates for
a and b, is difficult. To generate insights for the BEV case study, and to explore
possible non-convexity, we fix a = 100 and explore the optimal solution for
b = 10 and b = 50. Thus, an additional charging point will lower the market
price by b−βb
a
= $0.04 in the case b = 10 or by $0.44 in the case b = 50, reflecting
different market conditions for the infrastructure firm. In the following section,
we explore the sensitivity of the optimal solution for a variety of b, K, and
social cost of carbon (SCC) estimates. Naturally, using our bilevel model to
inform real technology policy decision making is parameterization-dependent,
and many of the parameter estimates given in Table 4.1 could be argued. In
that sense, this case study is meant to demonstrate and complement the core
contribution of this chapter: a stylized cost-benefit model of infrastructure-
dependent technology adoption and supporting policies. While it is beyond
the scope of this chapter, an in-depth study estimating the model’s parameters
and performing broad sensitivity analyses would certainly be a valuable step
toward using our analytical model to make precise policy recommendations.
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Parameter Value Data Source Notes
[1] Social cost of
carbon
50 [$/tonne CO2] RFF (2019) Global SCC at 3% discount










0.3 [kWh/mile] DOE (2020) Typical efficiency - Nissan Leaf,




0.000404 [tonne/mile] EPA (2018)








1522 [$/kW] Schroeder and
Traber (2012)













[9] Market size (n) 17,274,250 [LDVs] MarkLines
(2019)
2018 U.S. Sales Volume of





2.5% Priessner et al.
(2018), Rogers
(1962)
In 2018, U.S. BEV market
share was 1.95% (EVAdoption,
2019)
K 431,856 [Adopters] Calculated: [9]*[10]












b 50 Varied in analysis
Table 4.1. Table of parameters for the case study on BEV diffusion. The data
in numbered rows are used in calculations to estimate the model’s parameters,
given in bold.
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4.5.2 Case study solutions
In addition to presenting the solution to the BEV case study with the
unique parameterization given in Table 4.1, we also explore several other
parameterizations by varying those parameters which we believe to be subject
to the most uncertainty. First, we consider b = 10 and b = 50 as described
above to explore not only different market conditions for the infrastructure
firm, but also solution times to optimality, since for each of the instances
solved with b = 10, the optimization problem is non-convex, and for each of
the instances solved with b = 50, the optimization problem is convex. Second,
we consider three levels of K (1000, 431,856, and 1,000,000), for which it is
difficult to obtain robust estimates. And third, we consider two SCC estimates,
$50/tonne and $75/tonne, which respectively assume 3% and 2.5% discount
rates (RFF, 2019). In Table 4.2, we present the optimal solutions for the 12
cases generated by varying the parameters discussed above. For each set (b,
K, SCC), we report the optimal subsidies for adoption (π∗A) and infrastructure
investment (π∗I ), the optimal objective value z
∗, the level of infrastructure
provision y∗(πA, πI), and the number of adopters x(πA, y).
We begin our discussion with the case b = 50, and in particular the solution
for the case study parameterization [9], which is in bold in Table 4.2. Our
model’s technology policy recommendation is to provide zero adoption subsidy
and a $5167 infrastructure subsidy to the firm, reducing its per-unit production
cost to $312. Approximately 4544 charging points are built, leading to 458,757
BEV adopters. That is, the technology policy generates 26,901 additional
adopters beyond those innovator adopters K, with net positive social benefits
worth approximately $687 million. Indeed, in this case, the resolution of
the chicken-and-egg problem is that the policymaker supports infrastructure
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Case b K SCC π∗A π
∗
I z
∗ y∗(πA, πI) x(πA, y)
[1] 10 1000 $50 $532 $5479 $7,059,205 798 11,233
[2] 10 1000 $75 $919 $5479 $18,444,257 1290 18,158
[3] 10 431,856 $50 $0 $5167 $865,803,445 49,093 722,489
[4] 10 431,856 $75 $0 $5479 $1,441,898,846 52,924 745,163
[5] 10 1,000,000 $50 $0 $2326 $2,123,922,137 83,906 1,496,724
[6] 10 1,000,000 $75 $0 $4619 $3,347,907,411 112,009 1,663,091
[7] 50 1000 $50 $726 – $7,016,821 0 8526
[8] 50 1000 $75 $1085 $5479 $15,425,825 139 13,059
[9] 50 431,856 $50 $0 $5167 $687,337,949 4544 458,757
[10] 50 431,856 $75 $0 $5479 $1,044,260,785 4899 460,855
[11] 50 1,000,000 $50 $0 $2326 $1,602,612,449 7766 1,045,976
[12] 50 1,000,000 $75 $0 $4619 $2,418,915,470 10,367 1,061,375
Table 4.2. Optimal solutions for varied b, K, and SCC (which affects α)
parameters. The bold case [9] is the solution to the parameterization given in
Table 4.1. A dash in the π∗I column reflects the idea that if y
∗(πA, πI) = 0,
decision variable πI has no bearing on the optimal solution.
provision but not adoption. We hypothesize that no adoption subsidy is
provided because the large number of innovator adopters implies that the total
adoption policy cost would ex-ante exceed the benefits. Instead, policy funds
are more valuable if directed toward the infrastructure firm. Because π∗A = 0,
the policymaker is not “double-charged” for the infrastructure policy, for
otherwise she would pay the direct cost yπI and the indirect cost βbyπA, since
y increases with πI and πA. If the SCC increases to $75/tonne, as in case [10],
this effect is only amplified: more benefits are on the table for the same number
of adopters, and so the policymaker incurs a greater infrastructure policy cost
to generate additional adopters, effectively subsidizing the entire investment
cost of infrastructure provision. This “double-charging” effect is so strong
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that it is not until the SCC reaches $1350 that the solution actually changes,
and it becomes optimal for the policymaker to activate adoption subsidies in
addition to the infrastructure subsidy. Figure 4.3 illustrates the magnitude
of this “double-charging” effect. Indeed, while the policymaker’s objective
function value remains relatively flat along the πI dimension, increases in πA
lead to this double-charging effect, rapidly decreasing the objective value. For
example, in Figure 4.3, feasible policy allocations on the red line are within 25%
of optimality, indicating a very steep objective function in the πA dimension.
As a matter of technology policy design, suboptimal policy allocations can
carry considerable consequences. Intuitively, in this case, the large number
of innovator adopters K means any positive adoption subsidy πA induces
significant costs without corresponding benefits. In general, we attribute this
steepness to the linearly specified functional forms.
In cases [11] and [12], the number of innovator adopters K is considerably
larger at 1 million, or about 6% of the pool of potential adopters. Here,
the infrastructure subsidy is smaller because the higher number of innovator
adopters drives up infrastructure provision, which increases the total infras-
tructure policy cost. With respect to the SCC, the same double-charging
effect holds. On the other hand, in cases [7] and [8], when K is very low,
the firm faces considerably difficult market conditions: prices drop steeply
and it cannot count on innovator adopters alone to constitute the demand for
infrastructure provision. In case [7], a modest adoption subsidy is provided,
but the firm does not invest in any infrastructure. Between cases [7] and
[8], as the SCC increases, so does the policymaker’s motivation to raise the
number of adopters. First, this is achieved by increasing the adoption subsidy.
However, the firm’s optimal response depends on the adoption subsidy, and
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Figure 4.3. Contour map of the policymaker’s feasible region in case [9].
The optimal solution is denoted by the asterisk at (πA,πI) = (0,5167), and the
black and red lines are optimality thresholds, denoting solutions within 10%
and 25% of optimality, respectively.
when it becomes high enough at an SCC of $56/tonne, the firm supplies a
positive quantity of infrastructure. A noteworthy phenomenon occurs between
SCC values of $55/tonne to $56/tonne: the adoption subsidy increases and
reaches a maximum at $55/tonne, where the infrastructure provision is still
zero. At $56/tonne, the adoption subsidy falls from its $55/tonne level and
infrastructure provision becomes positive. Thereafter, as the SCC increases,
so too do the adoption subsidy and infrastructure provision. Intuitively, the
policymaker knows when the firm will supply positive infrastructure. At this
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point, she can now completely incentivize the firm and further increase net
benefits of the policy as long as she slightly reduces her adoption subsidy.
For the case b = 10, we uncover similar insights. First, a large number of
innovator adopters implies that technology policy should focus on incentivizing
infrastructure provision, not adoption directly. Once the infrastructure subsidy
reaches its limit, and further policy is spurred by a higher SCC, the adoption
subsidy increases. In cases [1] and [2], the double-charging threshold has
already been passed, and the adoption subsidy is positive and increases with
the SCC. With higher K, we again see that a larger and larger SCC is necessary
for it to be optimal to choose a positive adoption subsidy.
From the cases above, we can summarize the insights we glean on the
chicken-and-egg problem. First, a large number of innovator adopters makes
it suboptimal to offer an adoption subsidy; public funds are better spent
supporting the associated infrastructure investment. Second, while public
funds are better spent supporting the associated infrastructure, higher marginal
social benefit with respect to the number of adopters (e.g., due to a higher SCC
estimate) should eventually induce the policymaker to additionally provide
an adoption subsidy. And third, under a combination of a small number of
innovator adopters and unfavorable market conditions for the infrastructure
firm, the policymaker should exclusively provide adoption subsidies. As the
marginal social benefit for each additional adopter increases (as is the case
with an increasing SCC), the policymaker should raise her adoption subsidy
until it becomes optimal for the firm to invest positively in infrastructure, at
which point the policymaker “corrects” her choice by lowering the adoption
subsidy and applying a positive infrastructure subsidy.
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4.5.3 Comparison of solution methods
In this subsection, we demonstrate the application of the custom solution
strategy developed in Section 4.4 to our BEV case study, and compare its
performance to an off-the-shelf solver applied directly to the original, possibly
non-convex QP reformulation from Eq. (4.8).
Figure 4.4. Illustration of the solution strategy. Panel A is an instance of
case [9] and Panel B is an instance of case [8]. The light, dotted black lines
indicate the bounds of the feasible regions.
We begin with an illustration of the the solution strategy developed in
Section 4.4, which reduces the solution search space of the quadratic model
and circumvents possible non-convexity by solving the four single-variable QPs
called A1, A2, B1, and B2. In Figure 4.4, we visualize the one-dimensional
subsets of the feasible region that are explored by the decomposition programs.
Figure 4.4A is an instance of case [9] and Figure 4.4B is an instance of case [8].
In case [9], both the B1 and B2 programs are infeasible, and so the solution




πI ≤ c− Ka . In other words, the solution strategy explores only where πA = 0
or y∗(πA, πI) = 0. For case [8], both the A1 and A2 programs are infeasible,
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[1] 10 1000 $50 No 0.04717445 0.01641188
[2] 10 1000 $75 No 0.03520974 0.01276198
[3] 10 431,856 $50 No 0.02907454 0.02420106
[4] 10 431,856 $75 No 0.02922226 0.02431191
[5] 10 1,000,000 $50 No 0.01318080 0.01197627
[6] 10 1,000,000 $75 No 0.01348885 0.01190357
[7] 50 1000 $50 Yes 0.03580216 0.02509426
[8] 50 1000 $75 Yes 0.02962216 0.02388696
[9] 50 431,856 $50 Yes 0.03180345 0.02417662
[10] 50 431,856 $75 Yes 0.03032642 0.02386467
[11] 50 1,000,000 $50 Yes 0.01334619 0.01185480
[12] 50 1,000,000 $75 Yes 0.01322027 0.01185028
Table 4.3. Performance comparison of solution strategies for varied b, K, and
SCC parameters. Solution times (in seconds) are averages over 1000 trials.
and the solution strategy searches only along the inducement threshold line
and interior solutions from this line to the upper bound πI = c.
Practically, we would like to understand whether our custom solution
strategy outperforms applying an off-the-shelf solver directly to the original,
possibly non-convex QP. As a comparison, we test our strategy against Gurobi
9.0’s quadratic programming solver. If the resulting model is indeed non-
convex, then Gurobi applies a branch-and-bound technique to arrive at global
optimality; otherwise, a barrier method is used. It turns out that Gurobi and
our custom strategy return the same optimal solutions for all parameteriza-
tions, so the relevant outcomes for the comparison are their respective solution
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times required to determine the global maximum.
In Table 4.3, we list average solution times (over 1000 trials) for the 12
cases defined above and report whether or not the instance is convex. The
solution times (in seconds) are reported in the last two columns, and the time
for the faster method is displayed in bold. We see that our custom solution
strategy outperforms Gurobi for all the convex and non-convex instances. This
brief comparison suggests that our decomposition strategy is a compelling
alternative to directly solving the two-variable QP. Our technology policy
problem in this chapter is very small, so the choice between these two methods
is more of an intellectual exercise than a practical necessity. Nevertheless, the
performance gains from using our solution approach could be important for
larger problems with a similar structure.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter makes fundamental advances in modeling and understanding
how a policymaker should design incentives to overcome the chicken-and-egg
problem of infrastructure-dependent technology diffusion. While this chapter
is primarily a theoretical contribution that develops a stylized model capable of
yielding analytical insights, the practical importance of understanding these
processes is tremendous. For instance, research suggests that the looming
threat of climate change may be mitigated by realizing the widespread adop-
tion of clean technologies in the transportation and electricity sectors. The
BEV, which requires a system of charging infrastructure to compete with
ICEVs, and wind and solar PV generation, which require substantial energy
storage to displace fossil fuel plants on a massive scale, are touted as possible
solutions to climate change. Therefore, a policymaker must consider not only
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the core technology, but also the associated system of infrastructure required
to support it and make it attractive to potential adopters.
In this chapter, we have presented a stylized model of technology policy
decision making from the perspective of a policymaker who seeks to stimulate
the market penetration of an infrastructure-dependent technology. Our model
is a bilevel optimization problem in which a policymaker (leader) maximizes
net social benefits by setting the levels of two incentives: a subsidy for a profit-
maximizing firm (follower) to invest in infrastructure that raises the benefit
of adoption to consumers, and a direct subsidy for consumers to adopt the
technology. We have analytically derived the firm’s optimal infrastructure
investment response to the upper-level policy decisions, and shown that the
bilevel model is equivalent to a quadratic program. To bypass non-convexity,
we developed a custom solution strategy based on decomposition, and found
that it performs better than directly applying an off-the-shelf solver to the
potentially non-convex problem. Finally, we applied our bilevel framework
to a case study on the diffusion of BEVs and obtained insights into how a
policymaker should allocate resources to charging infrastructure and vehicle
incentives. The case study results certainly suggest that U.S. BEV incentives
would likely be more effective if some public funding were shifted from vehicle
subsidies to charging infrastructure subsidies, although this conclusion cannot
be asserted with complete confidence given the lack of data on the market for
use of charging points, among other factors.
As with any theoretical modeling effort structured to yield analytical
insights, we had to make some simplifying assumptions in order to preserve
tractability. These limitations were summarized above at the end of Section
4.3.3. Despite these simplifications, we have contributed a fresh model of
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infrastructure-dependent technology adoption and the chicken-and-egg problem
to the operations research literature, and demonstrated the benefits of using
a custom solution strategy to solve it. The model itself is our most significant
contribution.
Future research should attempt to extend our model in several valuable
directions. The deterministic model could be turned into a stochastic one
to capture uncertainty on several levels. In reality, the policymaker does
not generally know the parameters of the infrastructure firm’s problem with
certainty, and the adoption level resulting from adoption subsidy and infras-
tructure provision decisions depends on consumer behavior and other factors
which are impossible to predict. Similarly, our static model could be extended
to multiple time periods to investigate whether the optimal subsidy portfolio
varies over time to emphasize different instruments at different times. Instead
of having just one infrastructure firm, the lower level could have multiple
infrastructure firms competing with one another, which could be handled
through a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). To
address another noted limitation of the model, some of the functions which we
implicitly assume are linear (e.g., the policymaker’s objective, the adoption
function) could be generalized to allow for more empirically realistic forms.
However, all of these extensions would add considerable complexity to the
framework, thus likely coming at the expense of analytical tractability and the
ability to parameterize case studies using regression results from the literature.
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The goal of this dissertation is to advance the operations research modeling
of technology transitions and the role of policy support. Through a variety of
powerful operations research methodologies and relevant case studies, the indi-
vidual projects in this dissertation offer novel models of technology transitions
and insights into real-world technology policy.
The three projects of this dissertation employ distinct operations research
methods to model technology transitions and the role of policy support. Chapter
2 describes the development of an urban-scale energy system optimization
model. This work prompted a number of research questions concerning tech-
nology transitions that motivated the more fundamental, stylized models devel-
oped in Chapter 3. And, finally, in Chapter 4, our focus on technology
transition models narrows with the development of a stylized model of optimal
technology policy decision making for infrastructure-dependent technologies.
For each modeling development, we also presented a case study to illustrate
how our models could be used in real-world technology policy decision making.
In this concluding chapter, we first summarize our key findings and contri-
butions, then elaborate on future research directions to advance the under-
standing of technology transitions and the role of policy support.
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5.1 Summary of contributions and findings
Chapter 2 addresses the growing importance of cities in climate change
mitigation with the development of an energy system optimization model for
urban-scale decarbonization. Our optimization model determines the least-
cost power and transportation technology pathways to achieve a policy goal
of net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions and is used to analyze the Community
Climate Plan adopted by Austin, Texas. Our approach to energy system
optimization is novel in that we are able to capture the synergies between power
and transportation. The power and transportation sectors are the two largest
GHG emitters in the U.S., accounting for 28% and 29% of total emissions,
respectively (EPA, 2017b), and evidence suggests that these shares are even
higher in urban areas. Any serious effort to decarbonize cities will therefore
require monumental changes in how we generate electricity and travel from
place to place. At present, transportation and power are largely decoupled,
at least in the U.S. Petroleum products dominate the fuel mix of the former,
but have been almost completely phased out of the latter. This situation is
likely to change in the future as transportation shifts to alternative fuels that
are more closely linked to the power sector, especially under climate policies
(Anandarajah et al., 2013; Bosetti and Longden, 2013; Edelenbosch et al.,
2017; Pietzcker et al., 2014). Amid this trend, powerful synergies will emerge
whereby mitigation activities in power and transportation mutually enhance
one another. We design our model to leverage these synergies while optimizing
decarbonization pathways.
We find that the ACCP increases net present power and transportation
costs by 2.7% relative to business-as-usual. This economic impact is not
trivial, but it does demonstrate that even the particularly ambitious net-
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zero emissions by 2050 goal can be achieved at modest cost. The optimal
decarbonization pathway consists of two sequential stages: the power sector is
decarbonized first, then the focus shifts to transportation. The ACCP hastens
the elimination of coal from the power sector, initially through substitution
by natural gas, but increasingly via the expansion of renewables. Solar PV
actually comprises a majority of the 2050 generation mix even in the absence
of climate policy, based on optimistic cost projections alone. The primary
long-run impact of the ACCP on electricity is the replacement of natural
gas with wind, which is an effective complement to solar PV under high
renewable penetration due to their contrasting temporal profiles (wind at
night, solar PV during the day). Once electricity decarbonizes, private trans-
portation transitions to electric vehicles, which are less costly in these later
years. Capital cost differentials between carbon-free and conventional options
are more extreme in public transportation, which is therefore insensitive to the
policy context, even under a scenario of significant modal shift from private
to public transportation. Intelligent and coordinated scheduling of battery
electricity storage and electric vehicle charging play important roles in the
low-carbon transition. Battery storage charges during the daytime when solar
PV is abundant and discharges at night when solar PV is unavailable. Optimal
electric vehicle charging also occurs during the daytime to align with solar PV
availability, which implies that making charging infrastructure available at
workplaces would provide substantial system-wide value. Our model does not
select V2G or hydrogen technologies in its optimal decarbonization pathways.
Energy system optimization models, while case- and parameterization-
specific, remain valuable tools for designing intelligent technology policy. For
example, our transformation pathways offered what could be promising tran-
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sition fuels and provided insights into how intermittent renewable energy
sources could be managed with energy storage technologies and synergistic
electric vehicle charging schedules. By design and due to methodological limi-
tations, our optimization framework does not capture other drivers of adoption
besides cost considerations that arise from complex phenomena that exist in
technology transitions. Indeed, while an energy system optimization model
assumes that a technology transition will occur as long as a new technology
becomes cost-effective, we know from empirical observations that there are a
number of market failures that can hinder the diffusion of a technology even
after it becomes economically competitive.
Addressing this issue required taking a step back and examining the first
principles behind the processes of technology adoption and diffusion that drive
technology transitions. In Chapter 3, we built on earlier theoretical operations
research and economic models of technology adoption and diffusion to incor-
porate a policy decision maker. We determined that classic Markov stochastic
processes were strong candidates for modeling a technology transition, with
states representing stages of the diffusion process and a transition probability
matrix engendering the uncertainty in success of the technology transition.
Furthermore, decision making capabilities within the stochastic process could
simulate policy intervention: policy intervention could map to a different
transition probability matrix.
The first model is a Markov reward process (MRP) that represents policy
interventions with one-time, upfront costs, while the second model is a Markov
decision process (MDP) that describes policy interventions with recurring
costs. The distinction is important and applies to different policy instruments.
For example, R&D investment which permanently enhances the performance
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of a technology is well aligned with the persistent effect of the one-time invest-
ment in the MRP, whereas an adoption subsidy during a particular phase of the
technology life cycle corresponds better to the recurrent cost accounting of the
MDP. We derived analytical expressions for the willingness to pay (WTP) for
policy interventions that improve the probabilities of the technology diffusion
or development process advancing at various stages. We then analytically
established key similarities and differences between the two models. Next, we
numerically solved the most general MDP model to explore how the optimal
technology policy portfolio varies over the input parameter space. Finally, we
applied the MDP model to a case study on the development of lithium-ion
batteries for electric vehicles, based on expert elicitations.
In terms of the specific results we obtained, the MRP and MDP models
demonstrate some intuitive similarities. WTPs vary linearly with the rewards.
They always increase with respect to the reward for being in the complete
diffusion stage, but the WTP for policy intervention in the intermediate stage
can decrease with the reward obtained in this stage since this reward makes
completing the diffusion process less urgent. As the status-quo probability of
the diffusion process advancing from a stage declines toward zero, the WTP
for policy targeting this stage increases more and more steeply.
The possibility of regressing from the intermediate stage back to the initial
stage has a substantial impact on the behaviors of both models, and carries
important policy implications. In general, this possibility makes policy inter-
vention less valuable in the initial stage but more valuable in the intermediate
stage. With a danger of regressing from the intermediate stage back to the
initial stage, the policymaker has a higher WTP to raise the probability that
the diffusion process will advance from the intermediate stage to the complete
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diffusion stage. The numerical results reveal that the presence of the regressive
transition in the MDP model makes policy intervention in the intermediate
stage an important complement to earlier intervention in the initial stage.
Without the former, the latter could incur policy costs repeatedly as the
process makes it to the intermediate stage only to return to where it began.
In fact, under certain circumstances, the policymaker would even be willing
to pay for an intervention that actually reduces the probability of advancing
from the intermediate stage to the complete diffusion stage if it comes with a
sufficiently large reduction in the probability of regressing back to the initial
stage. The possibility of regressing is also a necessary condition for all of the
non-monotonic behaviors we uncovered.
The structural properties of the MRP and MDP models exhibit a few
notable differences that suggest how policymakers ought to think differently
about technology policy interventions with one-time versus recurring costs.
The most striking difference is that, as the enhanced transition probabilities
that intervention would purchase improve further, the resulting increases in
WTP are subject to diminishing returns in the MRP, but are subject to
constant returns in the MDP. The added value of incremental increases in
the probabilities of advancing do not diminish in the MDP because the desire
to avoid incurring policy costs repeatedly is an additional motivation to move
the diffusion process forward. The same reasoning explains why the MDP is
more powerfully affected by the possibility of a regressive transition than the
MRP is.
Naturally, the Markov models are highly theoretical. While they generate
analytical insights into whether technology policy intervention produces net
benefits, and whether earlier or later stage intervention is superior, they do
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not explicitly represent any actual policy instrument. In other words, the
relationship between policy expenditure and transition probability is a “black
box.” In Chapter 4, however, we do explicitly model infrastructure service and
adoption subsidies, which work to stimulate adoption of an infrastructure-
dependent technology from the supply and demand sides, respectively. Many
technologies in energy, transportation, and telecommunications require large
infrastructure systems to deliver benefits to adopters and society. Policy-
makers seeking to promote the diffusion of infrastructure-dependent tech-
nologies are often confronted with the chicken-and-egg problem: consumers
are reluctant to adopt the technology without adequate infrastructure avail-
able, and firms are reluctant to invest in infrastructure without a sufficient
number of adopters. This chicken-and-egg problem can hinder the diffusion of
new technologies and prolong the timeframe over which existing technological
systems remain locked-in. We formulated a stylized model of technology policy
decision making from the perspective of a policymaker who seeks to stimulate
the market penetration of an infrastructure-dependent technology in order to
overcome the chicken-and-egg problem. Our model is a bilevel optimization
problem in which a policymaker (leader) maximizes net social benefits by
setting the levels of two incentives: a subsidy for a profit-maximizing firm
(follower) to invest in infrastructure that raises the benefit of adoption to
consumers, and a direct subsidy for consumers to adopt the technology. We
analytically derived the firm’s optimal infrastructure investment response to
the upper-level policy decisions, and showed that the bilevel model is equiva-
lent to a quadratic program. To bypass non-convexity, we developed a custom
solution strategy based on decomposition, and found that it performs better
than directly applying an off-the-shelf solver to the potentially non-convex
problem. Finally, we presented a case study on the diffusion of battery electric
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vehicles and obtained insights into how a policymaker should allocate resources
to charging infrastructure and vehicle incentives.
While this project is primarily a theoretical contribution that developed
a stylized model capable of yielding analytical insights, the practical impor-
tance of understanding these processes is tremendous. For instance, research
suggests that the looming threat of climate change may be mitigated by
realizing the widespread adoption of clean technologies in the transporta-
tion and electricity sectors. The BEV, which requires a system of charging
infrastructure to compete with ICEVs, and wind and solar PV generation,
which require substantial energy storage to displace fossil fuel plants on a
massive scale, are touted as possible solutions to climate change. Therefore, a
policymaker must consider not only the core technology, but also the associated
system of infrastructure required to support it and make it attractive to
potential adopters.
In fact, our case study generated a number of insights for real-world tech-
nology policy for battery electric vehicles. First, a large number of innovator
adopters makes it suboptimal to offer an adoption subsidy; public funds are
better spent supporting the associated infrastructure investment. Second,
while public funds are better spent supporting the associated infrastructure,
higher marginal social benefit with respect to the number of adopters (e.g.,
due to a higher SCC estimate) should eventually induce the policymaker to
additionally provide an adoption subsidy. And third, under a combination of
a small number of innovator adopters and unfavorable market conditions for
the infrastructure firm, the policymaker should exclusively provide adoption
subsidies. As the marginal social benefit for each additional adopter increases
(as is the case with an increasing SCC), the policymaker should raise her
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adoption subsidy until it becomes optimal for the firm to invest positively
in infrastructure, at which point the policymaker “corrects” her choice by
lowering the adoption subsidy and applying a positive infrastructure subsidy.
For the remainder of this chapter, we discuss the implications of this
dissertation’s work and describe future research directions.
5.2 Future research directions
The research directions offered in the individual chapters are valuable
extensions that deserve attention: they would address modeling assumptions
and limitations to develop more parsimonious and realistic models of tech-
nology transitions. However, in this chapter, we describe what ought to be a
new paradigm in modeling technology transitions.
In Chapter 1, we described the history of technology transition research,
which can be delineated into two research traditions – the operations research
and economics tradition and the sociology of technology tradition. The former
builds mathematical models of technology adoption and diffusion, while the
latter develops fundamentally qualitative frameworks that identify how socio-
technical transitions occur. We believe that future research must exploit the
insights and organization of the latter to advance the former. Uniting the two
streams of research in this way is certainly an ambitious task, but we believe
that operations research methodologies offer useful modeling frameworks and
tools for advancing the quantitative analysis of technology diffusion processes
and technology policy decision making.
The multi-level perspective of technology transitions purports that the
socio-technical system can be represented by three interacting levels: niches,
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socio-technical regimes, and an exogenous socio-technical landscape (Geels,
2002, 2004). The socio-technical regime is characterized by path-dependence
and lock-in, which are represented in three constituent parts: the socio-technical
system, actors, and rules. Systemic developments in the socio-technical land-
scape are beyond the influence of the regime and are slow to change. When the
existing socio-technical regime is replaced by another, a technology transition
occurs. Radical innovations, i.e., innovations which are incompatible with the
existing socio-technical regime, incubate in niches. In these niches, innovations
enjoy protection from market selection and allow the opportunity for the
innovation to deviate from the “rules” of the regime, experiment, and learn.
Simultaneous pressure on the regime at the landscape level helps induce a
technology transition. In addition to the MLP, other conceptual approaches for
understanding technology transitions include ecological modernization theory,
sociology and social practice theory, and political ecology, each focusing on
different themes with different units of analyses (Sovacool, 2016). Such quali-
tative frameworks offer value to quantitative modeling efforts by systematizing
and organizing a way of thinking broadly about technology transitions.
Nevertheless, some researchers may balk at the idea that such purely
qualitative work has any ability to inform technology policy or contribute
to our understanding of technology transitions. And without a corresponding,
rigorous mathematical treatment and reliable data, their reservations would be
well-founded. However, that does not mean that these frameworks, essentially
an organization or ecology of perceived phenomena, are useless. To combine
the two would be an innovative and daunting project, but it can shed light
on some key research questions and decision making problems that previous
quantitative modeling work has not adequately addressed.
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Seto et al. (2016) identify three types of carbon lock-in: 1) infrastructural
and technological; 2) institutional; and 3) behavioral.1 When folded in to
a qualitative framework like the MLP, these lock-in types suggest the mech-
anisms by which complex and protracted technology transitions can occur.
As a starting point, a policymaker should therefore target those mechanisms.
However, constructing quantitative models of these lock-ins – and their interac-
tions – will be challenging. In the sections below, we specifically identify several
research directions that may begin to chip away at this modeling monolith.
5.2.1 Identification of niches
In the MLP framework, it is hypothesized that technological innovations
incubate in niches, or relatively isolated market segments, where they may
gain enough traction to pose a threat to or to apply substantial pressure on the
locked-in incumbent socio-technical regime (Geels, 2019; Kemp et al., 1998).
Future research could address this hypothesis. Specifically, we would like to
understand how a policymaker can identify an appropriate niche, how she can
support the technology within that niche, and how that support reverberates
throughout the entire socio-technical system. Take, for example, the case of
battery electric vehicles. There are a number of candidate niches where adop-
tion of electric vehicles may be swifter and policy support more effective, than
in the entire market segment of personal land-based transportation. These
include shared autonomous vehicle fleets, public transportation fleets, and
commercial shipping and delivery fleets. Within these niches, we may hypoth-
esize that several barriers to adoption are eliminated or at least diminished.
1We believe this typology is applicable to all socio-technical systems, not just those
responsible for carbon emissions.
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For example, unlike in private vehicle fleets, battery charging times and range
anxiety are less substantive issues, since coordinated fleets are not subject
to individuals’ preferences and so can be centrally planned. Infrastructure
investments can be handled at large scales and in the context of financial
business decisions. Indeed, charging schedules can be optimized around idle
times in the case of shared autonomous vehicles or loading and unloading
times in the case of shipping operations. Furthermore, the most significant
barrier to adoption – behavioral and cultural norms – largely disappear as
well. The issue of directly influencing individuals’ habit-formed behavior and
cultural proclivities is thus circumvented. And, finally, since the ultimate
goal is to stimulate a technology transition, i.e., destabilize the incumbent
socio-technical regime, a policymaker should like to understand how this niche
support reverberates throughout the system. In other words, is policy support
for technologies in niches effective? Economies of scale and learning-by-doing
may emerge from the niche and make personal electric vehicles cost competitive
and comparable in performance to incumbent internal combustion vehicles;
behaviors and cultural norms may change as consumers gain confidence in
their performance and reliability; and charging infrastructure may be more
readily available for immediate consumer use. Identifying such a suitable
niche, deciding on the type and level of policy support, and modeling how
these decisions affect technological change outside of the protected niches
is an optimization problem amenable to operations research methodologies.
Furthermore, such a policy strategy could be compared to traditional policy
instruments that do not directly target niches, thereby generating insights into
real-world technology policy.
183
5.2.2 Escaping behavioral lock-in and modeling challenges
Of the various types of lock-in identified, behavioral lock-in seems to be
the most difficult to surmount. Policymakers cannot apply standard policy
instruments to influence deeply entrenched behavior and may even fear the
controversy of attempting to do so. It nevertheless remains a transition bottle-
neck, especially when the transition desired involves substantial consumer-led
technology adoption. Furthermore, building a model of technology transitions
that incorporates human behavior and decision making is already controver-
sial since modelers may fundamentally disagree on why individuals make the
decisions they do, and how that decision making should be modeled in the
first place. Take, for example, the case of the energy efficiency gap, which
describes the slow uptake of energy efficient technologies that occurs, despite
their purported superiority in the long run. There is a gap between the realized
diffusion rate and that which would result should rational positive net present
value investments be the decision paradigm. Behavioral economists suggest
that a policy approach of libertarian paternalism could lead to better decision
making while not ex-ante eliminating alternatives or distorting economic incen-
tives (Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). Indeed, behavioral economists believe
that these suboptimal choices are not due to lack of information but instead
due to confounding preferences, decision heuristics, and social interactions
(Seto et al., 2016). This approach consists of “nudges”, a re-framing or re-
contextualization of decision alternatives, that may lead to “better” decisions.
Implementing nudges to escape behavioral lock-in essentially involves a schema
of non-financial policy instruments, which are largely unexplored in the tech-
nology transitions literature. It is worthwhile to study how non-financial
policy instruments, in addition to, or in lieu of financial policy instruments
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could stimulate a technology transition. In the section above, we suggested
that innovation in niches could spill-over to consumers, influencing their tech-
nology adoption decisions without direct economic incentive. How does this
happen, and if it does, how could a policymaker take advantage of that positive
feedback? We suggest that technology transition models deserve a stronger
representation of behavioral lock-in that would indicate how policy efforts
could reverse habit-formed and socially ingrained decision biases and failures.
5.2.3 Technology leap-frogging
In terms of long-term, global climate change mitigation efforts, researchers
have their eye on developing countries. Developing countries largely operate
on primitive primary energy sources, have large populations, and if historical
energy transitions are any indication, their transition to cleaner, more sustain-
able primary energy sources that we currently see in developed economies
entails a dangerous commitment of GHG emissions. Technological leap-frogging,
or the concept that such developing economies could skip over historical energy
transitions and accelerate into sustainable energy systems, is touted as a solu-
tion to rapid global decarbonization. Indeed, leap-frogging has the potential to
avoid the infrastructural and institutional carbon lock-ins, while contributing
to climate change mitigation, and offering substantial improvements in economic
productivity and quality of life. Unfortunately, however, inducing technolog-
ical leap-frogging is not at all straightforward. First, as is the case globally,
sustainable energy technologies remain somewhat cost-prohibitive. Even if,
for example, the net present value of investment in a natural-gas fired power
plant exceeds that of a coal fired power plant, credit may not be available and
infrastructure may not be in place to commit to that investment. In relatively
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poor communities without reliable electricity or heating and cooling, carbon
intensity is not the first priority. Furthermore, endogenous changes in energy
demands complicates the matter. Using a technology transition model to
explore how leap-frogging could occur entails modeling the interactions among
the various lock-in types.
Above all, we believe the advances described in this dissertation represent
a fundamental stepping-stone to this new paradigm of technology transition
modeling. And finally, we are optimistic that such a combination of perspec-
tive and technique could lead to substantially better technology policy deci-
sion making, especially when it will become crucially important. A number
of crucial research questions remain unanswered, and we believe operations
research models can contribute substantive solutions.
5.3 Are these models ready for primetime?
Studying technology transitions is not merely an academic exercise. Indeed,
the current and anticipated consequences of climate change have prompted
researchers from a variety of disciplines to seek to understand how a poli-
cymaker may influence or accelerate a technology transition. Unfortunately,
technology policy has been fraught with missteps and failures, in part, we
hypothesize, because of the sheer complexity of understanding the processes
by which technology transitions occur.
This dissertation has been written in order to advance the modeling of
technology transitions and the role of policy support. Our models yielded valu-
able insights and have paved the way for ever more creative and parsimonious
modeling approaches. While these models are theoretical, each real-world
case study demonstrates how they can be parameterized with data from other
186
sources and produce intuitive results, validating our modeling approaches.
Further, they have inspired what we believe could be a real paradigm shift
in the modeling. What remains to be answered is: are these models ready for
primetime? That is, do these models have the capability of informing real-
world technology policy? In short, yes, but no work is ever complete. That
is, there will always be an opportunity for more extensions, more complexity,
new methodologies, etc.
We reiterate here that the development of each model in Chapters 2, 3, and
4 was followed by an illustrative case study to demonstrate how our modeling
approach could inform real-world technology policy. These case studies speak
for themselves, but we would never recommend that a policymaker limit her
decision making to the results of any one model. As an example, take the
specific case studies evaluated in this dissertation and suppose a policymaker
wishes to mitigate climate change by using public money to affect technological
change. Each of the three modeling approaches provides a different perspective
and answers different questions, but ultimately complements each other. To
make this point clear, take the diffusion of electric vehicles as an example.
Specifically, the energy system optimization model in Chapter 2 will demon-
strate how the diffusion of electric vehicles might play out vis-a-vis intermittent
renewable electricity generation and battery charging and discharging activity.
The Markov models of Chapter 3 “zoom-in” on the development or diffusion
of electric vehicles to determine how the policymaker should support electric
vehicle development in the face of uncertain R&D outcomes. Finally, the
bilevel optimization model of Chapter 4 explores the relationship between
adoption and infrastructure and optimal policy allocation between different
actors. While the actual numerical results of these case studies are subject
187
to significant limitations and uncertainties, the general findings that emerge
about the technology policy approaches most likely to be effective – and the
contextual factors they most critically depend on – should hold with relatively
high confidence. For example, while we cannot confidently recommend that
the U.S. federal government should offer a subsidy of exactly $5167 per BEV
charging station, we do believe that the results of the case study in Chapter
4 suggest that the government’s policy approach for BEVs should allocate a
greater share of public funds to charging infrastructure deployment than it has
in recent years.
Indeed, as George Box put it, ”all models are wrong, but some are useful.”
In this way, yes, these models have value, but most importantly, they represent






Proofs of propositions in Chapter 3




WTP µMRP = 0 ∀µ ∈ {µ1, µ2, µ12} (A.1)
∂2
∂r23
WTP µMRP = 0 ∀µ ∈ {µ1, µ2, µ12} (A.2)
∂2
∂r22
WTP πMDP = 0 ∀π ∈ {π1, π2} (A.3)
∂2
∂r32
WTP πMDP = 0 ∀π ∈ {π1, π2} (A.4)
















WTP µ2MRP = pδ
(1−δ)(s−s′)−(q′−q)(1−δ+δp)
((1−δ+δq′+δs′)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq′))((1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq))
















> 0 if (1− δ)2(p′ − p) + δ(1− δ)(p′q − pq′)































(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq) > 0 (A.14)
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((1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq))2 < 0 (A.21)
∂2
∂q2
WTP µ12MRP = 2(δ(1− δ) + δ2p)
δp(1−δ+δp)(r3−r2)+δ2psr3










WTP π1MDP > 0 (by inspection of Eq. (B.91)) (A.24)
∂
∂q
WTP π2MDP < 0 (the algebraic quantity is omitted here for space) (A.25)
∂2
∂q2
WTP π2MDP > 0 (the algebraic quantity is omitted here for space)
(A.26)










((1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq))3 < 0 (A.28)
∂
∂s
WTP π2MDP > 0 (the algebraic quantity is omitted here for space) (A.29)
∂2
∂s2
WTP π2MDP < 0 (the algebraic quantity is omitted here for space)
(A.30)
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(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq) > 0 (A.35)
∂2
∂p′2





(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq) > 0 (A.37)
∂2
∂q′2
WTP π2MDP = 0 (A.38)
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5
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WTP µ1MRP = 2δ













































((1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq))3 > 0 (A.42)
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3.6









> 0 if q < A(1−δ+δs+δp
′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δs+δp)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ)+δ2p−A(δ(1−δ)+δ2p′)
= 0 if q = A(1−δ+δs+δp
′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δs+δp)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ)+δ2p−A(δ(1−δ)+δ2p′)















> 0 if p < A(1−δ+δq
′+δs′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ+δq)−Aδ(1−δ+δq′)
and δ(1− δ + δq)− Aδ(1− δ + δq′) < 0
> 0 if p > A(1−δ+δq
′+δs′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ+δq)−Aδ(1−δ+δq′)








WTP π2MDP > 0 if (q
′ − q)(r3 − r2)δ2(1− δ)s+ δ3r3(q′s− qs′)s





WTP π2MDP < 0 if
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Material supplemental to Chapter 3
B.1 Derivation of WTPs in the MRP model
The system of equations that defines the value functions of the MRP
under parameterization µ0 is given in Eq. (B.1). Rewards are received upon
transitions to States 2 and 3. Once this system of equations is solved, we do
not need to repeat the process for the other parameterizations; by symmetry,
we solve all four systems by solving one.

vµ0MRP (1) = pr2 + δ(1− p)v
µ0
MRP (1) + δpv
µ0
MRP (2)
vµ0MRP (2) = (1− q − s)r2 + qr3 + δsv
µ0
MRP (1) + δ(1− q − s)v
µ0
MRP (2) + δqv
µ0
MRP (3)




Via substitution, beginning with vµ0MRP (3), the solution for v
µ0
MRP (1) is
given in Eq. (B.2).
vµ0MRP (1) =
pr2 + δpqr3/(1− δ)
(1− δ + δq + δs)(1− δ) + δp(1− δ + δq)
(B.2)
By exploiting symmetry, we can construct all WTP expressions for param-
eterizations µ1, µ2, and µ12. These are given in Eqs. (B.3–B.5) below.
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We note that all WTPs are non-negative, given the natural conditions
p′ ≥ p, q′ ≥ q, r3 ≥ r2, s ≤ s′, and δ ∈ (0, 1). The corollaries are proven by
setting s = s′ = 0, and then simplifying.
B.2 Comparative statics analysis of WTPs in the MRP
model



















> 0 if q < A(1−δ+δs+δp
′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δs+δp)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ)+δ2p−A(δ(1−δ)+δ2p′)
= 0 if q = A(1−δ+δs+δp
′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δs+δp)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ)+δ2p−A(δ(1−δ)+δ2p′)


























































((1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp′(1−δ+δq))3 < 0 (B.13)
Computing the sign of
∂2
∂q2




WTP µ1MRP = 2δ






































WTP µ1MRP = 0 (B.16)
∂2
∂r23
WTP µ1MRP = 0 (B.17)





























WTP µ1MRP = 2δ
r2(1−δ)+δqr3
(1−δ+δq)(1−δ+δp′)3 > 0 (B.23)
∂2
∂p′2
WTP µ1MRP = (−2δ)
r2(1−δ)+δqr3
(1−δ+δq)(1−δ+δp′)3 < 0 (B.24)
∂2
∂q2
WTP µ1MRP < 0 (by inspection of Eq. (B.20)) (B.25)
∂2
∂r22
WTP µ1MRP = 0 (B.26)
∂2
∂r23
WTP µ1MRP = 0 (B.27)








> 0 if p < A(1−δ+δq
′+δs′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ+δq)−Aδ(1−δ+δq′)
and δ(1− δ + δq)− Aδ(1− δ + δq′) < 0
> 0 if p > A(1−δ+δq
′+δs′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ+δq)−Aδ(1−δ+δq′)





= 0 if p = A(1−δ+δq
′+δs′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ+δq)−Aδ(1−δ+δq′)
< 0 if p > A(1−δ+δq
′+δs′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ+δq)−Aδ(1−δ+δq′)
and δ(1− δ + δq)− Aδ(1− δ + δq′) < 0
< 0 if p < A(1−δ+δq
′+δs′)(1−δ)−(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)
δ(1−δ+δq)−Aδ(1−δ+δq′)






















((1−δ+δq′+δs′)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq′))2 < 0 (B.32)
∂
∂r2
WTP µ2MRP = pδ
(1−δ)(s−s′)−(q′−q)(1−δ+δp)
((1−δ+δq′+δs′)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq′))((1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq))









Computing the sign of
∂2
∂p2





















((1−δ+δq′+δs′)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq′))3 > 0 (B.39)
∂2
∂r′22
WTP µ2MRP = 0 (B.40)
∂2
∂r′23
WTP µ2MRP = 0 (B.41)









































(1−δ+δp)(1−δ+δq′)3 < 0 (B.49)
∂2
∂r22
WTP µ2MRP = 0 (B.50)
∂2
∂r23
WTP µ2MRP = 0 (B.51)







































> 0 if (1− δ)2(p′ − p) + δ(1− δ)(p′q − pq′)


















((1−δ+δq′+δs′)(1−δ)+δp′(1−δ+δq′))3 < 0 (B.61)
∂2
∂q2
WTP µ12MRP = 2(δ(1− δ) + δ2p)
δp(1−δ+δp)(r3−r2)+δ2psr3
((1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq))3 > 0 (B.62)
∂2
∂q′2






WTP µ12MRP = −2δ(1− δ)
pr2δ(1−δ)+δ2pqr3
((1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq))3 < 0 (B.64)
∂2
∂s′2
WTP µ12MRP = 2δ(1− δ)
p′r2δ(1−δ)+δ2p′q′r3




WTP µ12MRP = 0 (B.66)
∂2
∂r23
WTP µ12MRP = 0 (B.67)




























> 0 if (1− δ)2(p′ − p) + δ(1− δ)(p′q − pq′)




























(1−δ+δp′)(1−δ+δq′)3 < 0 (B.77)
∂2
∂r22
WTP µ12MRP = 0 (B.78)
∂2
∂r23
WTP µ12MRP = 0 (B.79)
B.3 Derivation of WTPs in the MDP model
The system of equations that defines the value functions of the MDP
under policy π0 is given in Eq. (B.80). Rewards are received upon transitions
to States 2 and 3.

vπ0MDP (1) = pr2 + δ(1− p)v
π0
MDP (1) + δpv
π0
MDP (2)
vπ0MDP (2) = (1− q − s)r2 + qr3 + δsv
π0
MDP (1) + δ(1− q − s)v
π0
MDP (2) + δqv
π0
MDP (3)




We note that, since no cost is incurred under policy π0, the system of equations
above is essentially the same as the system of equations for policy µ0 in the
MRP model (see Eq. (B.2)). We therefore have
vπ0MDP (1) =
pr2 + δpqr3/(1− δ)
(1− δ + δq + δs)(1− δ) + δp(1− δ + δq)
. (B.81)
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The system of equations that defines the value functions of the MDP under
policy π1 is given in Eq. (B.80).

vπ1MDP (1) = −c
π1
MDP + p
′r2 + δ(1− p′)vπ1MDP (1) + δp′v
π1
MDP (2)
vπ1MDP (2) = (1− q − s)r2 + qr3 + δsv
π0
MDP (1) + δ(1− q − s)v
π0
MDP (2) + δqv
π0
MDP (3)




We solve the system in Eq. (B.82) by substitution, beginning with vπ1MDP (3).
The solution is given in Eq. (B.83).
vπ1MDP (1) =
p′r2 + δp
′qr3/(1− δ)− cπ1MDP (1− δ + δq + δs)
(1− δ + δq + δs)(1− δ) + δp′(1− δ + δq)
(B.83)
We derive WTP π1MDP in Eq. (B.84) below.


















The system of equations that defines the value functions of the MDP under
policy π2 is given in Eq. (B.85).

vπ2MDP (1) = pr2 + δ(1− p)v
π2
MDP (1) + δpv
π2
MDP (2)
vπ2MDP (2) = −c
π2
MDP + (1− q′ − s′)r2 + q′r3 + δs′v
π2
MDP (1) + δ(1− q′ − s′)v
π2
MDP (2) + δq
′vπ2MDP (3)




We solve the system in Eq. (B.85) by substitution, beginning with vπ2MDP (3).





(1− δ + δq′ + δs′)(1− δ) + δp(1− δ + δq′)
(B.86)
We derive WTP π2MDP in Eq. (B.87) below.


















If s = s′ = 0, WTP π2MDP =
(q′−q)(r3−r2)
1−δ+δq .
The system of equations that defines the value functions of the MDP under
policy π12 is given in Eq. (B.88).

vπ12MDP (1) = −c
π12
MDP + p
′r2 + δ(1− p′)vπ12MDP (1) + δp′v
π12
MDP (2)
vπ12MDP (2) = −c
π12
MDP + (1− q′ − s′)r2 + q′r3 + δs′v
π12
MDP (1) + δ(1− q′ − s′)v
π12
MDP (2) + δq
′vπ12MDP (3)




We solve the system in Eq. (B.88) by substitution, beginning with vπ12MDP (3).
The solution is given in Eq. (B.89).
vπ12MDP (1) =
p′r2 + δp
′q′r3/(1− δ)− cπ12MDP (1− δ + δq′ + δs′ + δp′)
(1− δ + δq′ + δs′)(1− δ) + δp′(1− δ + δq′)
(B.89)
We derive WTP π12MDP in Eq. (B.90) below.































(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq) > 0 (B.92)
∂
∂q
WTP π1MDP = (p
′ − p)δ(1− δ) r3(1−δ+δp+δs)−r2(1−δ+δp)
((1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq))2
















(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq) > 0 (B.96)
∂2
∂p2
WTP π1MDP > 0 (by inspection of Eq. (B.91)) (B.97)
∂2
∂p′2











((1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq))3 > 0 (B.100)
∂2
∂r22
WTP π1MDP = 0 (B.101)
∂2
∂r32
WTP π1MDP = 0 (B.102)

























(1−δ+δq)(1−δ+δp) > 0 (B.107)
∂2
∂p2
WTP π1MDP > 0 (by inspection of Eq. (B.103)) (B.108)
∂2
∂p′2






(1−δ+δp)(1−δ+δq)3 < 0 (B.110)
∂2
∂r22
WTP π1MDP = 0 (B.111)
∂2
∂r32
WTP π1MDP = 0 (B.112)
B.3.3 Comparative statics of WTP π2MDP in the general case
∂
∂p
WTP π2MDP > 0 if (q
′ − q)(r3 − r2)δ2(1− δ)s+ δ3r3(q′s− qs′)s











(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq) > 0 (B.115)
∂
∂s




















(1−δ+δq+δs)(1−δ)+δp(1−δ+δq) > 0 (B.119)
∂2
∂p2
WTP π2MDP < 0 if
∂
∂p









WTP π2MDP = 0 (B.122)
∂2
∂s2




WTP π2MDP = 0 (B.124)
∂2
∂r22
WTP π2MDP = 0 (B.125)
∂2
∂r23
WTP π2MDP = 0 (B.126)
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B.3.4 Comparative statics of WTP π2MDP in the special case
∂
∂p

























(1−δ+δq)2 > 0 (B.132)
∂2
∂p2





(1−δ+δq)3 > 0 (B.134)
∂2
∂q′2
WTP π2MDP = 0 (B.135)
∂2
∂r22




WTP π2MDP = 0 (B.137)
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Appendix C
Proofs of propositions in and material
supplemental to Chapter 4
C.1 Coefficients of the objective function in Eq. (4.9)
The coefficients of the objective function of the quadratic program in Eq.
(4.9) are as below,












h4 = αβc +
αβbβc
2(b− βb)




αβba− (K − ac)
2(b− βb)
(C.1e)




C.2 Proofs of propositions
C.2.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
The infrastructure firm’s optimal response y∗(πA, πI) solves,
max
y(πA,πI)≥0









y − (c− πI)y.
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y − (c− πI) = 0,
and the second order condition − b−βb
a
< 0 holds, since b > βb, by assumption.











C.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Follows from Remarks 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. The Hessian matrixH is obtained
by partial differentiation of the upper level objective function of Eq. (4.5),
when −a(c−πI)+βcπA+K
2(b−βb)
is substituted for y. .
C.2.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
A twice continuously differentiable function is convex on a convex set if and
only if the Hessian matrix of second order partial derivatives is negative semi-
definite (Fletcher, 2013, Chapter 10). Next, the Hessian matrix is negative
semi-definite if and only if its eigenvalues are all non-positive (Anthony and



















noting H1 < 0, H2 < 0, and H3 < 0. The eigenvalues λ solve det(H−λI) = 0,













By inspection, λ2 ≤ 0 and λ1 ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ H1 + H3 +
√
(H1 −H3)2 + 4H22 ≤
0 ⇐⇒ 8βcab − 6βbβca ≥ β2ba2 + β2c . The feasible region is convex since it is
defined as the intersection of linear constraints, and so the quadratic program
is convex if and only if 8βcab− 6βbβca ≥ β2ba2 + β2c . .
C.2.4 Proof of Proposition 4.4
C.2.4.1 Program A1
Program A1 is (strictly) convex if and only if the coefficient h1 < 0, which
holds by inspection of Eq. (C.1a) above. The feasible region is the intersection
of linear constraints, so it is convex. .
C.2.4.2 Program A2






0 ⇐⇒ b > βb, which is true by assumption. The feasible region is the
intersection of linear constraints, so it is convex. .
C.2.4.3 Program B1





0 ⇐⇒ 8βcab− 6βbβca > β2ba2 + β2c . The feasible region is the intersection of
linear constraints, so it is convex. .
The solution to maximizing a single variable concave-up quadratic function
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with bound constraints lies at one of the bounds. To show this, we wish to solve
max
x∈X
f(·), where X = {x : l ≤ x ≤ u} 6= ∅ and f(·) is concave-up. Suppose
x ∈ X and without loss of generality suppose f(l) ≥ f(u). We can write x as
a convex combination of the lower and upper bounds as x = λl + (1 − λ)u,
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then, f(x) = f(λl + (1 − λ)u) ≤ λf(l) + (1 − λ)f(u) ≤
λf(l) + (1 − λ)f(l) = f(l), where the first inequality holds by convexity of
f(·) (concave-up) and the second by assumption that f(l) ≥ f(u). That is,
for arbitrary x ∈ X, we always have f(x) ≤ f(l), and l maximizes f(·) over
X. Generally, therefore, the solution to max
x∈X
f(·) is max(f(l), f(u)). .
C.2.4.4 Program B2






0 ⇐⇒ b > βb, which is true by assumption. The feasible region is the
intersection of linear constraints, so it is convex. .
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